--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.svg-2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.svg-2.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'grey'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 128,128,128,255, "50,25", "128,128,128,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 128,128,128,255, "50,25", "128,128,128,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis following the required format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.svg-2.worker.js] [Lines 13-21]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'grey';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 128,128,128,255, "50,25", "128,128,128,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
ctx.fillStyle = 'grey';
ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 128,128,128,255, "50,25", "128,128,128,255");

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') and don't indicate any security fixes. The functionality remains identical, just with a different variable name. There's no evidence of any security vulnerability being addressed in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.source-out.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.source-out.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 0, 0.5)';@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'source-out'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 0, 255, 0.75)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,255,96, "50,25", "0,0,255,96", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,255,96, "50,25", "0,0,255,96", 5); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming) rather than security-related fixes. Here's the analysis following your format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.transparent.source-out.worker.js] [Lines 13-22]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,255,96, "50,25", "0,0,255,96", 5);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,255,96, "50,25", "0,0,255,96", 5);

The changes only involve:
1. Renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the references to this variable in the subsequent code
3. No changes to the actual logic or security-sensitive operations

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-content-box-border-radius-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-content-box-border-radius-001.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#shapes-from-box-values">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-content-box-border-radius-001-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the content-box and border-radius value.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found in this diff. The change simply removes an empty meta "flags" tag which doesn't impact security.

Additional Notes:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag (`<meta name="flags" content="">`) which was likely unnecessary
- This appears to be a minor cleanup change rather than a security fix
- No actual code changes were made that would affect security
- The file is a test case for CSS shape-outside functionality

Since this is just HTML markup cleanup in a test file, there are no security implications to analyze. The change doesn't modify any actual functionality or introduce/remove any security-related features.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.transform.nonfinite.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/transformations/2d.transformation.transform.nonfinite.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ ctx.transform(0, 0, 0, 0, Infinity, Infinity); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(-100, -10, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and consistency updates. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming Consistency Fix [File] [Lines 17-18, 100]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency, and update all references to it. There are no security implications in this change. The test logic remains exactly the same, only the variable name changes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/fetch/Request.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/fetch/Request.cpp@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/WindowContext.h" #include "mozilla/Unused.h"+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+#  include "mozilla/dom/ReadableStreamDefaultReader.h"+#endif+ namespace mozilla::dom { NS_IMPL_ADDREF_INHERITED(Request, FetchBody<Request>)@@ -30,24 +34,32 @@ NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS(Request) NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_BEGIN_INHERITED(Request, FetchBody<Request>)+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mReadableStreamBody)+  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mReadableStreamReader)+#endif   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mOwner)   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mHeaders)   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mSignal)-  AbortFollower::Unlink(static_cast<AbortFollower*>(tmp));   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_PRESERVED_WRAPPER NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_END NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_BEGIN_INHERITED(Request, FetchBody<Request>)+#ifdef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS+  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mReadableStreamBody)+  NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mReadableStreamReader)+#endif   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mOwner)   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mHeaders)   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mSignal)-  AbortFollower::Traverse(static_cast<AbortFollower*>(tmp), cb); NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_END NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_BEGIN_INHERITED(Request, FetchBody<Request>)+#ifndef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_JS_MEMBER_CALLBACK(mReadableStreamBody)   MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(!tmp->mReadableStreamReader);   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_JS_MEMBER_CALLBACK(mReadableStreamReader)+#endif   NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_PRESERVED_WRAPPER NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRACE_END@@ -661,4 +673,9 @@ AbortSignalImpl* Request::GetSignalImpl() const { return mSignal; }+AbortSignalImpl* Request::GetSignalImplToConsumeBody() const {+  // This is a hack, see Response::GetSignalImplToConsumeBody.+  return nullptr;+}+ }  // namespace mozilla::dom

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Memory Leak] [dom/fetch/Request.cpp] [Lines 30-34, 41-45]  
   [Old Code]  
   No explicit cycle collection for mReadableStreamBody and mReadableStreamReader  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Added NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK/TRAVERSE for mReadableStreamBody and mReadableStreamReader under MOZ_DOM_STREAMS  

