--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/network/TCPServerSocketChild.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/network/TCPServerSocketChild.h@@ -47,8 +47,7 @@   NS_IMETHOD_(MozExternalRefCountType) Release() override;   TCPServerSocketChild(TCPServerSocket* aServerSocket, uint16_t aLocalPort,-                       uint16_t aBacklog, bool aUseArrayBuffers,-                       nsISerialEventTarget* aIPCEventTarget);+                       uint16_t aBacklog, bool aUseArrayBuffers);   ~TCPServerSocketChild();   void Close();

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Constructor Parameter Reduction] [dom/network/TCPServerSocketChild.h] [Lines 47-48]
[Old Code]
TCPServerSocketChild(TCPServerSocket* aServerSocket, uint16_t aLocalPort,
                       uint16_t aBacklog, bool aUseArrayBuffers,
                       nsISerialEventTarget* aIPCEventTarget);
[Fixed Code]
TCPServerSocketChild(TCPServerSocket* aServerSocket, uint16_t aLocalPort,
                       uint16_t aBacklog, bool aUseArrayBuffers);

Additional Details:
The change removes the `nsISerialEventTarget* aIPCEventTarget` parameter from the constructor. While this could be related to security (perhaps removing a potential attack surface or simplifying IPC handling), without more context about why this parameter was removed, I can't definitively say if this was fixing a specific vulnerability. It might be just a code simplification or refactoring. The change could potentially affect IPC security, but we'd need more information about the removed parameter's usage to be certain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-variant-numeric.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-fonts/font-variant-numeric.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="John Daggett" href="mailto:[email protected]"/> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-fonts-3/#font-variant-numeric-prop"/> <link rel="match" href="font-variant-numeric-ref.html"/>-<meta name="flags" content=""/> <meta name="assert" content="Values of font-variant-numeric should enable specific features without enabling others"/> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> <script type="text/javascript" src="support/fonts/gsubtest-features.js"></script>

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 5]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content=""/>
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows only the removal of a meta "flags" tag which appears to be test-related metadata
- No actual security vulnerabilities are present in this change
- The modification seems to be cleanup of test configuration rather than a security fix
- No CVE or known vulnerability patterns are involved in this change

The change is purely cosmetic/test-related with no security implications. No other vulnerabilities were identified in the provided diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.source-atop.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.source-atop.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, 0, 0);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and don't affect security. Here's the analysis following your format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.image.source-atop.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 32]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 191,255,64,128, "50,25", "191,255,64,128", 5);

The changes are purely variable naming improvements with no security implications. The functionality remains identical, just using a more concise variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/lint/python/pylint.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/lint/python/pylint.py@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from mozlint import result from mozlint.pathutils import expand_exclusions+from mach.site import InstallPipRequirementsException here = os.path.abspath(os.path.dirname(__file__)) PYLINT_REQUIREMENTS_PATH = os.path.join(here, "pylint_requirements.txt")@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@             PYLINT_REQUIREMENTS_PATH,             quiet=True,         )-    except subprocess.CalledProcessError:+    except (subprocess.CalledProcessError, InstallPipRequirementsException):         print(PYLINT_INSTALL_ERROR)         return 1

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Error Handling Improvement] [tools/lint/python/pylint.py] [Lines 54-57]  
   Old Code:  
   ```python
   except subprocess.CalledProcessError:
   ```  
   Fixed Code:  
   ```python
   except (subprocess.CalledProcessError, InstallPipRequirementsException):
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change adds an additional exception type to catch, which improves error handling but doesn't clearly indicate a security vulnerability. It might be related to better handling of pip requirements installation failures.

Note: The diff shows an improvement in error handling by catching an additional exception type (InstallPipRequirementsException), but this doesn't appear to be fixing a specific known vulnerability. The change is more about robustness than security. No clear security vulnerability is being addressed here.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.start.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.start.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var f = new FontFace("CanvasTest", "url('/fonts/CanvasTest.ttf')"); let fonts = (self.fonts ? self.fonts : document.fonts);@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@     ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);     ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';     ctx.fillText(' EE', 0, 37.5);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);   }).then(t_pass, t_fail); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable name in subsequent calls. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.start.html
   Lines: 17-18, 30-31
   Old Code: 
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.space.collapse.start.html
   Lines: 30-31
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
   ```

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains identical, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/all-prop-inherit-color.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-cascade/all-prop-inherit-color.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@   <title>CSS Cascade: "color" property preceded by "all: initial"</title>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-cascade-4/#all-shorthand">   <link rel="match" href="reference/ref-green-text.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Own 'color', preceded by 'all: inherit', overrides inherited 'color'.">   <style>     .outer {

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 5-6]
    [Old Code]
    <meta name="flags" content="">
    [Fixed Code]
    (line removed)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of a meta tag with empty "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This appears to be a test file modification rather than a security fix
- No actual security vulnerabilities are evident in this change
- The modification seems related to test configuration rather than security functionality

Note: Since this is a test file, security vulnerabilities would be unlikely unless the test was specifically testing security-related functionality, which doesn't appear to be the case here. The change is more likely related to test cleanup or maintenance.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.css-color-4-hsl-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.css-color-4-hsl-1.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'hsl(0, 100%, 50% / 1)'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily variable renaming and don't involve any security-sensitive operations. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-25]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ...
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are:
1. Renaming variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the variable name in the `_assertPixel` call
3. No changes to the actual security-sensitive operations or input handling

These changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security vulnerabilities. The test case continues to check the same color parsing behavior with the same assertions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/windows/ia2/ia2AccessibleAction.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/windows/ia2/ia2AccessibleAction.cpp@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ AccessibleWrap* ia2AccessibleAction::LocalAcc() {   return static_cast<MsaaAccessible*>(this)->LocalAcc();+}++Accessible* ia2AccessibleAction::Acc() {+  return static_cast<MsaaAccessible*>(this)->Acc(); } // IUnknown@@ -43,7 +47,7 @@   *aActionCount = 0;-  AccessibleWrap* acc = LocalAcc();+  Accessible* acc = Acc();   if (!acc) return CO_E_OBJNOTCONNECTED;   *aActionCount = acc->ActionCount();@@ -52,7 +56,7 @@ STDMETHODIMP ia2AccessibleAction::doAction(long aActionIndex) {-  AccessibleWrap* acc = LocalAcc();+  Accessible* acc = Acc();   if (!acc) return CO_E_OBJNOTCONNECTED;   uint8_t index = static_cast<uint8_t>(aActionIndex);@@ -64,7 +68,7 @@   if (!aDescription) return E_INVALIDARG;   *aDescription = nullptr;-  AccessibleWrap* acc = LocalAcc();+  Accessible* acc = Acc();   if (!acc) return CO_E_OBJNOTCONNECTED;   nsAutoString description;@@ -119,7 +123,7 @@   *aName = nullptr;-  AccessibleWrap* acc = LocalAcc();+  Accessible* acc = Acc();   if (!acc) return CO_E_OBJNOTCONNECTED;   nsAutoString name;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Type Safety Issue] [accessible/windows/ia2/ia2AccessibleAction.cpp] [Lines 47, 56, 68, 123]
   [Old Code]
   AccessibleWrap* acc = LocalAcc();
   [Fixed Code]
   Accessible* acc = Acc();

Additional Details:
- The change involves switching from using LocalAcc() (which returns AccessibleWrap*) to Acc() (which returns Accessible*)
- This appears to be a type safety improvement, making the code more general by using the base class pointer
- While this improves code maintainability and reduces potential casting issues, it's not clear if this fixes a specific security vulnerability
- The change is consistent across multiple methods in the file

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [No specific vulnerability found] [accessible/windows/ia2/ia2AccessibleAction.cpp] [Lines 16-19]
   [Old Code]
   (No previous code - new function added)
   [Fixed Code]
   Accessible* ia2AccessibleAction::Acc() {
     return static_cast<MsaaAccessible*>(this)->Acc();
   }

Additional Details:
- This is an addition of a new helper method rather than a security fix
- The method provides access to the base Accessible interface
- No security implications are apparent in this addition

Note: The changes appear to be primarily about improving type safety and code organization rather than fixing specific security vulnerabilities. The most significant change is the consistent use of the more general Accessible* type instead of the derived AccessibleWrap* type, which could prevent potential type-related issues but doesn't appear to address a known vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ruby/rb-display-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ruby/rb-display-001.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-ruby-1/#base-annotation-pairing">   <link rel="match" href="reference/rb-display-001-ref.html">-  <meta content="" name="flags">   <style>   ruby

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-ruby/rb-display-001.html [Lines] 9
    Old Code: <meta content="" name="flags">
    Fixed Code: [line removed]

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with name="flags". This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a cleanup of unnecessary markup.
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change.
- The change is likely related to test file maintenance rather than security hardening.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/readable-streams/tee.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/readable-streams/tee.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker // META: script=../resources/rs-utils.js // META: script=../resources/test-utils.js // META: script=../resources/recording-streams.js

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Removal of Test Environment] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/readable-streams/tee.any.js] [Lines 1]  
   [Old Code]  
   `// META: global=window,worker,jsshell`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `// META: global=window,worker`  

Additional Details:  
- The diff shows the removal of "jsshell" from the test environment globals. This could potentially affect test coverage but doesn't appear to be a direct security vulnerability.  
- The change might be related to test environment configuration rather than a security fix.  
- Without more context about why "jsshell" was removed, it's difficult to determine if this was addressing a security concern.  

No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be a test configuration modification rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/accessible/tests/browser/e10s/browser_treeupdate_optgroup.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/accessible/tests/browser/e10s/browser_treeupdate_optgroup.js@@ -41,10 +41,7 @@         {           COMBOBOX_LIST: [             {-              GROUPING: [-                { COMBOBOX_OPTION: [{ TEXT_LEAF: [] }] },-                { COMBOBOX_OPTION: [{ TEXT_LEAF: [] }] },-              ],+              GROUPING: [{ COMBOBOX_OPTION: [] }, { COMBOBOX_OPTION: [] }],             },             {               COMBOBOX_OPTION: [],

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a simplification of test data structure in an accessibility test file. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [accessible/tests/browser/e10s/browser_treeupdate_optgroup.js] [Lines 41-48]
    [Old Code]
    GROUPING: [
        { COMBOBOX_OPTION: [{ TEXT_LEAF: [] }] },
        { COMBOBOX_OPTION: [{ TEXT_LEAF: [] }] },
    ]
    [Fixed Code]
    GROUPING: [{ COMBOBOX_OPTION: [] }, { COMBOBOX_OPTION: [] }]

This appears to be a test case modification rather than a security fix. The change simplifies the structure of mock accessibility tree data used for testing, removing nested TEXT_LEAF elements that weren't necessary for the test. No security implications are evident in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-eof.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgb-eof.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgb(0, 255, 0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 17-18, 25]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ```
    Additional Details: This appears to be a simple variable name change from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas' for consistency or readability. No security implications are evident.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Variable Reference Update [File] [Line 25]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    ```
    Additional Details: This change simply updates the variable reference to match the renamed variable from the previous change. No security impact.

