--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/gecko/GeckoAppShell.java+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/gecko/GeckoAppShell.java@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ import org.mozilla.gecko.util.ProxySelector; import org.mozilla.gecko.util.ThreadUtils; import org.mozilla.geckoview.BuildConfig;+import org.mozilla.geckoview.GeckoResult; import org.mozilla.geckoview.R; public class GeckoAppShell {@@ -1456,4 +1457,15 @@     final int id = info.labelRes;     return id == 0 ? info.nonLocalizedLabel.toString() : context.getString(id);   }++  @WrapForJNI+  public static native boolean isParentProcess();++  /**+   * Returns a GeckoResult that will be completed to true if the GPU process is running and false if+   * it is disabled. If the GPU process is currently being (re)started this will wait until it is+   * ready before completing.+   */+  @WrapForJNI+  public static native GeckoResult<Boolean> ensureGpuProcessReady(); }

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Native Method Exposure] [mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/java/org/mozilla/gecko/GeckoAppShell.java] [Lines 1459-1467]
    [Old Code]
    (No equivalent native methods existed before)
    [Fixed Code]
    @WrapForJNI
    public static native boolean isParentProcess();

    /**
     * Returns a GeckoResult that will be completed to true if the GPU process is running and false if
     * it is disabled. If the GPU process is currently being (re)started this will wait until it is
     * ready before completing.
     */
    @WrapForJNI
    public static native GeckoResult<Boolean> ensureGpuProcessReady();

Additional Notes:
- The diff adds two new native methods exposed to JavaScript via @WrapForJNI annotation
- While not necessarily vulnerabilities themselves, exposing native methods always carries potential risks if not properly secured
- The methods appear to be related to process management (checking parent process status and GPU process readiness)
- Without seeing the native implementations, it's impossible to determine if there are actual vulnerabilities
- The changes seem focused on functionality rather than security fixes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.overlap.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.overlap.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#000'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ctx.moveTo(0, 30); ctx.lineTo(100, 30); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,127,0,255, "50,25", "0,127,0,255", 1);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,127,0,255, "50,25", "0,127,0,255", 1); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable was renamed for consistency. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.overlap.worker.js] [Lines 13-25]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,127,0,255, "50,25", "0,127,0,255", 1);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,127,0,255, "50,25", "0,127,0,255", 1);

The changes simply rename the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` throughout the file, which doesn't appear to address any security vulnerability. The functionality remains identical.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/dir-selector-rtl-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/dir-selector-rtl-001.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@     <link rel="author" title="Takeshi Kurosawa" href="mailto:[email protected]">     <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/selectors4/#dir-pseudo">     <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-    <meta name="flags" content="">     <meta name="assert" content="The :dir(rtl) pseudo-class matches an elment that has a directionality of right-to-left (rtl). Since the div element has dir=rtl, the selector matches.">     <style>        div {

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The modification appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag related to test flags, which doesn't have any security implications.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 5]
[Old Code]
<meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
(removed line)

This change is purely cosmetic/cleanup related to test configuration and doesn't address any security issues. The removed line was an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any functional purpose in the test file.

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff. The rest of the changes are either whitespace or unrelated to security.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/raptor/raptor/browsertime/base.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/raptor/raptor/browsertime/base.py@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@                 (                     "gecko_profile_features",                     "--firefox.geckoProfilerParams.features",-                    "js,leaf,stackwalk,cpu,threads",+                    "js,leaf,stackwalk,cpu,threads,screenshots",                 ),                 (                     "gecko_profile_threads",

Let me analyze the code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Exposure] [testing/raptor/raptor/browsertime/base.py] [Lines 353-357]
[Old Code]
                    "gecko_profile_features",
                    "--firefox.geckoProfilerParams.features",
                    "js,leaf,stackwalk,cpu,threads",
[Fixed Code]
                    "gecko_profile_features",
                    "--firefox.geckoProfilerParams.features",
                    "js,leaf,stackwalk,cpu,threads,screenshots",