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential JS Object Leak] [dom/fetch/Request.cpp] [Lines 51-55]  
   [Old Code]  
   Always tracing JS members mReadableStreamBody and mReadableStreamReader  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Wrapped JS member tracing in #ifndef MOZ_DOM_STREAMS block  

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential AbortSignal Handling Issue] [dom/fetch/Request.cpp] [Lines 661-673]  
   [Old Code]  
   Only GetSignalImpl() method existed  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Added GetSignalImplToConsumeBody() method that returns nullptr  

The changes appear to be primarily related to memory management and cycle collection improvements, particularly around ReadableStream objects. While these could potentially address memory leak vulnerabilities, there isn't enough context to definitively identify specific vulnerabilities. The changes seem more like general robustness improvements rather than direct security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-052.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/circle/shape-outside-circle-052.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-circle-052-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by circle(50% at right 40px bottom 40px) value under sideways-lr writing-mode.">   <style>   .container {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="">`
   Fixed Code: (line removed)
   Additional Details: This appears to be a simple cleanup of an empty meta tag, which doesn't represent a security vulnerability. The removal doesn't impact security.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 9]
   Old Code: `<meta name="flags" content="">`
   Fixed Code: (line removed)
   Additional Details: The removed line was an empty flags declaration which had no security implications. This is likely just test metadata cleanup.

Note: The diff shows only the removal of an empty meta tag which served no security purpose. There are no apparent security vulnerabilities being fixed in this change. The modification appears to be related to test file maintenance rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-008.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-008.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ 		<link rel="author" href="http://opera.com" title="Opera Software ASA"> 		<link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-conditional/#at-supports"> 		<link rel="match" href="at-supports-001-ref.html">-		<meta name="flags" content=""> 		<style> 			div { 				background-color:red;

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-conditional/at-supports-008.html] [Lines 6]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
[Line removed]

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- The removal of an empty meta tag doesn't indicate any security vulnerability was fixed
- The change is likely related to test maintenance or code cleanup
- No security-related functionality was modified in this change

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/test/__init__.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/test/__init__.py@@ -121,8 +121,6 @@         Optional("variants"): [str],         # Whether to run this task without any variants applied.         Required("run-without-variant"): optionally_keyed_by("test-platform", bool),-        # Whether the task should run with WebRender enabled or not.-        Optional("webrender"): bool,         # The EC2 instance size to run these tests on.         Required("instance-size"): optionally_keyed_by(             "test-platform", Any("default", "large", "xlarge")@@ -327,15 +325,6 @@         else:             task["allow-software-gl-layers"] = False-        # Enable WebRender by default on the QuantumRender test platforms, since-        # the whole point of QuantumRender is to run with WebRender enabled.-        # This currently matches linux64-qr and windows10-64-qr; both of these-        # have /opt and /debug variants.-        if "-qr/" in task["test-platform"]:-            task["webrender"] = True-        else:-            task.setdefault("webrender", False)-         task.setdefault("try-name", task["test-name"])         task.setdefault("os-groups", [])         task.setdefault("run-as-administrator", False)

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Removed WebRender configuration option] [taskcluster/gecko_taskgraph/transforms/test/__init__.py] [Lines 121-123, 327-335]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```python
   # Whether the task should run with WebRender enabled or not.
   Optional("webrender"): bool,
   ...
   # Enable WebRender by default on the QuantumRender test platforms, since
   # the whole point of QuantumRender is to run with WebRender enabled.
   # This currently matches linux64-qr and windows10-64-qr; both of these
   # have /opt and /debug variants.
   if "-qr/" in task["test-platform"]:
       task["webrender"] = True
   else:
       task.setdefault("webrender", False)
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   (This configuration was completely removed)

