Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: DEEPSEEK deepseek-chat--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/buffer_device_address.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/buffer_device_address.rs@@ -6,18 +6,16 @@ #[derive(Clone)] pub struct BufferDeviceAddress { handle: vk::Device,- fns: vk::KhrBufferDeviceAddressFn,+ fp: vk::KhrBufferDeviceAddressFn, } impl BufferDeviceAddress { pub fn new(instance: &Instance, device: &Device) -> Self {- let fns = vk::KhrBufferDeviceAddressFn::load(|name| unsafe {- mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(device.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+ let handle = device.handle();+ let fp = vk::KhrBufferDeviceAddressFn::load(|name| unsafe {+ mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr())) });- Self {- handle: device.handle(),- fns,- }+ Self { handle, fp } } #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetBufferDeviceAddressKHR.html>"]@@ -25,7 +23,7 @@ &self, info: &vk::BufferDeviceAddressInfoKHR, ) -> vk::DeviceAddress {- self.fns.get_buffer_device_address_khr(self.handle, info)+ self.fp.get_buffer_device_address_khr(self.handle, info) } #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetBufferOpaqueCaptureAddressKHR.html>"]@@ -33,7 +31,7 @@ &self, info: &vk::BufferDeviceAddressInfoKHR, ) -> u64 {- self.fns+ self.fp .get_buffer_opaque_capture_address_khr(self.handle, info) }@@ -42,7 +40,7 @@ &self, info: &vk::DeviceMemoryOpaqueCaptureAddressInfoKHR, ) -> u64 {- self.fns+ self.fp .get_device_memory_opaque_capture_address_khr(self.handle, info) }@@ -51,7 +49,7 @@ } pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::KhrBufferDeviceAddressFn {- &self.fns+ &self.fp } pub fn device(&self) -> vk::Device {
Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:
1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Memory Safety Issue] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/buffer_device_address.rs] [Lines 6-16]
[Old Code]
handle: vk::Device,
fns: vk::KhrBufferDeviceAddressFn,
...
let fns = vk::KhrBufferDeviceAddressFn::load(|name| unsafe {
mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(device.handle(), name.as_ptr()))
});
[Fixed Code]
handle: vk::Device,
fp: vk::KhrBufferDeviceAddressFn,
...
let handle = device.handle();
let fp = vk::KhrBufferDeviceAddressFn::load(|name| unsafe {
mem::transmute(instance.get_device_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr()))
});
The main change appears to be a field rename (fns → fp) and restructuring of the initialization code. While there's no obvious security vulnerability being fixed, the change could potentially relate to memory safety by ensuring the device handle is captured before being used in the unsafe block. However, this is speculative.
2. Vulnerability Existed: no
[Field Renaming] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/buffer_device_address.rs] [Throughout file]
[Old Code]
Various instances of `self.fns`
[Fixed Code]
Various instances of `self.fp`
This appears to be a simple field renaming from `fns` to `fp` throughout the file with no security implications. The functionality remains identical, just with a different field name.
The changes seem primarily focused on code organization and naming conventions rather than addressing specific security vulnerabilities. The unsafe block remains unchanged in its core functionality, though the restructuring might make the code slightly safer by ensuring the handle is captured before use.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wast/.cargo-checksum.json+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wast/.cargo-checksum.json@@ -1 +1 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/root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/mvk/macos_surface.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/mvk/macos_surface.rs@@ -1,29 +1,23 @@ use crate::prelude::*; use crate::vk; use crate::RawPtr;-use crate::{EntryCustom, Instance};+use crate::{Entry, Instance}; use std::ffi::CStr; use std::mem; #[derive(Clone)] pub struct MacOSSurface { handle: vk::Instance,- macos_surface_fn: vk::MvkMacosSurfaceFn,+ fp: vk::MvkMacosSurfaceFn, } impl MacOSSurface {- pub fn new<L>(entry: &EntryCustom<L>, instance: &Instance) -> Self {- let surface_fn = vk::MvkMacosSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {- mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(instance.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+ pub fn new(entry: &Entry, instance: &Instance) -> Self {+ let handle = instance.handle();+ let fp = vk::MvkMacosSurfaceFn::load(|name| unsafe {+ mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(handle, name.as_ptr())) });- Self {- handle: instance.handle(),- macos_surface_fn: surface_fn,- }- }-- pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {- vk::MvkMacosSurfaceFn::name()+ Self { handle, fp } } #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkCreateMacOSSurfaceMVK.html>"]@@ -33,7 +27,7 @@ allocation_callbacks: Option<&vk::AllocationCallbacks>, ) -> VkResult<vk::SurfaceKHR> { let mut surface = mem::zeroed();- self.macos_surface_fn+ self.fp .create_mac_os_surface_mvk( self.handle, create_info,@@ -43,8 +37,12 @@ .result_with_success(surface) }+ pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {+ vk::MvkMacosSurfaceFn::name()+ }+ pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::MvkMacosSurfaceFn {- &self.macos_surface_fn+ &self.fp } pub fn instance(&self) -> vk::Instance {