The changes in this diff appear to be purely cosmetic, involving variable renaming and reference updates. No security vulnerabilities were introduced or fixed in this particular diff. The changes are likely part of code standardization or readability improvements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.coincide.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.coincide.2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(0, 25); ctx.arcTo(100, 25, 100, 25, 1); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't involve any security-sensitive operations. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arcTo.coincide.2.worker.js [Lines] 13-24
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   ...
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and update all references to it. This doesn't appear to address any security issue but rather improves code consistency or readability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.source.size.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.source.size.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var imgdata1 = ctx.getImageData(0, 0, 10, 10); var imgdata2 = ctx.getImageData(0, 0, 20, 20);

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.source.size.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
The changes in this diff appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming the variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`. There are no security-related changes in this modification. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. No known vulnerabilities are addressed by this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/tests/recovery.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/tests/recovery.rs@@ -6,12 +6,15 @@ use super::super::{Connection, ConnectionParameters, Output, State}; use super::{-    assert_full_cwnd, connect, connect_force_idle, connect_rtt_idle, connect_with_rtt,-    default_client, default_server, fill_cwnd, maybe_authenticate, send_and_receive,-    send_something, AT_LEAST_PTO, DEFAULT_RTT, POST_HANDSHAKE_CWND,+    assert_full_cwnd, connect, connect_force_idle, connect_rtt_idle, connect_with_rtt, cwnd,+    default_client, default_server, fill_cwnd, maybe_authenticate, new_client, send_and_receive,+    send_something, AT_LEAST_PTO, DEFAULT_RTT, DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA, POST_HANDSHAKE_CWND, };+use crate::cc::CWND_MIN; use crate::path::PATH_MTU_V6;-use crate::recovery::{MAX_OUTSTANDING_UNACK, MIN_OUTSTANDING_UNACK, PTO_PACKET_COUNT};+use crate::recovery::{+    FAST_PTO_SCALE, MAX_OUTSTANDING_UNACK, MIN_OUTSTANDING_UNACK, PTO_PACKET_COUNT,+}; use crate::rtt::GRANULARITY; use crate::stats::MAX_PTO_COUNTS; use crate::tparams::TransportParameter;@@ -717,3 +720,91 @@     trickle(&mut sender, &mut receiver, 1, now);     assert_eq!(receiver.stats().frame_tx.ping, 0); }++/// This calculates the PTO timer immediately after connection establishment.+/// It depends on there only being 2 RTT samples in the handshake.+fn expected_pto(rtt: Duration) -> Duration {+    // PTO calculation is rtt + 4rttvar + ack delay.+    // rttvar should be (rtt + 4 * (rtt / 2) * (3/4)^n + 25ms)/2+    // where n is the number of round trips+    // This uses a 25ms ack delay as the ACK delay extension+    // is negotiated and no ACK_DELAY frame has been received.+    rtt + rtt * 9 / 8 + Duration::from_millis(25)+}++#[test]+fn fast_pto() {+    let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().fast_pto(FAST_PTO_SCALE / 2));+    let mut server = default_server();+    let mut now = connect_rtt_idle(&mut client, &mut server, DEFAULT_RTT);++    let res = client.process(None, now);+    let idle_timeout = ConnectionParameters::default().get_idle_timeout() - (DEFAULT_RTT / 2);+    assert_eq!(res, Output::Callback(idle_timeout));++    // Send data on two streams+    let stream = client.stream_create(StreamType::UniDi).unwrap();+    assert_eq!(+        client.stream_send(stream, DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA).unwrap(),+        DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA.len()+    );++    // Send a packet after some time.+    now += idle_timeout / 2;+    let dgram = client.process_output(now).dgram();+    assert!(dgram.is_some());++    // Nothing to do, should return a callback.+    let cb = client.process_output(now).callback();+    assert_eq!(expected_pto(DEFAULT_RTT) / 2, cb);++    // Once the PTO timer expires, a PTO packet should be sent should want to send PTO packet.+    now += cb;+    let dgram = client.process(None, now).dgram();++    let stream_before = server.stats().frame_rx.stream;+    server.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now);+    assert_eq!(server.stats().frame_rx.stream, stream_before + 1);+}++/// Even if the PTO timer is slowed right down, persistent congestion is declared+/// based on the "true" value of the timer.+#[test]+fn fast_pto_persistent_congestion() {+    let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().fast_pto(FAST_PTO_SCALE * 2));+    let mut server = default_server();+    let mut now = connect_rtt_idle(&mut client, &mut server, DEFAULT_RTT);++    let res = client.process(None, now);+    let idle_timeout = ConnectionParameters::default().get_idle_timeout() - (DEFAULT_RTT / 2);+    assert_eq!(res, Output::Callback(idle_timeout));++    // Send packets spaced by the PTO timer.  And lose them.+    // Note: This timing is a tiny bit higher than the client will use+    // to determine persistent congestion. The ACK below adds another RTT+    // estimate, which will reduce rttvar by 3/4, so persistent congestion+    // will occur at `rtt + rtt*27/32 + 25ms`.+    // That is OK as we're still showing that this interval is less than+    // six times the PTO, which is what would be used if the scaling+    // applied to the PTO used to determine persistent congestion.+    let pc_interval = expected_pto(DEFAULT_RTT) * 3;+    println!("pc_interval {:?}", pc_interval);+    let _drop1 = send_something(&mut client, now);++    // Check that the PTO matches expectations.+    let cb = client.process_output(now).callback();+    assert_eq!(expected_pto(DEFAULT_RTT) * 2, cb);++    now += pc_interval;+    let _drop2 = send_something(&mut client, now);+    let _drop3 = send_something(&mut client, now);+    let _drop4 = send_something(&mut client, now);+    let dgram = send_something(&mut client, now);++    // Now acknowledge the tail packet and enter persistent congestion.+    now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;+    let ack = server.process(Some(dgram), now).dgram();+    now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;+    client.process_input(ack.unwrap(), now);+    assert_eq!(cwnd(&client), CWND_MIN);+}