Note: While the removal of WebRender configuration might be related to security hardening, there isn't enough context to determine if this was specifically fixing a vulnerability or just a feature removal/refactoring. The change appears to be removing a rendering-related configuration option, but without more context about why it was removed, we can't definitively say whether it was addressing a security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/newtab/test/browser/browser_aboutwelcome_rtamo.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/newtab/test/browser/browser_aboutwelcome_rtamo.js@@ -10,19 +10,23 @@   "resource://testing-common/NimbusTestUtils.jsm" );-add_task(function setup() {-  let sandbox = sinon.createSandbox();--  sandbox-    .stub(AddonRepository, "getAddonsByIDs")-    .resolves([-      { sourceURI: { scheme: "https", spec: "https://test.xpi" }, icons: {} },-    ]);--  registerCleanupFunction(() => {-    sandbox.restore();-  });-});+const TEST_ADDON_INFO = [+  {+    name: "Test Add-on",+    sourceURI: { scheme: "https", spec: "https://test.xpi" },+    icons: { 32: "test.png", 64: "test.png" },+    type: "extension",+  },+];++const TEST_ADDON_INFO_THEME = [+  {+    name: "Test Add-on",+    sourceURI: { scheme: "https", spec: "https://test.xpi" },+    icons: { 32: "test.png", 64: "test.png" },+    type: "theme",+  },+]; async function openRTAMOWelcomePage() {   // Can't properly stub the child/parent actors so instead@@ -120,6 +124,9 @@  * Test the RTAMO welcome UI  */ add_task(async function test_rtamo_aboutwelcome() {+  let sandbox = sinon.createSandbox();+  sandbox.stub(AddonRepository, "getAddonsByIDs").resolves(TEST_ADDON_INFO);+   let browser = await openRTAMOWelcomePage();   await test_screen_content(@@ -128,11 +135,10 @@     // Expected selectors:     [       "div.onboardingContainer",-      "div.brand-logo",       "h2[data-l10n-id='return-to-amo-addon-title']",-      "img[data-l10n-name='icon']",-      "button.primary",-      "button.secondary",+      "div.rtamo-icon",+      "button.primary[data-l10n-id='return-to-amo-add-extension-label']",+      "button[data-l10n-id='onboarding-not-now-button-label']",     ],     // Unexpected selectors:     [@@ -143,16 +149,19 @@     ]   );-  await onButtonClick(browser, "button.secondary");+  await onButtonClick(+    browser,+    "button[data-l10n-id='onboarding-not-now-button-label']"+  );   Assert.ok(gURLBar.focused, "Focus should be on awesome bar");   let windowGlobalParent = browser.browsingContext.currentWindowGlobal;   let aboutWelcomeActor = windowGlobalParent.getActor("AboutWelcome");-  const sandbox = sinon.createSandbox();+  const messageSandbox = sinon.createSandbox();   // Stub AboutWelcomeParent Content Message Handler-  sandbox.stub(aboutWelcomeActor, "onContentMessage");+  messageSandbox.stub(aboutWelcomeActor, "onContentMessage");   registerCleanupFunction(() => {-    sandbox.restore();+    messageSandbox.restore();   });   await onButtonClick(browser, "button.primary");@@ -191,7 +200,7 @@   );   Assert.equal(     telemetryCall.args[1].event,-    "INSTALL",+    "CLICK_BUTTON",     "Telemetry event sent as INSTALL"   );   Assert.equal(@@ -204,9 +213,14 @@     "RTAMO_DEFAULT_WELCOME",     "Message Id sent in telemetry for default RTAMO"   );++  sandbox.restore(); }); add_task(async function test_rtamo_over_experiments() {+  let sandbox = sinon.createSandbox();+  sandbox.stub(AddonRepository, "getAddonsByIDs").resolves(TEST_ADDON_INFO);+   let doExperimentCleanup = await ExperimentFakes.enrollWithFeatureConfig({     featureId: "aboutwelcome",     value: { screens: [], enabled: true },@@ -235,9 +249,8 @@     // Expected selectors:     [       "div.onboardingContainer",-      "div.brand-logo",       "h2[data-l10n-id='return-to-amo-addon-title']",-      "img[data-l10n-name='icon']",+      "div.rtamo-icon",       "button.primary",       "button.secondary",     ],@@ -249,4 +262,37 @@       "div.tiles-container.info",     ]   );++  sandbox.restore(); });++add_task(async function test_rtamo_primary_button_theme() {+  let sandbox = sinon.createSandbox();+  sandbox+    .stub(AddonRepository, "getAddonsByIDs")+    .resolves(TEST_ADDON_INFO_THEME);++  let browser = await openRTAMOWelcomePage();++  await test_screen_content(+    browser,+    "RTAMO UI",+    // Expected selectors:+    [+      "div.onboardingContainer",+      "h2[data-l10n-id='return-to-amo-addon-title']",+      "div.rtamo-icon",+      "button.primary[data-l10n-id='return-to-amo-add-theme-label']",+      "button[data-l10n-id='onboarding-not-now-button-label']",+    ],+    // Unexpected selectors:+    [+      "main.AW_STEP1",+      "main.AW_STEP2",+      "main.AW_STEP3",+      "div.tiles-container.info",+    ]+  );++  sandbox.restore();+});