Looking at the provided code diffs, I'll analyze them for security fixes: 1. For the first diff in `third_party/rust/wast/.cargo-checksum.json`: This appears to be just a checksum update for multiple files in the wast crate. There's no actual code change shown that would indicate a security fix. Vulnerability Existed: no [No code changes indicating security fixes] [third_party/rust/wast/.cargo-checksum.json] [Various lines] [Old checksums] [New checksums] 2. For the second diff in `third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/mvk/macos_surface.rs`: The changes appear to be primarily structural/refactoring rather than security fixes. The main changes are: - Changed from `EntryCustom<L>` to `Entry` - Renamed `macos_surface_fn` to `fp` - Simplified the constructor - Moved the `name()` function below other methods While these changes improve the code organization, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed here. Vulnerability Existed: no [Code refactoring, no security fix] [third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/mvk/macos_surface.rs] [Various lines] [Old implementation using EntryCustom] [New implementation using Entry] No actual security vulnerabilities were identified in either diff. The changes appear to be either dependency updates or code refactoring without security implications.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-utils/src/thread.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-utils/src/thread.rs@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ unsafe { mem::transmute(closure) }; // Finally, spawn the closure.- self.builder.spawn(move || closure())?+ self.builder.spawn(closure)? }; let thread = handle.thread().clone();
Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes: Vulnerability Existed: not sure Potential Memory Safety Issue [File] third_party/rust/crossbeam-utils/src/thread.rs [Lines 446] [Old Code] self.builder.spawn(move || closure())? [Fixed Code] self.builder.spawn(closure)? Additional Details: The change involves how a closure is passed to thread spawning. The old version used `move || closure()` which created an additional closure layer, while the new version passes the closure directly. While this doesn't appear to be fixing a known vulnerability, it could potentially relate to memory safety by ensuring proper ownership transfer of the closure. The direct passing might prevent potential issues with closure capture or lifetime management that could occur with the extra wrapping. However, without more context, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability being fixed. Note: This doesn't match any common vulnerability patterns (like CVE entries), but represents a potential memory safety improvement in thread spawning behavior.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/fetch/private-network-access/fetch.https.window.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/fetch/private-network-access/fetch.https.window.js@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ // META: script=/common/subset-tests-by-key.js // META: script=/common/utils.js-// META: script=resources/support.js-// META: script=resources/ports.sub.js+// META: script=resources/support.sub.js // META: variant=?include=baseline // META: variant=?include=from-local // META: variant=?include=from-private@@ -27,28 +26,28 @@ // All fetches unaffected by Private Network Access. subsetTestByKey("from-local", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, {- source: { port: kPorts.httpsLocal },- target: { port: kPorts.httpsLocal },- expected: kFetchTestResult.success,+ source: { server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL },+ target: { server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL },+ expected: FetchTestResult.SUCCESS, }), "local to local: no preflight required."); subsetTestByKey("from-local", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, {- source: { port: kPorts.httpsLocal },- target: {- port: kPorts.httpsPrivate,- searchParams: { "final-headers": "cors" },- },- expected: kFetchTestResult.success,+ source: { server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL },+ target: {+ server: Server.HTTPS_PRIVATE,+ behavior: { response: ResponseBehavior.allowCrossOrigin() },+ },+ expected: FetchTestResult.SUCCESS, }), "local to private: no preflight required."); subsetTestByKey("from-local", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, {- source: { port: kPorts.httpsLocal },- target: {- port: kPorts.httpsPublic,- searchParams: { "final-headers": "cors" },- },- expected: kFetchTestResult.success,+ source: { server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL },+ target: {+ server: Server.HTTPS_PUBLIC,+ behavior: { response: ResponseBehavior.allowCrossOrigin() },+ },+ expected: FetchTestResult.SUCCESS, }), "local to public: no preflight required."); // Strictly speaking, the following two tests do not exercise PNA-specific@@ -56,31 +55,29 @@ // preflight requests are sent and handled as expected. subsetTestByKey("baseline", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, {- source: { port: kPorts.httpsLocal },- target: {- port: kPorts.httpsPublic,- searchParams: {- // Missing "preflight-uuid" param: preflight will fail.- "preflight-headers": "cors",- "final-headers": "cors",+ source: { server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL },+ target: {+ server: Server.HTTPS_PUBLIC,+ behavior: {+ preflight: PreflightBehavior.failure(),+ response: ResponseBehavior.allowCrossOrigin(), }, }, fetchOptions: { method: "PUT" },- expected: kFetchTestResult.failure,+ expected: FetchTestResult.FAILURE, }), "local to public: PUT preflight failure."); subsetTestByKey("baseline", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, {- source: { port: kPorts.httpsLocal },- target: {- port: kPorts.httpsPublic,- searchParams: {- "preflight-uuid": token(),- "preflight-headers": "cors",- "final-headers": "cors",- },+ source: { server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL },+ target: {+ server: Server.HTTPS_PUBLIC,+ behavior: {+ preflight: PreflightBehavior.success(token()),+ response: ResponseBehavior.allowCrossOrigin(),+ } }, fetchOptions: { method: "PUT" },- expected: kFetchTestResult.success,+ expected: FetchTestResult.SUCCESS, }), "local to public: PUT preflight success,"); // Generates tests of preflight behavior for a single (source, target) pair.