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Timing Attack Vulnerability] [third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/tests/recovery.rs] [Lines 717-720]
   [Old Code: No test cases for PTO timing]
   [Fixed Code: Added test cases for fast PTO timing calculations]

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Denial of Service via PTO Manipulation] [third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/tests/recovery.rs] [Lines 720-791]
   [Old Code: No tests for PTO scaling]
   [Fixed Code: Added tests for PTO scaling and persistent congestion detection]

The changes appear to be adding test cases for:
1. Fast PTO (Probe Timeout) timer calculations
2. Persistent congestion detection with scaled PTO values

While these changes don't directly fix a vulnerability, they add important test coverage for timing-related behaviors that could be security-relevant if not properly implemented. The tests verify that:
- PTO timers are calculated correctly
- Persistent congestion is properly detected even when PTO is scaled
- The implementation resists potential timing-based attacks or DoS scenarios

However, without seeing the actual implementation changes (only test cases), I can't definitively say whether vulnerabilities existed or were fixed. The test additions suggest the developers were being proactive about timing-related security considerations.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/events/test/window_wheel_default_action.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/events/test/window_wheel_default_action.html@@ -2400,17 +2400,113 @@       adjusted: true,       expected: kAdjustedForLeft.result,       cleanup (cb) {+                 SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set":+                                               [["mousewheel.autodir.enabled",+                                                 false]]},+                                            cb);+               } },+    // Tests:   Test that autodir scrolling can be force-enabled using windowUtils.+    //          This only tests vertical wheel scrolls being adjusted to be+    //          horizontal, rather than re-testing all autodir behaviours just for+    //          this way of enabling it.+    // Results: Vertical wheel scrolls are adjusted to be horizontal whereas the+    //          horizontal wheel scrolls are unadjusted.+    // Reason:  Auto-dir adjustment applies to a target if the target overflows+    //          in only one direction and the direction is orthogonal to the+    //          wheel and deltaZ is zero.+    { description: "force-enabled auto-dir scroll to " + kAdjustedForDown.desc ++                   "(originally bottom) by pixel scroll even if lineOrPageDelta is 0, " ++                   "no vertical scrollbar",+      event: { deltaMode: WheelEvent.DOM_DELTA_PIXEL,+               deltaX: 0.0, deltaY: 8.0, deltaZ: 0.0,+               lineOrPageDeltaX: 0, lineOrPageDeltaY: 0, isMomentum: false,+               expectedOverflowDeltaX: 0, expectedOverflowDeltaY: 0,+               shiftKey: false, ctrlKey: false, altKey: false, metaKey: false, osKey: false },+      adjusted: true,+      expected: kAdjustedForDown.result,+      prepare (cb) {+                 gScrollableElement.style.overflowX = "auto";+                 gScrollableElement.style.overflowY = "hidden";+                 resetScrollPosition(gScrollableElement);+                 winUtils.setMousewheelAutodir(gScrollableElement, true, kHonoursRoot)+                 cb();+               } },+    { description: "force-enabled auto-dir scroll to " + kAdjustedForDown.desc ++                   "(originally bottom) by pixel scroll when lineOrPageDelta is 1, " ++                   "no vertical scrollbar",+      event: { deltaMode: WheelEvent.DOM_DELTA_PIXEL,+               deltaX: 0.0, deltaY: 8.0, deltaZ: 0.0,+               lineOrPageDeltaX: 0, lineOrPageDeltaY: 1, isMomentum: false,+               expectedOverflowDeltaX: 0, expectedOverflowDeltaY: 0,+               shiftKey: false, ctrlKey: false, altKey: false, metaKey: false, osKey: false },+      adjusted: true,+      expected: kAdjustedForDown.result },+    { description: "force-enabled auto-dir scroll to " + kAdjustedForUp.desc ++                   "(originally top) by pixel scroll even if lineOrPageDelta is 0, " ++                   "no vertical scrollbar",+      event: { deltaMode: WheelEvent.DOM_DELTA_PIXEL,+               deltaX: 0.0, deltaY: -8.0, deltaZ: 0.0,+               lineOrPageDeltaX: 0, lineOrPageDeltaY: 0, isMomentum: false,+               expectedOverflowDeltaX: 0, expectedOverflowDeltaY: 0,+               shiftKey: false, ctrlKey: false, altKey: false, metaKey: false, osKey: false },+      adjusted: true,+      expected: kAdjustedForUp.result },+    { description: "force-enabled auto-dir scroll to " + kAdjustedForUp.desc ++                   "(originally top) by pixel scroll when lineOrPageDelta is -1, " ++                   "no vertical scrollbar",+      event: { deltaMode: WheelEvent.DOM_DELTA_PIXEL,+               deltaX: 0.0, deltaY: -8.0, deltaZ: 0.0,+               lineOrPageDeltaX: 0, lineOrPageDeltaY: -1, isMomentum: false,+               expectedOverflowDeltaX: 0, expectedOverflowDeltaY: 0,+               shiftKey: false, ctrlKey: false, altKey: false, metaKey: false, osKey: false },+      adjusted: true,+      expected: kAdjustedForUp.result },+    { description: "force-enabled auto-dir scroll to right by pixel scroll even if lineOrPageDelta is 0, " ++                   "no vertical scrollbar",+      event: { deltaMode: WheelEvent.DOM_DELTA_PIXEL,+               deltaX: 8.0, deltaY: 0.0, deltaZ: 0.0,+               lineOrPageDeltaX: 0, lineOrPageDeltaY: 0, isMomentum: false,+               expectedOverflowDeltaX: 0, expectedOverflowDeltaY: 0,+               shiftKey: false, ctrlKey: false, altKey: false, metaKey: false, osKey: false },+      adjusted: false,+      expected: kScrollRight },+    { description: "force-enabled auto-dir scroll to right by pixel scroll when lineOrPageDelta is 1, " ++                   "no vertical scrollbar",+      event: { deltaMode: WheelEvent.DOM_DELTA_PIXEL,+               deltaX: 8.0, deltaY: 0.0, deltaZ: 0.0,+               lineOrPageDeltaX: 1, lineOrPageDeltaY: 0, isMomentum: false,+               expectedOverflowDeltaX: 0, expectedOverflowDeltaY: 0,+               shiftKey: false, ctrlKey: false, altKey: false, metaKey: false, osKey: false },+      adjusted: false,+      expected: kScrollRight },+    { description: "force-enabled auto-dir scroll to left by pixel scroll even if lineOrPageDelta is 0, " ++                   "no vertical scrollbar",+      event: { deltaMode: WheelEvent.DOM_DELTA_PIXEL,+               deltaX: -8.0, deltaY: 0.0, deltaZ: 0.0,+               lineOrPageDeltaX: 0, lineOrPageDeltaY: 0, isMomentum: false,+               expectedOverflowDeltaX: 0, expectedOverflowDeltaY: 0,+               shiftKey: false, ctrlKey: false, altKey: false, metaKey: false, osKey: false },+      adjusted: false,+      expected: kScrollLeft },+    { description: "force-enabled auto-dir scroll to left by pixel scroll when lineOrPageDelta is -1, " ++                   "no vertical scrollbar",+      event: { deltaMode: WheelEvent.DOM_DELTA_PIXEL,+               deltaX: -8.0, deltaY: 0.0, deltaZ: 0.0,+               lineOrPageDeltaX: -1, lineOrPageDeltaY: 0, isMomentum: false,+               expectedOverflowDeltaX: 0, expectedOverflowDeltaY: 0,+               shiftKey: false, ctrlKey: false, altKey: false, metaKey: false, osKey: false },+      adjusted: false,+      expected: kScrollLeft,+      cleanup (cb) {                  gScrollableElement.style.position = "static";                  gScrollableElement.style.top = "auto";                  gScrollableElement.style.left = "auto";                  gScrollableElement.style.overflow = "auto";                  Object.assign(document.body.style, kOldStyleForRoot);                  Object.assign(gScrollableElement.style, kOldStyleForTarget);-                 SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set":-                                               [["mousewheel.autodir.enabled",-                                                 false]]},-                                            cb);-               } },+                 winUtils.setMousewheelAutodir(gScrollableElement, false, false);+                 cb();+              } },   ];   let styleDescForRoot = "";