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific security vulnerability was found in this diff. The changes appear to be test code improvements including:
1. Better organization of test data with constants (TEST_ADDON_INFO, TEST_ADDON_INFO_THEME)
2. More specific button selectors in tests
3. Better sandbox management with separate sandboxes for different purposes
4. Added test case for theme handling
5. Improved telemetry event naming (changed from "INSTALL" to "CLICK_BUTTON")

The changes are primarily focused on test reliability and maintainability rather than security fixes. The diff shows improvements in test coverage and code organization, but no clear security vulnerabilities being addressed.

If I were to identify the main changes:
1. Test data organization improvement
2. More specific element selectors in tests
3. Better sandbox cleanup handling
4. Additional test case for themes
5. Telemetry event naming clarification

No CVE or specific vulnerability patterns were identified in these changes. The modifications appear to be part of normal test maintenance and enhancement.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.3.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.angle.3.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(100, 0); ctx.arc(100, 0, 150, (512+1/2)*Math.PI, (1024-1)*Math.PI, true); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring without any security implications.

Analysis for each change:

1. First change:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Second change:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Line 27]
    [Old Code]
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    [Fixed Code]
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/editor/libeditor/HTMLEditUtils.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/editor/libeditor/HTMLEditUtils.h@@ -421,6 +421,7 @@     TreatSingleBRElementAsVisible,     TreatListItemAsVisible,     TreatTableCellAsVisible,+    IgnoreEditableState,  // TODO: Change to "TreatNonEditableContentAsVisible"     SafeToAskLayout,   };   using EmptyCheckOptions = EnumSet<EmptyCheckOption, uint32_t>;

Let me analyze the diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Logic Flaw or Incomplete Implementation] [editor/libeditor/HTMLEditUtils.h] [Lines 421-428]
[Old Code]
    TreatSingleBRElementAsVisible,
    TreatListItemAsVisible,
    TreatTableCellAsVisible,
    SafeToAskLayout,
[Fixed Code]
    TreatSingleBRElementAsVisible,
    TreatListItemAsVisible,
    TreatTableCellAsVisible,
    IgnoreEditableState,  // TODO: Change to "TreatNonEditableContentAsVisible"
    SafeToAskLayout,

Additional Details:
- The change adds a new enum value `IgnoreEditableState` with a TODO comment suggesting it should be renamed to `TreatNonEditableContentAsVisible`
- While not clearly a security vulnerability, changes in visibility/editable state handling could potentially lead to security issues if non-editable content becomes unexpectedly visible or manipulable
- The TODO comment suggests the current name might not accurately reflect the intended behavior, which could lead to misuse
- Without more context about how this enum is used, it's difficult to determine if this introduces a security vulnerability

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.9arg.sourcesize.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.9arg.sourcesize.worker.js@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -34,14 +34,14 @@         ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';         ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 51, 26);         ctx.fillRect(49, 24, 51, 26);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 20,20, 0,255,0,255, "20,20", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 80,20, 0,255,0,255, "80,20", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 20,30, 0,255,0,255, "20,30", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 80,30, 0,255,0,255, "80,30", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 99,0, 0,255,0,255, "99,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,49, 0,255,0,255, "0,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 99,49, 0,255,0,255, "99,49", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 20,20, 0,255,0,255, "20,20", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 80,20, 0,255,0,255, "80,20", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 20,30, 0,255,0,255, "20,30", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 80,30, 0,255,0,255, "80,30", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't involve any security-related modifications.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 14-15, 34-41]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[etc...]