Additional Details:
The change adds "screenshots" to the gecko profiler features. While not clearly a security vulnerability, this could potentially expose sensitive visual information through screenshots during profiling. The security impact would depend on how these profiling features are used in the application.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/components/glean/docs/user/gifft.md+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/components/glean/docs/user/gifft.md@@ -31,22 +31,22 @@ | Glean Metric Type | Telementry Probe Type | | ----------------- | --------------------- |-| [boolean](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/boolean.html) | [Scalar of kind: boolean](../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html) |-| [labeled_boolean](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/labeled_booleans.html) | [Keyed scalar of kind: boolean](../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html) |-| [counter](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/counter.html) | [Scalar of kind: uint](../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html) |-| [labeled_counter](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/labeled_counters.html) | [Keyed Scalar of kind: uint](../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html) |-| [string](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/string.html) | [Scalar of kind: string](../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html) |+| [boolean](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/boolean.html) | [Scalar of kind: boolean](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst) |+| [labeled_boolean](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/labeled_booleans.html) | [Keyed scalar of kind: boolean](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst) |+| [counter](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/counter.html) | [Scalar of kind: uint](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst) |+| [labeled_counter](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/labeled_counters.html) | [Keyed Scalar of kind: uint](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst) |+| [string](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/string.html) | [Scalar of kind: string](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst) | | [labeled_string](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/labeled_strings.html) | *No Supported Telemetry Type* |-| [string_list](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/string_list.html) | [Keyed Scalar of kind: boolean](../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html). The keys are the strings. The values are all `true`. Calling `Set` on the labeled_string is not mirrored (since there's no way to remove keys from a keyed scalar of kind boolean). Doing so will log a warning. |-| [timespan](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/timespan.html) | [Scalar of kind: uint](../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html). The value is in units of milliseconds. |-| [timing_distribution](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/timing_distribution.html) | [Histogram of kind "linear" or "exponential"](../../telemetry/collection/histograms.html#exponential). Samples will be in units of milliseconts. |-| [memory_distribution](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/memory_distribution.html) | [Histogram of kind "linear" or "exponential"](../../telemetry/collection/histograms.html#exponential). Samples will be in `memory_unit` units. |-| [custom_distribution](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/custom_distribution.html) | [Histogram of kind "linear" or "exponential"](../../telemetry/collection/histograms.html#exponential). Samples will be used as is. Ensure the bucket count and range match. |-| [uuid](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/uuid.html) | [Scalar of kind: string](../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html). Value will be in canonical 8-4-4-4-12 format. Value is not guaranteed to be valid, and invalid values may be present in the mirrored scalar which the uuid metric remains empty. Calling `GenerateAndSet` on the uuid is not mirrored, and will log a warning. |-| [datetime](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/datetime.html) | [Scalar of kind: string](../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html). Value will be in ISO8601 format. |-| [events](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/event.html) | [Events](../../telemetry/collection/events.html). The `value` field will be left empty.  |-| [quantity](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/quantity.html) | [Scalar of kind: uint](../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html) |-| [rate](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/rate.html) | [Keyed Scalar of kind: uint](../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html). The keys are "numerator" and "denominator". Does not work for `rate` metrics with external denominators. |+| [string_list](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/string_list.html) | [Keyed Scalar of kind: boolean](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst). The keys are the strings. The values are all `true`. Calling `Set` on the labeled_string is not mirrored (since there's no way to remove keys from a keyed scalar of kind boolean). Doing so will log a warning. |+| [timespan](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/timespan.html) | [Scalar of kind: uint](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst). The value is in units of milliseconds. |+| [timing_distribution](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/timing_distribution.html) | [Histogram of kind "linear" or "exponential"](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/histograms.rst#exponential). Samples will be in units of milliseconts. |+| [memory_distribution](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/memory_distribution.html) | [Histogram of kind "linear" or "exponential"](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/histograms.rst#exponential). Samples will be in `memory_unit` units. |+| [custom_distribution](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/custom_distribution.html) | [Histogram of kind "linear" or "exponential"](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/histograms.rst#exponential). Samples will be used as is. Ensure the bucket count and range match. |+| [uuid](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/uuid.html) | [Scalar of kind: string](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst). Value will be in canonical 8-4-4-4-12 format. Value is not guaranteed to be valid, and invalid values may be present in the mirrored scalar while the uuid metric remains empty. Calling `GenerateAndSet` on the uuid is not mirrored, and will log a warning. |+| [datetime](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/datetime.html) | [Scalar of kind: string](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst). Value will be in ISO8601 format. |+| [events](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/event.html) | [Events](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/events.rst). The `value` field will be left empty.  |+| [quantity](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/quantity.html) | [Scalar of kind: uint](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst) |+| [rate](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/rate.html) | [Keyed Scalar of kind: uint](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst). The keys are "numerator" and "denominator". Does not work for `rate` metrics with external denominators. | ### The `telemetry_mirror` property in `metrics.yaml`@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ then the Glean metric will have a value and the Telemetry mirror probe won't. Also recall that Telemetry probes split their values across processes.-[Glean metrics do not](ipc.md).+[Glean metrics do not](../dev/ipc.md). This may manifest as curious anomalies when comparing the Glean metric to its Telemetry mirror probe. Ensure your analyses are aggregating Telemetry values from all processes, or define and use process-specific Glean metrics and Telemetry mirror probes to keep things separate.@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ For example, if you are measuring "Number of Monitors" with a [`quantity`](https://mozilla.github.io/glean/book/user/metrics/quantity.html) sent by default in the Glean "metrics" ping mirrored to a-[Scalar of kind: uint](../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html)+[Scalar of kind: uint](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst) sent by default in the Telemetry "main" ping, then if the user plugs in a second monitor between midnight (when Telemetry "main" pings with reason "daily" are sent) and 4AM@@ -158,5 +158,43 @@ and the event will be Summarized in Telemetry as all disabled events are. See-[the Telemetry Event docs](../../telemetry/collection/events.html)+[the Telemetry Event docs](/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/events.rst) for details on how disabled Telemetry Events behave.++### Numeric Values++The arguments and storage formats for Glean's numeric types+(`counter`, `labeled_counter`, `quantity`, `rate`, and `timespan`)+are different from Telemetry's numeric type+(Scalar of kind `uint`).++This results in a few notable differences.++#### Saturation and Overflow++`counter`, `labeled_counter`, and `rate` metrics are stored as 32-bit signed values.+`quantity` metrics are stored as 64-bit signed values.+All of these Glean numeric metric types saturate at their maximum representable value.++Scalars of kind `uint` are stored as 32-bit unsigned values.+They will overflow if they exceed the value $2^{32} - 1$.++If a Glean numeric type saturates, it will record an error of type `invalid_overflow`.+In your analyses please check for these errors.++#### Quantity Value Over-size++Values greater than $2^{32} - 1$ passed to a `quantity` metric's+`set()` method will be clamped to $2^{32} - 1$ before being passed to the metric's Telemetry mirror.++#### Negative Values++Values less than 0 passed to any numeric metric type's API will not be passed on to the Telemetry mirror.+This avoids small negative numbers being cast into a stunningly large numbers,+and keeps the Telemetry mirror's value closer to that of the Glean metric.++#### Long Time Spans++If the number of milliseconds between calls to a+`timespan` metric's `start()` and `stop()` methods exceeds $2^{32} - 1$,+the value passed to the metric's Telemetry mirror will be clamped to $2^{32} - 1$.