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't identify any clear security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be test case additions and modifications related to mouse wheel scrolling behavior and auto-direction functionality. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
This appears to be a functional test modification rather than a security fix. The changes add new test cases for force-enabled auto-direction scrolling behavior and properly clean up test state.

The main changes are:
- Added new test cases for force-enabled auto-dir scrolling
- Modified cleanup function to properly reset mousewheel autodir state
- Added prepare functions for test setup
- No security-related patterns (like XSS, injection, etc.) were modified

The changes focus on testing functionality around:
- Mouse wheel scrolling behavior
- Auto-direction adjustment
- Proper cleanup of test state
- WindowUtils.setMousewheelAutodir functionality

Since this is a test file and the changes are focused on testing functionality rather than fixing security issues, I don't identify any vulnerabilities in this diff.

Would you like me to analyze any other specific aspects of this change?

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/notification/Notification.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/notification/Notification.h@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include "mozilla/DOMEventTargetHelper.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h" #include "mozilla/dom/NotificationBinding.h"+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h" #include "nsIObserver.h" #include "nsISupports.h"@@ -29,7 +30,6 @@ class WorkerNotificationObserver; class Promise; class StrongWorkerRef;-class WorkerPrivate; /*  * Notifications on workers introduce some lifetime issues. The property we@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@   // Initialized on the worker thread, never unset, and always used in   // a read-only capacity. Used on any thread.-  WorkerPrivate* mWorkerPrivate;+  CheckedUnsafePtr<WorkerPrivate> mWorkerPrivate;   // Main thread only.   WorkerNotificationObserver* mObserver;

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
   Improper Pointer Usage / Potential Use-After-Free [File] dom/notification/Notification.h [Lines] 207
   [Old Code]
   WorkerPrivate* mWorkerPrivate;
   [Fixed Code]
   CheckedUnsafePtr<WorkerPrivate> mWorkerPrivate;

Additional Details:
- The vulnerability appears to be related to unsafe pointer usage that could lead to use-after-free scenarios. The fix replaces a raw pointer with a CheckedUnsafePtr wrapper, which provides better memory safety guarantees.
- The change suggests the original code might have had potential memory safety issues when accessing mWorkerPrivate across threads.
- The inclusion of "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h" header also suggests better type safety and proper declaration handling.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Missing Header Inclusion / Potential Type Safety Issue [File] dom/notification/Notification.h [Lines] 10
   [Old Code]
   (missing include for WorkerPrivate)
   [Fixed Code]
   #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"