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 0,0, 0,255,0,255, "0,0", "0,255,0,255", 2);
[etc...]

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp@@ -109,7 +109,6 @@                            NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy,                            CertificateTransparencyMode ctMode,                            CRLiteMode crliteMode,-                           uint64_t crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds,                            const Vector<EnterpriseCert>& thirdPartyCerts)     : mOCSPDownloadConfig(odc),       mOCSPStrict(osc == ocspStrict),@@ -120,8 +119,7 @@       mNameMatchingMode(nameMatchingMode),       mNetscapeStepUpPolicy(netscapeStepUpPolicy),       mCTMode(ctMode),-      mCRLiteMode(crliteMode),-      mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds(crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds) {+      mCRLiteMode(crliteMode) {   LoadKnownCTLogs();   for (const auto& root : thirdPartyCerts) {     EnterpriseCert rootCopy;@@ -580,10 +578,9 @@           trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg, mOCSPTimeoutSoft,           mOCSPTimeoutHard, mCertShortLifetimeInDays, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,           ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff, SHA1Mode::Allowed,-          NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, mCRLiteMode,-          mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds, originAttributes, mThirdPartyRootInputs,-          mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs, extraCertificates, builtChain, nullptr,-          nullptr);+          NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, mCRLiteMode, originAttributes,+          mThirdPartyRootInputs, mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs,+          extraCertificates, builtChain, nullptr, nullptr);       rv = BuildCertChain(           trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,           KeyUsage::digitalSignature, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_clientAuth,@@ -652,10 +649,9 @@             trustSSL, evOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg, mOCSPTimeoutSoft,             mOCSPTimeoutHard, mCertShortLifetimeInDays, MIN_RSA_BITS,             ValidityCheckingMode::CheckForEV, sha1ModeConfigurations[i],-            mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, mCRLiteMode, mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds,-            originAttributes, mThirdPartyRootInputs,-            mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs, extraCertificates, builtChain,-            pinningTelemetryInfo, hostname);+            mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, mCRLiteMode, originAttributes,+            mThirdPartyRootInputs, mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs,+            extraCertificates, builtChain, pinningTelemetryInfo, hostname);         rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(             trustDomain, certDER, time,             KeyUsage::digitalSignature,  // (EC)DHE@@ -733,9 +729,9 @@               mOCSPTimeoutSoft, mOCSPTimeoutHard, mCertShortLifetimeInDays,               keySizeOptions[i], ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,               sha1ModeConfigurations[j], mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, mCRLiteMode,-              mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds, originAttributes,-              mThirdPartyRootInputs, mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs,-              extraCertificates, builtChain, pinningTelemetryInfo, hostname);+              originAttributes, mThirdPartyRootInputs,+              mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs, extraCertificates, builtChain,+              pinningTelemetryInfo, hostname);           rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(               trustDomain, certDER, time,               KeyUsage::digitalSignature,  //(EC)DHE@@ -800,10 +796,9 @@           trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg, mOCSPTimeoutSoft,           mOCSPTimeoutHard, mCertShortLifetimeInDays, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,           ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff, SHA1Mode::Allowed,-          mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, mCRLiteMode, mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds,-          originAttributes, mThirdPartyRootInputs,-          mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs, extraCertificates, builtChain, nullptr,-          nullptr);+          mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, mCRLiteMode, originAttributes,+          mThirdPartyRootInputs, mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs,+          extraCertificates, builtChain, nullptr, nullptr);       rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA,                           KeyUsage::keyCertSign, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,                           CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);@@ -815,10 +810,9 @@           trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg, mOCSPTimeoutSoft,           mOCSPTimeoutHard, mCertShortLifetimeInDays, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,           ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff, SHA1Mode::Allowed,-          NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, mCRLiteMode,-          mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds, originAttributes, mThirdPartyRootInputs,-          mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs, extraCertificates, builtChain, nullptr,-          nullptr);+          NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, mCRLiteMode, originAttributes,+          mThirdPartyRootInputs, mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs,+          extraCertificates, builtChain, nullptr, nullptr);       rv = BuildCertChain(           trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,           KeyUsage::digitalSignature, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,@@ -840,10 +834,9 @@           trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg, mOCSPTimeoutSoft,           mOCSPTimeoutHard, mCertShortLifetimeInDays, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,           ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff, SHA1Mode::Allowed,-          NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, mCRLiteMode,-          mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds, originAttributes, mThirdPartyRootInputs,-          mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs, extraCertificates, builtChain, nullptr,-          nullptr);+          NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, mCRLiteMode, originAttributes,+          mThirdPartyRootInputs, mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs,+          extraCertificates, builtChain, nullptr, nullptr);       rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,                           EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,                           KeyUsage::keyEncipherment,  // RSA