After analyzing the provided code diff, I can confirm that this is a documentation change with no actual code modifications. The changes primarily involve updating links and adding documentation about numeric value handling. There are no security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff.

Here's the analysis following the requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerabilities found in documentation update [File] [Lines]
[Old documentation links and content]
[Updated documentation links and added numeric value explanations]

The changes include:
1. Updating relative links to absolute paths (e.g., `../../telemetry/collection/scalars.html` to `/toolkit/components/telemetry/collection/scalars.rst`)
2. Adding new documentation section about numeric value handling differences between Glean and Telemetry
3. Fixing a typo in "milliseconds" (was "milliseconts")
4. Updating some wording for clarity

These are all documentation improvements with no security implications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-table-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-table-001.html@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="match" href="reference/contain-paint-047-ref.html">   <meta content="This test checks that paint containment applies to table elements. Therefore the content of the table element should be clipped to the padding edge of its principal box." name="assert">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <style>   div#table

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-contain/contain-paint-table-001.html] [Lines 10]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">]
[Fixed Code: (line removed)]

Additional details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute. This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix.
2. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed here.
3. The modification doesn't affect any security-related functionality or introduce any security controls.
4. The change is likely related to test configuration rather than security hardening.

No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change. The modification appears to be purely cosmetic or related to test configuration cleanup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/netwerk/test/fuzz/TestHttpFuzzing.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/netwerk/test/fuzz/TestHttpFuzzing.cpp@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static int FuzzingInitNetworkHttp3(int* argc, char*** argv) {   Preferences::SetBool("fuzzing.necko.http3", true);-  Preferences::SetBool("network.http.http3.enabled", true);+  Preferences::SetBool("network.http.http3.enable", true);   Preferences::SetCString("network.http.http3.alt-svc-mapping-for-testing",                           "fuzz.bad.tld;h3=:443");   httpSpec = "https://fuzz.bad.tld/";

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[HTTP3 Preference Misconfiguration] [netwerk/test/fuzz/TestHttpFuzzing.cpp] [Lines 56-57]
[Old Code]
  Preferences::SetBool("network.http.http3.enabled", true);
[Fixed Code]
  Preferences::SetBool("network.http.http3.enable", true);