@@ -104,7 +101,7 @@ subsetKey, source, sourceDescription,- targetPort,+ targetServer, targetDescription, }) { const prefix =@@ -113,119 +110,108 @@ subsetTestByKey(subsetKey, promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source, target: {- port: targetPort,- searchParams: {- // Missing "preflight-uuid" param: preflight will fail.- "preflight-headers": "cors+pna",- "final-headers": "cors",- },- },- expected: kFetchTestResult.failure,+ server: targetServer,+ behavior: {+ preflight: PreflightBehavior.failure(),+ response: ResponseBehavior.allowCrossOrigin(),+ },+ },+ expected: FetchTestResult.FAILURE, }), prefix + "failed preflight."); subsetTestByKey(subsetKey, promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source, target: {- port: targetPort,- searchParams: {- "preflight-uuid": token(),- },- },- expected: kFetchTestResult.failure,+ server: targetServer,+ behavior: {+ preflight: PreflightBehavior.noCorsHeader(token()),+ response: ResponseBehavior.allowCrossOrigin(),+ },+ },+ expected: FetchTestResult.FAILURE, }), prefix + "missing CORS headers on preflight response."); subsetTestByKey(subsetKey, promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source, target: {- port: targetPort,- searchParams: {- "preflight-uuid": token(),- "preflight-headers": "cors",- },- },- expected: kFetchTestResult.failure,+ server: targetServer,+ behavior: {+ preflight: PreflightBehavior.noPnaHeader(token()),+ response: ResponseBehavior.allowCrossOrigin(),+ },+ },+ expected: FetchTestResult.FAILURE, }), prefix + "missing PNA header on preflight response."); subsetTestByKey(subsetKey, promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source, target: {- port: targetPort,- searchParams: {- "preflight-uuid": token(),- "preflight-headers": "cors+pna",- },- },- expected: kFetchTestResult.failure,+ server: targetServer,+ behavior: { preflight: PreflightBehavior.success(token()) },+ },+ expected: FetchTestResult.FAILURE, }), prefix + "missing CORS headers on final response."); subsetTestByKey(subsetKey, promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source, target: {- port: targetPort,- searchParams: {- "preflight-uuid": token(),- "preflight-headers": "cors+pna",- "final-headers": "cors",- },- },- expected: kFetchTestResult.success,+ server: targetServer,+ behavior: {+ preflight: PreflightBehavior.success(token()),+ response: ResponseBehavior.allowCrossOrigin(),+ },+ },+ expected: FetchTestResult.SUCCESS, }), prefix + "success."); subsetTestByKey(subsetKey, promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source, target: {- port: targetPort,- searchParams: {- "preflight-uuid": token(),- "preflight-headers": "cors+pna",- "final-headers": "cors",+ server: targetServer,+ behavior: {+ preflight: PreflightBehavior.success(token()),+ response: ResponseBehavior.allowCrossOrigin(), }, }, fetchOptions: { method: "PUT" },- expected: kFetchTestResult.success,+ expected: FetchTestResult.SUCCESS, }), prefix + "PUT success."); subsetTestByKey(subsetKey, promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source,- target: { port: targetPort },+ target: { server: targetServer }, fetchOptions: { mode: "no-cors" },- expected: kFetchTestResult.failure,+ expected: FetchTestResult.FAILURE, }), prefix + "no-CORS mode failed preflight."); subsetTestByKey(subsetKey, promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source, target: {- port: targetPort,- searchParams: { "preflight-uuid": token() },+ server: targetServer,+ behavior: { preflight: PreflightBehavior.noCorsHeader(token()) }, }, fetchOptions: { mode: "no-cors" },- expected: kFetchTestResult.failure,+ expected: FetchTestResult.FAILURE, }), prefix + "no-CORS mode missing CORS headers on preflight response."); subsetTestByKey(subsetKey, promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source, target: {- port: targetPort,- searchParams: {- "preflight-uuid": token(),- "preflight-headers": "cors",- },+ server: targetServer,+ behavior: { preflight: PreflightBehavior.noPnaHeader(token()) }, }, fetchOptions: { mode: "no-cors" },- expected: kFetchTestResult.failure,+ expected: FetchTestResult.FAILURE, }), prefix + "no-CORS mode missing PNA header on preflight response."); subsetTestByKey(subsetKey, promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source, target: {- port: targetPort,- searchParams: {- "preflight-uuid": token(),- "preflight-headers": "cors+pna",- },+ server: targetServer,+ behavior: { preflight: PreflightBehavior.success(token()) }, }, fetchOptions: { mode: "no-cors" },- expected: kFetchTestResult.opaque,+ expected: FetchTestResult.OPAQUE, }), prefix + "no-CORS mode success."); }@@ -236,25 +222,25 @@ makePreflightTests({ subsetKey: "from-private",- source: { port: kPorts.httpsPrivate },+ source: { server: Server.HTTPS_PRIVATE }, sourceDescription: "private",- targetPort: kPorts.httpsLocal,+ targetServer: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL, targetDescription: "local", }); subsetTestByKey("from-private", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, {- source: { port: kPorts.httpsPrivate },- target: { port: kPorts.httpsPrivate },- expected: kFetchTestResult.success,+ source: { server: Server.HTTPS_PRIVATE },+ target: { server: Server.HTTPS_PRIVATE },+ expected: FetchTestResult.SUCCESS, }), "private to private: no preflight required."); subsetTestByKey("from-private", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, {- source: { port: kPorts.httpsPrivate },- target: {- port: kPorts.httpsPublic,- searchParams: { "final-headers": "cors" },- },- expected: kFetchTestResult.success,+ source: { server: Server.HTTPS_PRIVATE },+ target: {+ server: Server.HTTPS_PRIVATE,+ behavior: { response: ResponseBehavior.allowCrossOrigin() },+ },+ expected: FetchTestResult.SUCCESS, }), "private to public: no preflight required."); // Source: public secure context.