Additional Details:
- While this might not represent a direct security vulnerability, missing proper header inclusions can sometimes lead to type safety issues that could be exploited. The explicit inclusion of WorkerPrivate.h improves code safety.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/crashreporter/test/nsTestCrasher.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/crashreporter/test/nsTestCrasher.cpp@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ const int16_t CRASH_PHC_BOUNDS_VIOLATION = 23; const int16_t CRASH_HEAP_CORRUPTION = 24; const int16_t CRASH_EXC_GUARD = 25;+const int16_t CRASH_STACK_OVERFLOW = 26; #if XP_WIN && HAVE_64BIT_BUILD && defined(_M_X64) && !defined(__MINGW32__)@@ -153,6 +154,31 @@ } #endif+#ifndef XP_WIN+static int64_t recurse(int64_t aRandom) {+  char buff[256] = {};+  int64_t result = aRandom;++  strncpy(buff, "This is gibberish", sizeof(buff));++  for (auto& c : buff) {+    result += c;+  }++  if (result == 0) {+    return result;+  }++  return recurse(result);+}++static void* overflow_stack(void* aInput) {+  int64_t result = recurse(*((int64_t*)(aInput)));++  return (void*)result;+}+#endif  // XP_WIN+ extern "C" NS_EXPORT void Crash(int16_t how) {   switch (how) {     case CRASH_INVALID_POINTER_DEREF: {@@ -265,6 +291,18 @@       }     } #endif  // XP_MACOSX+#ifndef XP_WIN+    case CRASH_STACK_OVERFLOW: {+      pthread_t thread_id;+      int64_t data = 1337;+      int rv = pthread_create(&thread_id, nullptr, overflow_stack, &data);+      if (!rv) {+        pthread_join(thread_id, nullptr);+      }++      break;  // This should be unreachable+    }+#endif  // XP_WIN     default:       break;   }

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Stack Overflow Vulnerability] [toolkit/crashreporter/test/nsTestCrasher.cpp] [Lines 154-174, 291-300]
[Old Code]
(No code present for stack overflow test case)
[Fixed Code]
static int64_t recurse(int64_t aRandom) {
  char buff[256] = {};
  int64_t result = aRandom;

  strncpy(buff, "This is gibberish", sizeof(buff));

  for (auto& c : buff) {
    result += c;
  }

  if (result == 0) {
    return result;
  }

  return recurse(result);
}

static void* overflow_stack(void* aInput) {
  int64_t result = recurse(*((int64_t*)(aInput)));

  return (void*)result;
}

Additional Details:
- This appears to be adding a new test case for stack overflow crashes
- The code intentionally creates a stack overflow through infinite recursion
- While this is a test case (not a vulnerability fix), the pattern could be similar to actual stack overflow vulnerabilities
- The test is explicitly guarded by #ifndef XP_WIN, suggesting platform-specific considerations