Additional Details:
- The change appears to be correcting a preference name from "network.http.http3.enabled" to "network.http.http3.enable"
- While this could potentially affect HTTP3 functionality, it's not clear if this was an actual security vulnerability or just a configuration fix
- The change might relate to proper HTTP3 protocol handling, but without more context, we can't confirm if this was fixing a security issue

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.align.invalid.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/text/2d.text.align.invalid.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.textAlign = 'start'; ctx.textAlign = 'bogus';

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional details:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or vulnerability fixes are evident in this diff
- The modification doesn't affect any security-sensitive operations or introduce/remove any security controls
- The test case continues to check invalid textAlign values ('bogus') which is part of normal test functionality

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.valid.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.valid.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.lineWidth = 1.5; _assertSame(ctx.lineWidth, 1.5, "ctx.lineWidth", "1.5");

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.width.valid.worker.js [Lines] 13-14
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` with no security implications. This is likely a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix. No known vulnerability is being addressed here.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/codegen/from_meta_impl.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/darling_core/src/codegen/from_meta_impl.rs@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@ use proc_macro2::TokenStream; use quote::ToTokens;-use syn;-use ast::{Data, Fields, Style};-use codegen::{Field, OuterFromImpl, TraitImpl, Variant};+use crate::ast::{Data, Fields, Style};+use crate::codegen::{Field, OuterFromImpl, TraitImpl, Variant}; pub struct FromMetaImpl<'a> {     pub base: TraitImpl<'a>,@@ -53,7 +52,7 @@                 let decls = base.local_declarations();                 let core_loop = base.core_loop();                 let default = base.fallback_decl();-                let map = base.map_fn();+                let post_transform = base.post_transform_call();                 quote!(                     fn from_list(__items: &[::syn::NestedMeta]) -> ::darling::Result<Self> {@@ -72,7 +71,7 @@                         ::darling::export::Ok(Self {                             #(#inits),*-                        }) #map+                        }) #post_transform                     }                 )             }

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Dependency Update/Code Organization [File] [Lines 1-9]
   [Old Code]
   use proc_macro2::TokenStream;
   use quote::ToTokens;
   -use syn;
   -
   -use ast::{Data, Fields, Style};
   -use codegen::{Field, OuterFromImpl, TraitImpl, Variant};
   
   [Fixed Code]
   use proc_macro2::TokenStream;
   use quote::ToTokens;
   +use crate::ast::{Data, Fields, Style};
   +use crate::codegen::{Field, OuterFromImpl, TraitImpl, Variant};

   Additional Details: This appears to be a code organization change updating import paths to use explicit crate:: prefix rather than relative paths. No security implications found.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Function Renaming for Clarity [File] [Lines 53,72]
   [Old Code]
   let map = base.map_fn();
   ...
   }) #map
   
   [Fixed Code]
   let post_transform = base.post_transform_call();
   ...
   }) #post_transform

   Additional Details: The function name changed from `map_fn` to `post_transform_call`, which might indicate a security-relevant change in functionality, but without seeing the implementation of these functions, I can't be certain. The change suggests more explicit transformation handling.

No clear security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The changes appear to be primarily code organization and naming improvements rather than security fixes. The function renaming might have security implications if the old implementation had vulnerabilities, but this cannot be determined from the diff alone.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/polygon/shape-outside-polygon-023.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/polygon/shape-outside-polygon-023.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-polygon-023-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the boxes are wrapping around the right float shape defined by the polygon(60px 20px, 100px 60px, 20px 60px, 60px 100px) border-box value under vertical-lr writing-mode.">   <style>   .container {

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag for flags, which doesn't have any security implications.

Answer:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found in this change. The diff only removes an empty meta tag which doesn't affect security.

The change is purely cosmetic/structural and doesn't involve any security-sensitive code or functionality. The file is a test case for CSS shape-outside property functionality, and the modification doesn't introduce or fix any security-related issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/themes/toolbox.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/themes/toolbox.css@@ -384,6 +384,14 @@   --menuitem-icon-image: url("chrome://devtools/skin/images/command-noautohide.svg"); }+#toolbox-meatball-menu-pseudo-locale-accented {+  --menuitem-icon-image: url("chrome://devtools/skin/images/command-accented.svg");+}++#toolbox-meatball-menu-pseudo-locale-bidi {+  --menuitem-icon-image: url("chrome://devtools/skin/images/command-bidi.svg");+}+ #toolbox-meatball-menu-settings {   --menuitem-icon-image: url("chrome://devtools/skin/images/settings.svg"); }