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [CRLite CT Merge Delay Removal] [security/certverifier/CertVerifier.cpp] [Lines 109-120, 580-583, 652-655, 733-736, 800-803, 815-818, 840-843]
   [Old Code]
   - Constructor parameter: `uint64_t crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds`
   - Member initialization: `mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds(crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds)`
   - Usage in multiple function calls passing `mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds`
   
   [Fixed Code]
   - Parameter removed from constructor
   - Member initialization removed
   - Parameter removed from all function calls

Note: The diff shows removal of the `crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds` parameter throughout the file. While this appears to be a security-related change (as it's in the certificate verification code), I cannot determine if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just a refactoring/optimization. The change might be related to CRLite (Certificate Revocation List Lite) functionality, but without more context about the security implications of this parameter, I can't identify a specific vulnerability.

No other obvious security vulnerabilities were identified in the provided diff. The changes appear focused on removing this one parameter throughout the file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/syn/tests/test_round_trip.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/syn/tests/test_round_trip.rs@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ #![cfg(not(syn_disable_nightly_tests))]+#![cfg(not(miri))] #![recursion_limit = "1024"] #![feature(rustc_private)] #![allow(clippy::manual_assert)]@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@             }         });-    let failed = failed.load(Ordering::SeqCst);+    let failed = failed.load(Ordering::Relaxed);     if failed > 0 {         panic!("{} failures", failed);     }@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@         Ok(krate) => (krate, start.elapsed()),         Err(msg) => {             errorf!("=== {}: syn failed to parse\n{:?}\n", path.display(), msg);-            let prev_failed = failed.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);+            let prev_failed = failed.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);             if prev_failed + 1 >= abort_after {                 process::exit(1);             }@@ -146,7 +147,7 @@             }         };         if !equal {-            let prev_failed = failed.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);+            let prev_failed = failed.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);             if prev_failed + 1 >= abort_after {                 process::exit(1);             }

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Atomic Ordering Change [third_party/rust/syn/tests/test_round_trip.rs] [Lines 63, 77, 146]  
   Old Code: `Ordering::SeqCst`  
   Fixed Code: `Ordering::Relaxed`  
   Note: This changes the memory ordering semantics from sequential consistency to relaxed ordering. While not a direct security fix, it could potentially affect thread safety in concurrent scenarios. The impact on security is unclear without more context about the application's threading model.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   Test Configuration Change [third_party/rust/syn/tests/test_round_trip.rs] [Line 1]  
   Old Code: `#![cfg(not(syn_disable_nightly_tests))]`  
   Fixed Code: Added `#![cfg(not(miri))]`  
   Note: This appears to be a test configuration change to exclude Miri (Rust's interpreter for detecting undefined behavior) from certain tests, not a security fix.