@@ -264,24 +250,24 @@ makePreflightTests({ subsetKey: "from-public",- source: { port: kPorts.httpsPublic },+ source: { server: Server.HTTPS_PUBLIC }, sourceDescription: "public",- targetPort: kPorts.httpsLocal,+ targetServer: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL, targetDescription: "local", }); makePreflightTests({ subsetKey: "from-public",- source: { port: kPorts.httpsPublic },+ source: { server: Server.HTTPS_PUBLIC }, sourceDescription: "public",- targetPort: kPorts.httpsPrivate,+ targetServer: Server.HTTPS_PRIVATE, targetDescription: "private", }); subsetTestByKey("from-public", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, {- source: { port: kPorts.httpsPublic },- target: { port: kPorts.httpsPublic },- expected: kFetchTestResult.success,+ source: { server: Server.HTTPS_PUBLIC },+ target: { server: Server.HTTPS_PUBLIC },+ expected: FetchTestResult.SUCCESS, }), "public to public: no preflight required."); // These tests verify that documents fetched from the `local` address space yet@@ -290,64 +276,60 @@ subsetTestByKey("from-treat-as-public", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source: {- port: kPorts.httpsLocal,- headers: { "Content-Security-Policy": "treat-as-public-address" },- },- target: { port: kPorts.httpsLocal },- expected: kFetchTestResult.failure,+ server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL,+ treatAsPublic: true,+ },+ target: { server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL },+ expected: FetchTestResult.FAILURE, }), "treat-as-public-address to local: failed preflight."); subsetTestByKey("from-treat-as-public", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source: {- port: kPorts.httpsLocal,- headers: { "Content-Security-Policy": "treat-as-public-address" },- },- target: {- port: kPorts.httpsLocal,- searchParams: {- "preflight-uuid": token(),- "preflight-headers": "cors+pna",+ server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL,+ treatAsPublic: true,+ },+ target: {+ server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL,+ behavior: {+ preflight: PreflightBehavior.success(token()), // Interesting: no need for CORS headers on same-origin final response. }, },- expected: kFetchTestResult.success,+ expected: FetchTestResult.SUCCESS, }), "treat-as-public-address to local: success."); subsetTestByKey("from-treat-as-public", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source: {- port: kPorts.httpsLocal,- headers: { "Content-Security-Policy": "treat-as-public-address" },- },- target: { port: kPorts.httpsPrivate },- expected: kFetchTestResult.failure,+ server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL,+ treatAsPublic: true,+ },+ target: { server: Server.HTTPS_PRIVATE },+ expected: FetchTestResult.FAILURE, }), "treat-as-public-address to private: failed preflight."); subsetTestByKey("from-treat-as-public", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source: {- port: kPorts.httpsLocal,- headers: { "Content-Security-Policy": "treat-as-public-address" },- },- target: {- port: kPorts.httpsPrivate,- searchParams: {- "preflight-uuid": token(),- "preflight-headers": "cors+pna",- "final-headers": "cors",- },- },- expected: kFetchTestResult.success,+ server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL,+ treatAsPublic: true,+ },+ target: {+ server: Server.HTTPS_PRIVATE,+ behavior: {+ preflight: PreflightBehavior.success(token()),+ response: ResponseBehavior.allowCrossOrigin(),+ },+ },+ expected: FetchTestResult.SUCCESS, }), "treat-as-public-address to private: success."); subsetTestByKey("from-treat-as-public", promise_test, t => fetchTest(t, { source: {- port: kPorts.httpsLocal,- headers: { "Content-Security-Policy": "treat-as-public-address" },- },- target: {- port: kPorts.httpsPublic,- searchParams: {- "final-headers": "cors",- }- },- expected: kFetchTestResult.success,+ server: Server.HTTPS_LOCAL,+ treatAsPublic: true,+ },+ target: {+ server: Server.HTTPS_PUBLIC,+ behavior: { response: ResponseBehavior.allowCrossOrigin() },+ },+ expected: FetchTestResult.SUCCESS, }), "treat-as-public-address to public: no preflight required.");
After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't identify any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily refactoring and test improvements for Private Network Access (PNA) functionality, with the following notable changes: 1. The script imports have been simplified (removing ports.sub.js and using support.sub.js instead) 2. The test cases have been refactored to use a more object-oriented approach with Server, ResponseBehavior, and PreflightBehavior constants 3. The test assertions have been updated to use FetchTestResult constants 4. The way preflight and response behaviors are specified has been changed to use behavior objects rather than URL searchParams These changes appear to be architectural improvements rather than security fixes. Here's the structured response: Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found in this diff. The changes appear to be test refactoring and improvements for Private Network Access functionality. If we were to speculate about potential security implications, the changes might relate to: 1. Better handling of CORS and PNA headers 2. More robust preflight request testing 3. Clearer separation of test concerns However, since these are test file changes and no actual vulnerabilities are being fixed, I cannot identify any specific security issues in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/extensions/webidl-api/ExtensionAPIBase.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/extensions/webidl-api/ExtensionAPIBase.h@@ -139,10 +139,12 @@ dom::Promise* aPromise, const RefPtr<dom::Function>& aCallback);- MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void ResolvedCallback(- JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;- MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void RejectedCallback(- JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;+ MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,+ JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+ ErrorResult& aRv) override;+ MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,+ JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,+ ErrorResult& aRv) override; private: ChromeCompatCallbackHandler(ExtensionBrowser* aExtensionBrowser,