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] devtools/client/themes/toolbox.css [Lines 384-394]
    [Old Code]
    (No previous definitions for these menu items)
    [Fixed Code]
    #toolbox-meatball-menu-pseudo-locale-accented {
      --menuitem-icon-image: url("chrome://devtools/skin/images/command-accented.svg");
    }
    
    #toolbox-meatball-menu-pseudo-locale-bidi {
      --menuitem-icon-image: url("chrome://devtools/skin/images/command-bidi.svg");
    }

Additional Details:
- The diff shows only the addition of new CSS rules for menu items in the developer tools theme
- The changes involve adding new icon references for pseudo-locale menu items
- No security vulnerabilities are apparent as these are purely stylistic changes
- The URLs use the secure chrome:// protocol which is internal to Firefox
- No user input or sensitive data handling is involved in these changes

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/mochitest/tests/SimpleTest/ExtensionTestUtils.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/mochitest/tests/SimpleTest/ExtensionTestUtils.js@@ -1,9 +1,21 @@-var ExtensionTestUtils = {};- const { ExtensionTestCommon } = SpecialPowers.Cu.import(   "resource://testing-common/ExtensionTestCommon.jsm",   {} );++var ExtensionTestUtils = {+  // Shortcut to more easily access WebExtensionPolicy.backgroundServiceWorkerEnabled+  // from mochitest-plain tests.+  getBackgroundServiceWorkerEnabled() {+    return ExtensionTestCommon.getBackgroundServiceWorkerEnabled();+  },++  // A test helper used to check if the pref "extension.backgroundServiceWorker.forceInTestExtension"+  // is set to true.+  isInBackgroundServiceWorkerTests() {+    return ExtensionTestCommon.isInBackgroundServiceWorkerTests();+  },+}; ExtensionTestUtils.loadExtension = function(ext) {   // Cleanup functions need to be registered differently depending on

Here's my analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/mochitest/tests/SimpleTest/ExtensionTestUtils.js] [Lines 1-21]
[Old Code]
var ExtensionTestUtils = {};

const { ExtensionTestCommon } = SpecialPowers.Cu.import(
  "resource://testing-common/ExtensionTestCommon.jsm",
  {}
);
[Fixed Code]
const { ExtensionTestCommon } = SpecialPowers.Cu.import(
  "resource://testing-common/ExtensionTestCommon.jsm",
  {}
);

var ExtensionTestUtils = {
  getBackgroundServiceWorkerEnabled() {
    return ExtensionTestCommon.getBackgroundServiceWorkerEnabled();
  },

  isInBackgroundServiceWorkerTests() {
    return ExtensionTestCommon.isInBackgroundServiceWorkerTests();
  },
};

Additional Details:
The changes appear to be functional enhancements rather than security fixes. The diff shows:
1. Reorganization of code (moving the ExtensionTestUtils declaration after the import)
2. Addition of two new utility methods for testing background service workers
3. No apparent security vulnerabilities were fixed in this change

The modifications seem focused on adding testing capabilities for background service workers in extensions, which is a feature addition rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.source-over.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.source-over.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 1.0)';@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'source-over'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 255, 0, 1.0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,255, "50,25", "255,255,0,255", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,255, "50,25", "255,255,0,255", 5); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) without any security implications. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.source-over.worker.js] [Lines 13-22]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,255, "50,25", "255,255,0,255", 5);
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,255, "50,25", "255,255,0,255", 5);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature, improving variable naming consistency without addressing any security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_cert_chains.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_cert_chains.js@@ -4,28 +4,6 @@ // file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. "use strict";--function test_cert_equals() {-  let certA = constructCertFromFile("bad_certs/default-ee.pem");-  let certB = constructCertFromFile("bad_certs/default-ee.pem");-  let certC = constructCertFromFile("bad_certs/expired-ee.pem");--  ok(-    certA != certB,-    "Cert objects constructed from the same file should not be equal" +-      " according to the equality operators"-  );-  ok(-    certA.equals(certB),-    "equals() on cert objects constructed from the same cert file should" +-      " return true"-  );-  ok(-    !certA.equals(certC),-    "equals() on cert objects constructed from files for different certs" +-      " should return false"-  );-} // We hard-code the following certificates for the pkcs7 export tests so that we // don't have to change the test data when the certificates change each year.@@ -679,12 +657,6 @@   do_get_profile();   add_tls_server_setup("BadCertAndPinningServer", "bad_certs");-  // Test nsIX509Cert.equals-  add_test(function() {-    test_cert_equals();-    run_next_test();-  });-   add_test(function() {     test_cert_pkcs7_export();     run_next_test();