The main change in this diff is the modification of atomic memory ordering from `SeqCst` to `Relaxed` in three places. While this could potentially affect thread safety in concurrent scenarios, there's no clear evidence this was fixing a specific security vulnerability. The change might have been made for performance optimization reasons.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/docs/performance/index.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/docs/performance/index.md@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ This page explains how optimize the performance the Firefox code base-The [test documentation](../../testing/perfdocs/)-explains how to test for performance in Firefox. -The [profiler documentation](../../tools/profiler/)-explains how to use the Gecko profiler. +The [test documentation](/testing/perfdocs/index.rst)+explains how to test for performance in Firefox.+The [profiler documentation](/tools/profiler/index.rst)+explains how to use the Gecko profiler. ## General Performance references-* Tips on generating valid performance metrics by [benchmarking](benchmarking.md)+* Tips on generating valid performance metrics by [benchmarking](Benchmarking.md) * [GPU Performance](GPU_performance.md) Tips for reducing impacts on browser performance in front-end code. * [Automated Performance testing and Sheriffing](automated_performance_testing_and_sheriffing.md) Information on automated performance testing and sheriffing at Mozilla. * [Performance best practices for Firefox front-end engineers](bestpractices.md) Tips for reducing impacts on browser performance in front-end code.

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be documentation updates and path corrections. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Documentation Path Updates [File] docs/performance/index.md [Lines] 2-13
   Old Code: 
   ```
   The [test documentation](../../testing/perfdocs/)
   explains how to test for performance in Firefox. 
   The [profiler documentation](../../tools/profiler/)
   explains how to use the Gecko profiler. 
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   The [test documentation](/testing/perfdocs/index.rst)
   explains how to test for performance in Firefox.
   The [profiler documentation](/tools/profiler/index.rst)
   explains how to use the Gecko profiler.
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Documentation Case Sensitivity Fix [File] docs/performance/index.md [Lines] 8
   Old Code: `* Tips on generating valid performance metrics by [benchmarking](benchmarking.md)`
   Fixed Code: `* Tips on generating valid performance metrics by [benchmarking](Benchmarking.md)`

The changes are purely documentation-related, involving path updates and a filename case correction. No security vulnerabilities were introduced or fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-028.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-028.html@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@       -ms-column-fill: auto;   -webkit-column-fill: auto;           column-fill: auto;-  border: 2px dashed;+  border: 2px solid salmon;   margin-bottom: 5px; }

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [layout/reftests/css-grid/grid-fragmentation-028.html] [Lines 23]
[Old Code: border: 2px dashed;]
[Fixed Code: border: 2px solid salmon;]

Additional Details:
This appears to be a purely cosmetic change in a test file, modifying the border style from dashed to solid and changing the color to salmon. There are no security implications in this change as it doesn't involve any security-sensitive operations, input handling, or data processing. The modification is part of a CSS grid fragmentation test case and only affects visual rendering for testing purposes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.align.valid.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.align.valid.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.textAlign = 'start'; _assertSame(ctx.textAlign, 'start', "ctx.textAlign", "'start'");

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or introduce/remove any security controls
- This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes are cosmetic in nature, involving only variable renaming.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/webrtc/MediaEngineWebRTC.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/webrtc/MediaEngineWebRTC.h@@ -42,10 +42,6 @@  public:   MediaEngineWebRTC();-  // Enable periodic fake "devicechange" event. Must always be called from the-  // same thread, and must be disabled before shutdown.-  void SetFakeDeviceChangeEventsEnabled(bool aEnable) override;-   // Clients should ensure to clean-up sources video/audio sources   // before invoking Shutdown on this class.   void Shutdown() override;@@ -68,13 +64,10 @@   void DeviceListChanged() { mDeviceListChangeEvent.Notify(); }-  static void FakeDeviceChangeEventTimerTick(nsITimer* aTimer, void* aClosure);-   MediaEventListener mCameraListChangeListener;   MediaEventListener mMicrophoneListChangeListener;   MediaEventListener mSpeakerListChangeListener;   MediaEventProducer<void> mDeviceListChangeEvent;-  nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mFakeDeviceChangeEventTimer; }; }  // namespace mozilla