Based on the provided diff, here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Error Handling Improvement [File] [Lines 139-144]
[Old Code]
MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void ResolvedCallback(
JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;
MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void RejectedCallback(
JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue) override;
[Fixed Code]
MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void ResolvedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
ErrorResult& aRv) override;
MOZ_CAN_RUN_SCRIPT void RejectedCallback(JSContext* aCx,
JS::Handle<JS::Value> aValue,
ErrorResult& aRv) override;
Additional Details:
The change adds ErrorResult parameters to callback functions, which suggests improved error handling. While this isn't directly fixing a known vulnerability, it could potentially prevent unhandled exceptions or error conditions that might lead to security issues. The modification allows for better error propagation and handling in the callback functions.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/linux_like/android/mod.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/linux_like/android/mod.rs@@ -2328,6 +2328,9 @@ pub const ALG_OP_DECRYPT: ::c_int = 0; pub const ALG_OP_ENCRYPT: ::c_int = 1;+// sys/mman.h+pub const MLOCK_ONFAULT: ::c_int = 0x01;+ // uapi/linux/vm_sockets.h pub const VMADDR_CID_ANY: ::c_uint = 0xFFFFFFFF; pub const VMADDR_CID_HYPERVISOR: ::c_uint = 0;@@ -2582,6 +2585,7 @@ pub fn strerror_r(errnum: ::c_int, buf: *mut c_char, buflen: ::size_t) -> ::c_int; pub fn gettimeofday(tp: *mut ::timeval, tz: *mut ::timezone) -> ::c_int;+ pub fn mlock2(addr: *const ::c_void, len: ::size_t, flags: ::c_int) -> ::c_int; pub fn madvise(addr: *mut ::c_void, len: ::size_t, advice: ::c_int) -> ::c_int; pub fn ioctl(fd: ::c_int, request: ::c_int, ...) -> ::c_int; pub fn msync(addr: *mut ::c_void, len: ::size_t, flags: ::c_int) -> ::c_int;
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Memory Locking Enhancement] [third_party/rust/libc/src/unix/linux_like/android/mod.rs] [Lines 2328-2330, 2585] [Old Code] (No previous MLOCK_ONFAULT constant or mlock2 function) [Fixed Code] pub const MLOCK_ONFAULT: ::c_int = 0x01; pub fn mlock2(addr: *const ::c_void, len: ::size_t, flags: ::c_int) -> ::c_int; Additional Details: - The diff adds support for MLOCK_ONFAULT flag and mlock2 system call, which are related to memory locking functionality - This appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix - The mlock2 system call with MLOCK_ONFAULT flag allows for more granular control over memory locking, which could have security implications (preventing swapping of sensitive memory), but doesn't appear to fix a specific vulnerability - Without more context about why these were added, it's unclear if this addresses a specific security issue or is just adding functionality No clear security vulnerability is being fixed here, just the addition of new memory management capabilities.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.nocontext.source-in.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.nocontext.source-in.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 0.5)';@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'source-in'; var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); ctx.drawImage(offscreenCanvas2, 0, 0);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5); t.done(); });
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming and don't affect security. Here's the analysis following your format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.uncovered.nocontext.source-in.worker.js] [Lines 13-22]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,0,0,0, "50,25", "0,0,0,0", 5);
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or clarity, but this doesn't represent a security fix. The functionality remains identical.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/environment.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/environment.py@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+import errno import json import os import signal@@ -297,3 +298,28 @@ s.close() return failed, pending+++def wait_for_service(logger, host, port, timeout=60):+ """Waits until network service given as a tuple of (host, port) becomes+ available or the `timeout` duration is reached, at which point+ ``socket.error`` is raised."""+ addr = (host, port)+ logger.debug(f"Trying to connect to {host}:{port}")+ end = time.time() + timeout+ while end > time.time():+ so = socket.socket()+ try:+ so.connect(addr)+ except socket.timeout:+ pass+ except socket.error as e:+ if e.errno != errno.ECONNREFUSED:+ raise+ else:+ logger.debug(f"Connected to {host}:{port}")+ return True+ finally:+ so.close()+ time.sleep(0.5)+ raise socket.error("Service is unavailable: %s:%i" % addr)
Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes:
Vulnerability Existed: yes
[Improper Error Handling Leading to Potential Information Leak] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/environment.py] [Lines 297-298, added lines 300-325]
[Old Code]
s.close()
return failed, pending
[Fixed Code]
s.close()
return failed, pending
def wait_for_service(logger, host, port, timeout=60):
"""Waits until network service given as a tuple of (host, port) becomes
available or the `timeout` duration is reached, at which point
``socket.error`` is raised."""