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Test Coverage Reduction] [security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_cert_chains.js] [Lines 4-28, 679-683]
   [Old Code]
   function test_cert_equals() {
     let certA = constructCertFromFile("bad_certs/default-ee.pem");
     let certB = constructCertFromFile("bad_certs/default-ee.pem");
     let certC = constructCertFromFile("bad_certs/expired-ee.pem");
   
     ok(
       certA != certB,
       "Cert objects constructed from the same file should not be equal" +
         " according to the equality operators"
     );
     ok(
       certA.equals(certB),
       "equals() on cert objects constructed from the same cert file should" +
         " return true"
     );
     ok(
       !certA.equals(certC),
       "equals() on cert objects constructed from files for different certs" +
         " should return false"
     );
   }
   
   // And in test setup:
   add_test(function() {
     test_cert_equals();
     run_next_test();
   });
   [Fixed Code]
   [Entire test function and its invocation removed]

Notes:
- The diff shows removal of a test function `test_cert_equals()` and its test case
- While this removes test coverage for certificate equality checking, it's unclear if this represents a security vulnerability
- The removal might indicate either:
  * The functionality is no longer needed (certificate equality checking moved elsewhere)
  * The test was deemed unnecessary
  * The functionality was removed from the product
- Without more context about why this was removed, we can't definitively say if this represents a security fix or just test cleanup

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-percent.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-percent.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0%,100%,0%,0.499)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,127, "50,25", "0,255,0,127");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,127, "50,25", "0,255,0,127"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding function call. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-21]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
    ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0%,100%,0%,0.499)';
    ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,127, "50,25", "0,255,0,127");
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    ctx.fillStyle = '#f00';
    ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0%,100%,0%,0.499)';
    ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,127, "50,25", "0,255,0,127");

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.clip.2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.clip.2.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ ctx.shadowOffsetX = 50; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50); ctx.restore();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Variable Renaming [File] [Lines 13-14, 28-29]
   Old Code:
   ```javascript
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```javascript
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");
   ```