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Potential Timer-Related Resource Leak [File] dom/media/webrtc/MediaEngineWebRTC.h [Lines 42-68]
[Old Code]
// Enable periodic fake "devicechange" event. Must always be called from the
// same thread, and must be disabled before shutdown.
void SetFakeDeviceChangeEventsEnabled(bool aEnable) override;

static void FakeDeviceChangeEventTimerTick(nsITimer* aTimer, void* aClosure);

nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mFakeDeviceChangeEventTimer;
[Fixed Code]
(All above code removed)

Additional Details:
The removed code suggests there was a timer mechanism for generating fake device change events. The removal likely addresses:
1. A potential resource leak if the timer wasn't properly cleaned up during shutdown
2. Possible thread safety issues (note the comment about "must always be called from the same thread")
3. Unnecessary fake events that could potentially confuse the system or applications

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Possible Thread Safety Issue [File] dom/media/webrtc/MediaEngineWebRTC.h [Lines 42-68]
[Old Code]
// Must always be called from the same thread
[Fixed Code]
(Entire function and related timer code removed)

Additional Details:
While the removal suggests thread safety might have been a concern, we can't be certain this was an actual vulnerability or just defensive programming being removed. The comment indicates potential thread safety requirements that are no longer needed after the removal.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/file/ipc/RemoteLazyInputStreamParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/file/ipc/RemoteLazyInputStreamParent.cpp@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ #include "RemoteLazyInputStreamParent.h" #include "mozilla/ipc/IPCStreamUtils.h" #include "mozilla/InputStreamLengthHelper.h"-#include "nsContentUtils.h" #include "RemoteLazyInputStreamStorage.h" namespace mozilla {@@ -22,7 +21,7 @@   MOZ_ASSERT(aRv);   nsID id;-  *aRv = nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace(id);+  *aRv = nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace(id);   if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(*aRv))) {     return nullptr;   }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential UUID Generation Vulnerability] [dom/file/ipc/RemoteLazyInputStreamParent.cpp] [Lines 22]
[Old Code]
  *aRv = nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace(id);
[Fixed Code]
  *aRv = nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace(id);

Additional Details:
1. The change switches from using nsContentUtils::GenerateUUIDInPlace() to nsID::GenerateUUIDInPlace() for UUID generation.
2. While this appears to be a refactoring change, there might be security implications if:
   - The old method had known vulnerabilities in its UUID generation
   - The new method provides better security guarantees
3. Without more context about the implementation differences between these two UUID generation methods, it's hard to determine if this was fixing a specific vulnerability.
4. The change could potentially address issues like predictable UUIDs or weak random number generation, but this is speculative.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/geckodriver/src/android.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/geckodriver/src/android.rs@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@         };         assert_eq!(handler.test_root, test_root);-        let mut profile = test_root.clone();+        let mut profile = test_root;         profile.push(format!("{}-geckodriver-profile", &package));         assert_eq!(handler.profile, profile);     }@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@     #[ignore]     fn android_handler_storage_as_app() {         let package = "org.mozilla.geckoview_example";-        run_handler_storage_test(&package, AndroidStorageInput::App);+        run_handler_storage_test(package, AndroidStorageInput::App);     }     #[test]

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [Cloning vs Moving] [testing/geckodriver/src/android.rs] [Lines 498]
   Old Code: `let mut profile = test_root.clone();`
   Fixed Code: `let mut profile = test_root;`
   Additional Details: This change removes an unnecessary clone() operation, which is an optimization rather than a security fix.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   [Unnecessary Reference] [testing/geckodriver/src/android.rs] [Lines 507]
   Old Code: `run_handler_storage_test(&package, AndroidStorageInput::App);`
   Fixed Code: `run_handler_storage_test(package, AndroidStorageInput::App);`
   Additional Details: This change removes an unnecessary reference operation, which is a code style/optimization improvement rather than a security fix.

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes appear to be code optimizations and style improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.