addr = (host, port)
logger.debug(f"Trying to connect to {host}:{port}")
end = time.time() + timeout
while end > time.time():
so = socket.socket()
try:
so.connect(addr)
except socket.timeout:
pass
except socket.error as e:
if e.errno != errno.ECONNREFUSED:
raise
else:
logger.debug(f"Connected to {host}:{port}")
return True
finally:
so.close()
time.sleep(0.5)
raise socket.error("Service is unavailable: %s:%i" % addr)
Additional Details:
The fix adds proper error handling for socket connections, specifically checking for ECONNREFUSED errors. Without this, the code might expose sensitive error information or fail to properly handle connection errors. The new code properly differentiates between connection refused errors (which are expected during service startup) and other socket errors (which are re-raised). This prevents potential information leaks through error messages and ensures more robust error handling.
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Resource Leak] [testing/web-platform/tests/tools/wptrunner/wptrunner/environment.py] [Lines 297-298, added lines 300-325]
[Old Code]
s.close()
return failed, pending
[Fixed Code]
s.close()
return failed, pending
def wait_for_service(logger, host, port, timeout=60):
"""Waits until network service given as a tuple of (host, port) becomes
available or the `timeout` duration is reached, at which point
``socket.error`` is raised."""
addr = (host, port)
logger.debug(f"Trying to connect to {host}:{port}")
end = time.time() + timeout
while end > time.time():
so = socket.socket()
try:
so.connect(addr)
except socket.timeout:
pass
except socket.error as e:
if e.errno != errno.ECONNREFUSED:
raise
else:
logger.debug(f"Connected to {host}:{port}")
return True
finally:
so.close()
time.sleep(0.5)
raise socket.error("Service is unavailable: %s:%i" % addr)
Additional Details:
The new code includes a finally block to ensure socket resources are properly closed, which might address potential resource leaks. However, since we don't see the previous implementation of this functionality (it's a new addition), we can't be certain if this actually fixes an existing vulnerability or just implements new functionality with proper resource handling.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/.github/workflows/interfaces.yml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/.github/workflows/interfaces.yml@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ body: | This automated pull request updates interfaces/*.idl from [@webref/idl ${{ env.webref_idl_version }}](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@webref/idl/v/${{ env.webref_idl_version }}).- Before merging, please check that any tests that depend on the updated IDL files still work.+ Before merging, please check that any tests that depend on the updated IDL files still work. In particular, check for **gray boxes as the wpt.fyi check status**, which usually means that some tests have regressed. If additional changes are needed, please manually create another PR based on this one.
Based on the provided diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be purely informational, adding more detailed instructions about what to check before merging. Here's the analysis:
Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/.github/workflows/interfaces.yml
Lines: 25
Old Code: Before merging, please check that any tests that depend on the updated IDL files still work.
Fixed Code: Before merging, please check that any tests that depend on the updated IDL files still work. In particular, check for **gray boxes as the wpt.fyi check status**, which usually means that some tests have regressed.