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security vulnerabilities are being addressed in this diff
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has changed
- This is likely a consistency improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jsapi-tests/testParserAtom.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jsapi-tests/testParserAtom.cpp@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ } END_TEST(testParserAtom_empty)-// Test length-1 fast-path is consistent across entry points.-BEGIN_TEST(testParserAtom_tiny1) {+// Test length-1 fast-path is consistent across entry points for ASCII.+BEGIN_TEST(testParserAtom_tiny1_ASCII) {   using js::frontend::ParserAtom;   using js::frontend::ParserAtomsTable;   using js::frontend::ParserAtomVector;@@ -61,14 +61,251 @@   CHECK(atomTable.internUtf8(cx, utf8, 1) == refIndex);   CHECK(atomTable.internChar16(cx, char16, 1) == refIndex);-  // Note: If Latin1-Extended characters become supported, then UTF-8 behaviour-  // should be tested.-  char16_t ae = 0x00E6;-  CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(&ae, 1));--  return true;-}-END_TEST(testParserAtom_tiny1)+  return true;+}+END_TEST(testParserAtom_tiny1_ASCII)++// Test length-1 fast-path is consistent across entry points for non-ASCII.+BEGIN_TEST(testParserAtom_tiny1_nonASCII) {+  using js::frontend::ParserAtom;+  using js::frontend::ParserAtomsTable;+  using js::frontend::ParserAtomVector;++  js::LifoAlloc alloc(512);+  ParserAtomsTable atomTable(cx->runtime(), alloc);++  {+    char16_t euro = 0x0080;+    JS::Latin1Char latin1[] = {0x80};+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC2)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0x80))};+    char16_t char16[] = {0x0080};++    auto refIndex = cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(&euro, 1);+    CHECK(refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internLatin1(cx, latin1, 1) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internUtf8(cx, utf8, 2) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internChar16(cx, char16, 1) == refIndex);+  }++  {+    char16_t frac12 = 0x00BD;+    JS::Latin1Char latin1[] = {0xBD};+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC2)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xBD))};+    char16_t char16[] = {0x00BD};++    auto refIndex =+        cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(&frac12, 1);+    CHECK(refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internLatin1(cx, latin1, 1) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internUtf8(cx, utf8, 2) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internChar16(cx, char16, 1) == refIndex);+  }++  {+    char16_t iquest = 0x00BF;+    JS::Latin1Char latin1[] = {0xBF};+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC2)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xBF))};+    char16_t char16[] = {0x00BF};++    auto refIndex =+        cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(&iquest, 1);+    CHECK(refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internLatin1(cx, latin1, 1) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internUtf8(cx, utf8, 2) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internChar16(cx, char16, 1) == refIndex);+  }++  {+    char16_t agrave = 0x00C0;+    JS::Latin1Char latin1[] = {0xC0};+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC3)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0x80))};+    char16_t char16[] = {0x00C0};++    auto refIndex =+        cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(&agrave, 1);+    CHECK(refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internLatin1(cx, latin1, 1) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internUtf8(cx, utf8, 2) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internChar16(cx, char16, 1) == refIndex);+  }++  {+    char16_t ae = 0x00E6;+    JS::Latin1Char latin1[] = {0xE6};+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC3)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xA6))};+    char16_t char16[] = {0x00E6};++    auto refIndex = cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(&ae, 1);+    CHECK(refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internLatin1(cx, latin1, 1) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internUtf8(cx, utf8, 2) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internChar16(cx, char16, 1) == refIndex);+  }++  {+    char16_t yuml = 0x00FF;+    JS::Latin1Char latin1[] = {0xFF};+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC3)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xBF))};+    char16_t char16[] = {0x00FF};++    auto refIndex = cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(&yuml, 1);+    CHECK(refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internLatin1(cx, latin1, 1) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internUtf8(cx, utf8, 2) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internChar16(cx, char16, 1) == refIndex);+  }++  return true;+}+END_TEST(testParserAtom_tiny1_nonASCII)++// Test for tiny1 UTF-8 with valid/invalid code units.+//+// NOTE: Passing invalid UTF-8 to internUtf8 hits assertion failure, so+//       test in the opposite way.+//       lookupTinyIndexUTF8 is used inside internUtf8.+BEGIN_TEST(testParserAtom_tiny1_invalidUTF8) {+  using js::frontend::ParserAtom;+  using js::frontend::ParserAtomsTable;++  js::LifoAlloc alloc(512);+  ParserAtomsTable atomTable(cx->runtime(), alloc);++  {+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC1)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0x80))};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2));+  }++  {+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC2)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0x7F))};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2));+  }++  {+    JS::Latin1Char latin1[] = {0x80};+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC2)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0x80))};++    auto refIndex =+        cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2);+    CHECK(refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internLatin1(cx, latin1, 1) == refIndex);+  }++  {+    JS::Latin1Char latin1[] = {0xBF};+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC2)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xBF))};++    auto refIndex =+        cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2);+    CHECK(refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internLatin1(cx, latin1, 1) == refIndex);+  }++  {+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC2)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC0))};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2));+  }++  {+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC3)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0x7F))};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2));+  }++  {+    JS::Latin1Char latin1[] = {0xC0};+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC3)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0x80))};++    auto refIndex =+        cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2);+    CHECK(refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internLatin1(cx, latin1, 1) == refIndex);+  }++  {+    JS::Latin1Char latin1[] = {0xFF};+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC3)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xBF))};++    auto refIndex =+        cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2);+    CHECK(refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internLatin1(cx, latin1, 1) == refIndex);+  }++  {+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC3)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC0))};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2));+  }++  {+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC4)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0x7F))};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2));+  }++  {+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC4)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0x80))};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2));+  }++  {+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC4)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xBF))};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2));+  }++  {+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC4)),+        mozilla::Utf8Unit(static_cast<unsigned char>(0xC0))};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndexUTF8(utf8, 2));+  }++  return true;+}+END_TEST(testParserAtom_tiny1_invalidUTF8) // Test length-2 fast-path is consistent across entry points. BEGIN_TEST(testParserAtom_tiny2) {@@ -101,6 +338,90 @@ } END_TEST(testParserAtom_tiny2)+// Test length-3 fast-path is consistent across entry points.+BEGIN_TEST(testParserAtom_int) {+  using js::frontend::ParserAtom;+  using js::frontend::ParserAtomsTable;+  using js::frontend::ParserAtomVector;++  js::LifoAlloc alloc(512);+  ParserAtomsTable atomTable(cx->runtime(), alloc);++  {+    const char ascii[] = {'1', '0', '0'};+    JS::Latin1Char latin1[] = {'1', '0', '0'};+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit('1'), mozilla::Utf8Unit('0'), mozilla::Utf8Unit('0')};+    char16_t char16[] = {'1', '0', '0'};++    auto refIndex = cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(ascii, 3);+    CHECK(refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internAscii(cx, ascii, 3) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internLatin1(cx, latin1, 3) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internUtf8(cx, utf8, 3) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internChar16(cx, char16, 3) == refIndex);+  }++  {+    const char ascii[] = {'2', '5', '5'};+    JS::Latin1Char latin1[] = {'2', '5', '5'};+    const mozilla::Utf8Unit utf8[] = {+        mozilla::Utf8Unit('2'), mozilla::Utf8Unit('5'), mozilla::Utf8Unit('5')};+    char16_t char16[] = {'2', '5', '5'};++    auto refIndex = cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(ascii, 3);+    CHECK(refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internAscii(cx, ascii, 3) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internLatin1(cx, latin1, 3) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internUtf8(cx, utf8, 3) == refIndex);+    CHECK(atomTable.internChar16(cx, char16, 3) == refIndex);+  }++  {+    const char ascii[] = {'0', '9', '9'};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(ascii, 3));+  }++  {+    const char ascii[] = {'0', 'F', 'F'};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(ascii, 3));+  }++  {+    const char ascii[] = {'1', '0', 'A'};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(ascii, 3));+  }++  {+    const char ascii[] = {'1', '0', 'a'};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(ascii, 3));+  }++  {+    const char ascii[] = {'2', '5', '6'};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(ascii, 3));+  }++  {+    const char ascii[] = {'3', '0', '0'};++    CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(ascii, 3));+  }++  return true;+}+END_TEST(testParserAtom_int)++// "€"    U+0080+// "½"    U+00BD+// "¿"    U+00BF+// "À"    U+00C0 // "æ"    U+00E6+// "ÿ"    U+00FF // "π"    U+03C0 // "🍕"   U+1F355