Note: This appears to be adding test functionality rather than fixing a vulnerability, but I've included it in case the test was added to verify a stack overflow protection mechanism. The actual security impact would depend on how this test case is used in the broader context.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.2.double.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.2.double.worker.js@@ -13,18 +13,18 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.roundRect(0, 0, 100, 50, [0, 20, 0]); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating the corresponding assertions. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.2.double.worker.js
   Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.3.radii.2.double.worker.js
   Old Code: _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   Fixed Code: _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are consistent throughout the file, simply renaming the variable and updating its references. There are no security-related fixes in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/firefox.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/firefox.py@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@-import base64-import io import json import os import platform import signal import subprocess import tempfile-import zipfile+import time from abc import ABCMeta, abstractmethod+from http.client import HTTPConnection import mozinfo import mozleak@@ -20,7 +19,7 @@ from .base import (Browser,                    ExecutorBrowser,-                   NullBrowser,+                   WebDriverBrowser,                    OutputHandler,                    OutputHandlerState,                    browser_command,@@ -33,10 +32,8 @@                                             MarionettePrintRefTestExecutor,  # noqa: F401                                             MarionetteWdspecExecutor,  # noqa: F401                                             MarionetteCrashtestExecutor)  # noqa: F401-from ..webdriver_server import WebDriverServer---here = os.path.dirname(__file__)++ __wptrunner__ = {"product": "firefox",                  "check_args": "check_args",@@ -85,6 +82,8 @@ def browser_kwargs(logger, test_type, run_info_data, config, **kwargs):     return {"binary": kwargs["binary"],+            "webdriver_binary": kwargs["webdriver_binary"],+            "webdriver_args": kwargs["webdriver_args"],             "prefs_root": kwargs["prefs_root"],             "extra_prefs": kwargs["extra_prefs"],             "test_type": test_type,@@ -111,17 +110,6 @@             "specialpowers_path": kwargs["specialpowers_path"]}-class WdSpecProfile(object):-    def __init__(self, profile):-        self.profile = profile--    def __enter__(self):-        return self--    def __exit__(self, *args, **kwargs):-        self.profile.cleanup()-- def executor_kwargs(logger, test_type, test_environment, run_info_data,                     **kwargs):     executor_kwargs = base_executor_kwargs(test_type, test_environment, run_info_data,@@ -144,55 +132,10 @@         if kwargs["binary_args"]:             options["args"] = kwargs["binary_args"]-        profile_creator = ProfileCreator(logger,-                                         kwargs["prefs_root"],-                                         test_environment.config,-                                         test_type,-                                         kwargs["extra_prefs"],-                                         kwargs["gecko_e10s"],-                                         run_info_data["fission"],-                                         kwargs["browser_channel"],-                                         kwargs["binary"],-                                         kwargs["certutil_binary"],-                                         test_environment.config.ssl_config["ca_cert_path"])-        if kwargs["processes"] > 1:-            # With multiple processes, we would need a profile directory per process, but we-            # don't have an easy way to do that, so include the profile in the capabilties-            # directly instead. This means recreating it per session, which is slow-            options["profile"] = profile_creator.create_base64()-            profile = None-        else:-            profile = profile_creator.create()-            options["args"].extend(["--profile", profile.profile])-            test_environment.env_extras_cms.append(WdSpecProfile(profile))+        if not kwargs["binary"] and kwargs["headless"] and "--headless" not in options["args"]:+            options["args"].append("--headless")         capabilities["moz:firefoxOptions"] = options--        # This gets reused for firefox_android, but the environment setup-        # isn't required in that case-        if kwargs["binary"]:-            environ = get_environ(logger,-                                  kwargs["binary"],-                                  kwargs["debug_info"],-                                  kwargs["stylo_threads"],-                                  kwargs["headless"],-                                  kwargs["chaos_mode_flags"])-            leak_report_file = setup_leak_report(kwargs["leak_check"], profile, environ)--            # This doesn't work with wdspec tests-            # In particular tests can create a session without passing in the capabilites-            # and in those cases we get the default geckodriver profile which doesn't-            # guarantee zero network access-            del environ["MOZ_DISABLE_NONLOCAL_CONNECTIONS"]-            executor_kwargs["environ"] = environ-        else:-            if kwargs["headless"] and "--headless" not in options["args"]:-                options["args"].append("--headless")-            leak_report_file = None--        executor_kwargs["stackfix_dir"] = kwargs["stackfix_dir"],-        executor_kwargs["leak_report_file"] = leak_report_file-        executor_kwargs["asan"] = run_info_data.get("asan")     if kwargs["certutil_binary"] is None:         capabilities["acceptInsecureCerts"] = True@@ -266,7 +209,7 @@ def update_properties():-    return (["os", "debug", "fission", "e10s", "processor", "swgl"],+    return (["os", "debug", "fission", "e10s", "processor", "swgl", "domstreams"],             {"os": ["version"], "processor": ["bits"]})@@ -607,7 +550,8 @@ class ProfileCreator:     def __init__(self, logger, prefs_root, config, test_type, extra_prefs, e10s,-                 enable_fission, browser_channel, binary, certutil_binary, ca_certificate_path):+                 enable_fission, browser_channel, binary, certutil_binary,+                 ca_certificate_path):         self.logger = logger         self.prefs_root = prefs_root         self.config = config@@ -637,21 +581,6 @@             self._setup_ssl(profile)         return profile--    def create_base64(self, **kwargs):-        profile = self.create(**kwargs)-        try:-            with io.BytesIO() as buf:-                with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, "w", compression=zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zipf:-                    for dirpath, _, filenames in os.walk(profile.profile):-                        for filename in filenames:-                            src_path = os.path.join(dirpath, filename)-                            dest_path = os.path.relpath(src_path, profile.profile)-                            with open(src_path, "rb") as f:-                                zipf.writestr(dest_path, f.read())-                return base64.b64encode(buf.getvalue()).decode("ascii").strip()-        finally:-            profile.cleanup()     def _load_prefs(self):         prefs = Preferences()@@ -881,10 +810,112 @@             return False-class FirefoxWdSpecBrowser(NullBrowser):-    def __init__(self, logger, leak_check=False, **kwargs):-        super().__init__(logger, **kwargs)+class FirefoxWdSpecBrowser(WebDriverBrowser):+    def __init__(self, logger, binary, prefs_root, webdriver_binary, webdriver_args,+                 extra_prefs=None, debug_info=None, symbols_path=None, stackwalk_binary=None,+                 certutil_binary=None, ca_certificate_path=None, e10s=False,+                 enable_fission=False, stackfix_dir=None, leak_check=False,+                 asan=False, stylo_threads=1, chaos_mode_flags=None, config=None,+                 browser_channel="nightly", headless=None, **kwargs):++        super().__init__(logger, binary, webdriver_binary, webdriver_args)+        self.binary = binary+        self.webdriver_binary = webdriver_binary++        self.stackfix_dir = stackfix_dir+        self.symbols_path = symbols_path+        self.stackwalk_binary = stackwalk_binary++        self.asan = asan         self.leak_check = leak_check+        self.leak_report_file = None++        self.env = self.get_env(binary, debug_info, stylo_threads, headless, chaos_mode_flags)++        profile_creator = ProfileCreator(logger,+                                         prefs_root,+                                         config,+                                         "wdspec",+                                         extra_prefs,+                                         e10s,+                                         enable_fission,+                                         browser_channel,+                                         binary,+                                         certutil_binary,+                                         ca_certificate_path)++        self.profile = profile_creator.create()+        self.marionette_port = None++    def get_env(self, binary, debug_info, stylo_threads, headless, chaos_mode_flags):+        env = get_environ(self.logger,+                          binary,+                          debug_info,+                          stylo_threads,+                          headless,+                          chaos_mode_flags)+        env["RUST_BACKTRACE"] = "1"+        # This doesn't work with wdspec tests+        # In particular tests can create a session without passing in the capabilites+        # and in those cases we get the default geckodriver profile which doesn't+        # guarantee zero network access+        del env["MOZ_DISABLE_NONLOCAL_CONNECTIONS"]+        return env++    def create_output_handler(self, cmd):+        return FirefoxOutputHandler(self.logger,+                                    cmd,+                                    stackfix_dir=self.stackfix_dir,+                                    symbols_path=self.symbols_path,+                                    asan=self.asan,+                                    leak_report_file=self.leak_report_file)++    def start(self, group_metadata, **kwargs):+        self.leak_report_file = setup_leak_report(self.leak_check, self.profile, self.env)+        super().start(group_metadata, **kwargs)++    def stop(self, force=False):+        # Initially wait for any WebDriver session to cleanly shutdown+        # When this is called the executor is usually sending a end session+        # command to the browser. We don't have a synchronisation mechanism+        # that allows us to know that process is ongoing, so poll the status+        # endpoint until there isn't a session, before killing the driver.+        if self.is_alive():+            end_time = time.time() + BrowserInstance.shutdown_timeout+            while time.time() < end_time:+                self.logger.debug("Waiting for WebDriver session to end")+                try:+                    self.logger.debug(f"Connecting to http://{self.host}:{self.port}/status")+                    conn = HTTPConnection(self.host, self.port)+                    conn.request("GET", "/status")+                    res = conn.getresponse()+                    self.logger.debug(f"Got response from http://{self.host}:{self.port}/status")+                except Exception:+                    self.logger.debug(+                        f"Connecting to http://{self.host}:{self.port}/status failed")+                    break+                if res.status != 200:+                    self.logger.debug(f"Connecting to http://{self.host}:{self.port}/status "+                                      f"gave status {res.status}")+                    break+                data = res.read()+                try:+                    msg = json.loads(data)+                except ValueError:+                    self.logger.debug("/status response was not valid JSON")+                    break+                if msg.get("value", {}).get("ready") is True:+                    self.logger.debug("Got ready status")+                    break+                self.logger.debug(f"Got status response {data}")+                time.sleep(1)+            else:+                self.logger.debug("WebDriver session didn't end")+        super().stop(force=force)++    def cleanup(self):+        super().cleanup()+        self.profile.cleanup()     def settings(self, test):         return {"check_leaks": self.leak_check and not test.leaks,@@ -894,24 +925,12 @@                 "mozleak_allowed": self.leak_check and test.mozleak_allowed,                 "mozleak_thresholds": self.leak_check and test.mozleak_threshold}--class GeckoDriverServer(WebDriverServer):-    output_handler_cls = FirefoxOutputHandler--    def __init__(self, logger, marionette_port=2828, binary="geckodriver",-                 host="127.0.0.1", port=None, env=None, args=None):-        if env is None:-            env = os.environ.copy()-        env["RUST_BACKTRACE"] = "1"-        WebDriverServer.__init__(self, logger, binary,-                                 host=host,-                                 port=port,-                                 env=env,-                                 args=args)-        self.marionette_port = marionette_port-     def make_command(self):-        return [self.binary,-                "--marionette-port", str(self.marionette_port),+        return [self.webdriver_binary,                 "--host", self.host,-                "--port", str(self.port)] + self._args+                "--port", str(self.port)] + self.webdriver_args++    def executor_browser(self):+        cls, args = super().executor_browser()+        args["profile"] = self.profile.profile+        return cls, args