The change is focused on improving the clarity of the merge instructions rather than addressing any security issues. No security-related patterns (like credential exposure, injection vulnerabilities, etc.) are present in either the old or new code.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/absolute-tables-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/absolute-tables-001.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Anders Ruud" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="author" title="David Grogan" href="mailto:[email protected]"> <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/CSS22/visudet.html#the-width-property" title="See Note in <percentage>">-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="percent lengths of an abspos table are resolved against the padding box of the parent" /> <style> main div {
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes: 1. Vulnerability Existed: no No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-tables/absolute-tables-001.html [Lines] 5 [Old Code] `<meta name="flags" content="" />` [Fixed Code] (line removed) Additional Details: - The change simply removes an empty meta tag for "flags" which doesn't appear to be security-related - This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix - No known vulnerability is associated with this change - The modification doesn't introduce any security improvements or fixes
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-007.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-007.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/"> <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#shapes-from-box-values"> <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-007-ref.html">- <meta name="flags" content=""> <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the left float shape defined by the border-box and border-bottom-right-radius value under vertical-lr writing-mode."> <style> .container {
Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities: Vulnerability Existed: no [No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/shape-box/shape-outside-border-box-border-radius-007.html] [Lines 9] [Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">] [Fixed Code: (line removed)] Additional details: 1. The change simply removes an empty meta "flags" tag which appears to be test-related metadata. 2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being fixed here. 3. The change seems to be a test cleanup rather than a security fix. 4. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change. The modification doesn't appear to address any security issue but rather improves code cleanliness by removing unnecessary markup.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.null.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.put.null.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.putImageData(null, 0, 0); }); t.done();
Analyzing the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
Old Code:
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
Fixed Code:
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional Details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- The functionality remains exactly the same
- No security implications are apparent from this change
- The test continues to verify that passing null to putImageData throws a TypeError as expected
This appears to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.kern.consistent-manual.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.draw.kern.consistent-manual.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
Additional details:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security implications are evident in this change
- The modification seems to be for code consistency or readability rather than security fixes
- No known vulnerability patterns are present in either the old or new code
This appears to be a refactoring change rather than a security fix. The functionality remains identical, only the variable name has been changed.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/taskcluster/mach_commands.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/taskcluster/mach_commands.py@@ -360,13 +360,13 @@ import gecko_taskgraph import gecko_taskgraph.actions import gecko_taskgraph.generator- import gecko_taskgraph.parameters+ from taskgraph.parameters import parameters_loader try: setup_logging( command_context, quiet=options["quiet"], verbose=options["verbose"] )- parameters = gecko_taskgraph.parameters.parameters_loader(options["parameters"])+ parameters = parameters_loader(options["parameters"]) tgg = gecko_taskgraph.generator.TaskGraphGenerator( root_dir=options.get("root"),
Let me analyze this code diff for potential security fixes.
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Import Restructuring] [taskcluster/mach_commands.py] [Lines 360-367]
[Old Code]
import gecko_taskgraph
import gecko_taskgraph.actions
import gecko_taskgraph.generator
import gecko_taskgraph.parameters
try:
setup_logging(
command_context, quiet=options["quiet"], verbose=options["verbose"]
)
parameters = gecko_taskgraph.parameters.parameters_loader(options["parameters"])
[Fixed Code]
import gecko_taskgraph
import gecko_taskgraph.actions
import gecko_taskgraph.generator
from taskgraph.parameters import parameters_loader
try:
setup_logging(
command_context, quiet=options["quiet"], verbose=options["verbose"]
)
parameters = parameters_loader(options["parameters"])
Additional Details:
- The change appears to be primarily about restructuring imports rather than fixing a security vulnerability
- The modification changes how parameters_loader is imported (from gecko_taskgraph.parameters to taskgraph.parameters)
- While this could potentially affect security if the original import path was vulnerable, there's no clear evidence of a security fix here
- The functionality remains the same, just accessed through a different import path
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/media/MediaStreamError.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/media/MediaStreamError.cpp@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS0(MediaMgrError)-void MediaMgrError::Reject(dom::Promise* aPromise) {+void MediaMgrError::Reject(dom::Promise* aPromise) const { switch (mName) { case Name::AbortError: aPromise->MaybeRejectWithAbortError(mMessage);
Let me analyze the code diff for potential security fixes:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Promise Rejection Issue] [dom/media/MediaStreamError.cpp] [Lines 47]
[Old Code]
void MediaMgrError::Reject(dom::Promise* aPromise) {
[Fixed Code]
void MediaMgrError::Reject(dom::Promise* aPromise) const {
Additional Details:
The change adds a 'const' qualifier to the Reject method. While this isn't directly fixing a known vulnerability, it could be related to thread safety or preventing unintended modifications to the object state during promise rejection. The const qualifier ensures the method doesn't modify the object's state, which could potentially prevent race conditions in multi-threaded scenarios. However, without more context, I can't definitively say this fixes a specific vulnerability.
Note: The diff shows only this one change, and it appears to be more of a code quality/thread safety improvement rather than a direct security fix.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/tools/lint/android/lints.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/tools/lint/android/lints.py@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ "path": mozpath.relpath(r["file"], topsrcdir), "lineno": int(r["line"]), "column": int(r.get("column") or 0),- "message": "Unexpected api change. Please run ./gradlew {} for more "+ "message": "Unexpected api change. Please run ./mach gradle {} for more " "information".format( " ".join(lintargs["substs"]["GRADLE_ANDROID_API_LINT_TASKS"]) ),@@ -194,7 +194,10 @@ for issue in issues: issue["path"] = issue["path"].replace(lintargs["root"], "") # We want warnings to be errors for linting purposes.- issue["level"] = "error"+ # TODO: Bug 1316188 - resolve missing javadoc comments+ issue["level"] = (+ "error" if issue["message"] != ": no comment" else "warning"+ ) results.append(result.from_config(config, **issue)) return results@@ -229,6 +232,10 @@ for issue in root.findall("issue"): location = issue[0]+ if "third_party" in location.get("file") or "thirdparty" in location.get(+ "file"+ ):+ continue err = { "level": issue.get("severity").lower(), "rule": issue.get("id"),
Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] tools/lint/android/lints.py [Lines] 160-164
Old Code:
"message": "Unexpected api change. Please run ./gradlew {} for more "
"information".format(
" ".join(lintargs["substs"]["GRADLE_ANDROID_API_LINT_TASKS"])
Fixed Code:
"message": "Unexpected api change. Please run ./mach gradle {} for more "
"information".format(
" ".join(lintargs["substs"]["GRADLE_ANDROID_API_LINT_TASKS"])
Additional Details: This appears to be a command change from ./gradlew to ./mach gradle, which doesn't indicate a security vulnerability fix.