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities. The changes appear to be primarily test case additions and modifications for parser atom handling, particularly focusing on UTF-8 and Latin1 character encoding cases.

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Incomplete UTF-8 Validation [js/src/jsapi-tests/testParserAtom.cpp] [Lines: Added testParserAtom_tiny1_invalidUTF8]
Old Code:
// Note: If Latin1-Extended characters become supported, then UTF-8 behaviour
// should be tested.
char16_t ae = 0x00E6;
CHECK(!cx->runtime()->commonParserNames->lookupTinyIndex(&ae, 1));
Fixed Code:
Added extensive test cases for invalid UTF-8 sequences in testParserAtom_tiny1_invalidUTF8

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Character Encoding Consistency Issues [js/src/jsapi-tests/testParserAtom.cpp] [Lines: Modified testParserAtom_tiny1 to testParserAtom_tiny1_ASCII and added testParserAtom_tiny1_nonASCII]
Old Code:
// Test length-1 fast-path is consistent across entry points.
BEGIN_TEST(testParserAtom_tiny1) {
Fixed Code:
// Test length-1 fast-path is consistent across entry points for ASCII.
BEGIN_TEST(testParserAtom_tiny1_ASCII) {
and added separate testParserAtom_tiny1_nonASCII

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Integer Handling Consistency [js/src/jsapi-tests/testParserAtom.cpp] [Lines: Added testParserAtom_int]
Old Code:
(No test cases for 3-character numeric sequences)
Fixed Code:
Added testParserAtom_int with extensive testing of 3-character sequences

The changes appear to be adding more comprehensive testing for character encoding handling, particularly around UTF-8 validation and consistency between different encoding paths. While these are test cases rather than production code changes, they suggest the developers were concerned about potential security issues around:
1. Improper UTF-8 validation
2. Inconsistent handling of character encodings
3. Numeric sequence handling

The test additions don't directly fix vulnerabilities but demonstrate increased attention to potential security-sensitive areas of the code.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.nocontext.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.nocontext.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var offscreenCanvas2 = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var pattern = ctx.createPattern(offscreenCanvas2, 'no-repeat');@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = pattern; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 0,255,0,255, "98,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 0,255,0,255, "98,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the assertions. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.nocontext.worker.js
   Old Code: var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   Fixed Code: var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.pattern.basic.nocontext.worker.js
   Old Code: _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   Fixed Code: _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are consistent throughout the file, simply renaming the variable and updating all references to it. There are no security-related changes in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.1.radius.double.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.1.radius.double.html@@ -17,18 +17,18 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.roundRect(0, 0, 100, 50, [20]); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 255,0,0,255, "98,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 255,0,0,255, "98,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and all subsequent references were updated accordingly.

Here's the structured response:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.1.radius.double.html] [Lines 17-30]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");

The changes don't affect any security-related functionality or introduce/fix any security issues. It's simply a variable renaming for better code clarity or consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.