I'll analyze the code diff for security fixes. Here are the potential vulnerabilities I've identified:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Insecure Network Connection Handling [File] testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/firefox.py [Lines] 144-155 (old), 132-134 (new)  
Old Code:  
```python
del environ["MOZ_DISABLE_NONLOCAL_CONNECTIONS"]
executor_kwargs["environ"] = environ
```  
Fixed Code:  
(Removed the insecure connection handling code entirely)  

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Insecure Profile Handling [File] testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/firefox.py [Lines] 607-581 (old)  
Old Code:  
```python
def create_base64(self, **kwargs):
    profile = self.create(**kwargs)
    try:
        with io.BytesIO() as buf:
            with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, "w", compression=zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zipf:
                for dirpath, _, filenames in os.walk(profile.profile):
                    for filename in filenames:
                        src_path = os.path.join(dirpath, filename)
                        dest_path = os.path.relpath(src_path, profile.profile)
                        with open(src_path, "rb") as f:
                            zipf.writestr(dest_path, f.read())
            return base64.b64encode(buf.getvalue()).decode("ascii").strip()
    finally:
        profile.cleanup()
```  
Fixed Code:  
(Removed the base64 profile creation method entirely)  

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Information Leak [File] testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/browsers/firefox.py [Lines] 810-925  
Old Code:  
```python
class FirefoxWdSpecBrowser(NullBrowser):
    def __init__(self, logger, leak_check=False, **kwargs):
        super().__init__(logger, **kwargs)
        self.leak_check = leak_check
```  
Fixed Code:  
```python
class FirefoxWdSpecBrowser(WebDriverBrowser):
    def __init__(self, logger, binary, prefs_root, webdriver_binary, webdriver_args,
                 extra_prefs=None, debug_info=None, symbols_path=None, stackwalk_binary=None,
                 certutil_binary=None, ca_certificate_path=None, e10s=False,
                 enable_fission=False, stackfix_dir=None, leak_check=False,
                 asan=False, stylo_threads=1, chaos_mode_flags=None, config=None,
                 browser_channel="nightly", headless=None, **kwargs):
```
(Changed from NullBrowser to WebDriverBrowser with more secure initialization and proper cleanup)

The main security improvements appear to be:
1. Removal of insecure network connection handling
2. Removal of potentially unsafe base64 profile serialization
3. More secure browser initialization with proper resource cleanup

The changes suggest a focus on removing potentially insecure code paths and implementing more robust security practices in the browser testing infrastructure.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.