2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leakage [File] tools/lint/android/lints.py [Lines] 194-197
Old Code:
issue["level"] = "error"
Fixed Code:
issue["level"] = (
"error" if issue["message"] != ": no comment" else "warning"
)
Additional Details: While this change modifies error handling behavior, it's unclear if this was fixing a security issue or just adjusting severity levels. The reference to Bug 1316188 suggests it might be related to missing Javadoc comments rather than a security fix.
3. Vulnerability Existed: no
Third-party Code Filtering [File] tools/lint/android/lints.py [Lines] 229-234
Old Code:
for issue in root.findall("issue"):
location = issue[0]
Fixed Code:
for issue in root.findall("issue"):
location = issue[0]
if "third_party" in location.get("file") or "thirdparty" in location.get(
"file"
):
continue
Additional Details: This change adds filtering for third-party code in linting, which improves code quality control but doesn't appear to address a specific security vulnerability.
No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in the provided diff. The changes appear to be primarily related to improving linting behavior and command execution paths.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/geckodriver/doc/Testing.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/geckodriver/doc/Testing.md@@ -55,5 +55,5 @@ [cargo]: http://doc.crates.io/guide.html [headless mode]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Firefox/Headless_mode [mozconfig]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Developer_guide/Build_Instructions/Configuring_Build_Options-[trace-level logs]: TraceLogs.html-[Marionette protocol]: https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/testing/marionette/Protocol.html+[trace-level logs]: TraceLogs.md+[Marionette protocol]: /testing/marionette/Protocol.md
Analysis of the provided code diff:
1. Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/geckodriver/doc/Testing.md [Lines] 55-56
[Old Code]
[trace-level logs]: TraceLogs.html
[Marionette protocol]: https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/testing/marionette/Protocol.html
[Fixed Code]
[trace-level logs]: TraceLogs.md
[Marionette protocol]: /testing/marionette/Protocol.md
The changes appear to be documentation updates where file extensions were changed from .html to .md and a URL was simplified to a relative path. These modifications don't indicate any security fixes, but rather documentation formatting improvements. No known vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp@@ -236,6 +236,11 @@ // Sandboxed document check: javascript: URI execution is disabled // in a sandboxed document unless 'allow-scripts' was specified. if (targetDoc->HasScriptsBlockedBySandbox()) {+ if (nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> obs =+ mozilla::services::GetObserverService()) {+ obs->NotifyWhenScriptSafe(ToSupports(innerWin),+ "javascript-uri-blocked-by-sandbox");+ } return NS_ERROR_DOM_RETVAL_UNDEFINED; }
Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:
Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Sandbox Bypass or Missing Security Notification] [dom/jsurl/nsJSProtocolHandler.cpp] [Lines 236-241]
[Old Code]
```cpp
if (targetDoc->HasScriptsBlockedBySandbox()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_RETVAL_UNDEFINED;
}
```
[Fixed Code]
```cpp
if (targetDoc->HasScriptsBlockedBySandbox()) {
if (nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> obs =
mozilla::services::GetObserverService()) {
obs->NotifyWhenScriptSafe(ToSupports(innerWin),
"javascript-uri-blocked-by-sandbox");
}
return NS_ERROR_DOM_RETVAL_UNDEFINED;
}
```
Additional Details:
1. The change adds a security notification when JavaScript URIs are blocked by sandbox restrictions
2. While this doesn't fix a direct vulnerability, it improves security monitoring
3. The notification could help detect potential sandbox bypass attempts
4. Without more context, it's unclear if this was fixing a specific vulnerability or just improving security infrastructure
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/readable-streams/reentrant-strategies.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/readable-streams/reentrant-strategies.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker // META: script=../resources/recording-streams.js // META: script=../resources/rs-utils.js // META: script=../resources/test-utils.js
Analysis of the code diff: 1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure [Potential Scope Reduction] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/readable-streams/reentrant-strategies.any.js] [Lines 1] Old Code: `// META: global=window,worker,jsshell` Fixed Code: `// META: global=window,worker` Additional Details: - The change removes 'jsshell' from the global scope declaration in the test file's metadata - This could be a security-related change if 'jsshell' had potential security implications, but without more context about why it was removed, we can't be certain - It might represent a tightening of the test environment scope for security reasons, but could also be unrelated to security Note: Since this is a test file change, it's less likely to represent a direct security vulnerability in production code, but could reflect security considerations in the testing environment.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.
--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.fill.closed.basic.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.fill.closed.basic.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ ctx.lineTo(100, 50); ctx.lineTo(0, 50); ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });
Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The modifications appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes (variable renaming). Here's the analysis following your requested format:
Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.fill.closed.basic.html] [Lines 17-28]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't appear to have any security implications. The functionality remains identical.
If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.