--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hex2.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.hex2.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = '#f0'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily variable renaming and don't involve security-related modifications. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14, 20]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are:
1. Renaming variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
2. Updating the references to this variable in the assertions
3. No changes to the actual functionality or security-related aspects of the code

These appear to be purely cosmetic/consistency changes rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/extensions/formautofill/content/formautofill.css+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/extensions/formautofill/content/formautofill.css@@ -42,12 +42,12 @@ #autofill-credit-card-notification popupnotificationcontent > .desc-message-box > image {   -moz-context-properties: fill;   fill: currentColor;-  margin-inline-start: 6px;-  width: 16px;-  height: 16px;+  width: auto;+  height: auto;   list-style-image: url(chrome://formautofill/content/icon-credit-card-generic.svg); } #autofill-address-notification popupnotificationcontent > .desc-message-box > description, #autofill-credit-card-notification popupnotificationcontent > .desc-message-box > description {   font-style: italic;+  margin-inline-start: 4px; }

Based on the provided CSS diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely stylistic/visual adjustments to the form autofill notification UI. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [browser/extensions/formautofill/content/formautofill.css] [Lines 42-50]
   Old Code:
   ```
   margin-inline-start: 6px;
   width: 16px;
   height: 16px;
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   width: auto;
   height: auto;
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [browser/extensions/formautofill/content/formautofill.css] [Lines 47-50]
   Old Code:
   ```
   font-style: italic;
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   font-style: italic;
   margin-inline-start: 4px;
   ```

The changes involve:
1. Adjusting image dimensions from fixed 16px to auto
2. Adding a margin to description elements
These are UI/UX improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/newtab/test/unit/aboutwelcome/MultiStageAWProton.test.jsx+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/newtab/test/unit/aboutwelcome/MultiStageAWProton.test.jsx@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@         order: 0,         content: {           title: "test title",-          subtitle: "test subtitle",+          hero_text: "test subtitle",         },       };       const wrapper = mount(<MultiStageProtonScreen {...SCREEN_PROPS} />);

Based on the provided code diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [browser/components/newtab/test/unit/aboutwelcome/MultiStageAWProton.test.jsx] [Lines 32-37]
[Old Code]
        content: {
          title: "test title",
          subtitle: "test subtitle",
        },
[Fixed Code]
        content: {
          title: "test title",
          hero_text: "test subtitle",
        }

Additional Details:
1. This appears to be a simple field name change in a test file (from 'subtitle' to 'hero_text')
2. The change is in a test file, not production code
3. No security implications are evident from this change
4. The modification seems to be part of a UI/text labeling update rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/base/content/test/siteIdentity/browser_bug906190.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/base/content/test/siteIdentity/browser_bug906190.js@@ -129,7 +129,13 @@  */ add_task(async function test_initialize() {   await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({-    set: [["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", true]],+    set: [+      ["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", true],+      // We need to disable the dFPI heuristic. So, we won't have unnecessary+      // 3rd party cookie permission that could affect following tests because+      // it will create a permission icon on the URL bar.+      ["privacy.restrict3rdpartystorage.heuristic.recently_visited", false],+    ],   }); });

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Mixed Content Handling Issue] [browser/base/content/test/siteIdentity/browser_bug906190.js] [Lines 129-136]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
     set: [["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", true]],
   });
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
     set: [
       ["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", true],
       // We need to disable the dFPI heuristic. So, we won't have unnecessary
       // 3rd party cookie permission that could affect following tests because
       // it will create a permission icon on the URL bar.
       ["privacy.restrict3rdpartystorage.heuristic.recently_visited", false],
     ],
   });
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change adds a new preference to disable dFPI heuristic for testing purposes. While this isn't a security fix per se, it might relate to preventing test interference from privacy/security features. The original code had a typo ("mixed_content" was misspelled as "mixed_content") which was corrected.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no  
   [Typo Fix] [browser/base/content/test/siteIdentity/browser_bug906190.js] [Lines 129-136]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```javascript
   ["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", true]
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```javascript
   ["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", true]
   ```  
   Additional Details: The original code had a typo in the preference name ("mized_content" vs "mixed_content") which was corrected. While this isn't a security vulnerability, it could have caused the test to not properly set the intended preference.

Note: The main change appears to be test-related configuration rather than a direct security fix. The addition of the privacy restriction preference is for test isolation purposes rather than fixing a vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.nowrap.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/drawing-images-to-the-canvas/2d.drawImage.nowrap.worker.js@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ promise.then(function(response) {     createImageBitmap(response).then(bitmap => {         ctx.drawImage(bitmap, -1950, 0, 2000, 50);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 45,25, 0,255,0,255, "45,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);-        _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 55,25, 0,255,0,255, "55,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 45,25, 0,255,0,255, "45,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);+        _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 55,25, 0,255,0,255, "55,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);     }, t_fail); }).then(t_pass, t_fail);

Analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable references in the assertions. Here's the analysis following the requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No Vulnerability Found [File] [Lines 14-15, 31-33]
    Old Code:
    ```javascript
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    // ...
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 45,25, 0,255,0,255, "45,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 55,25, 0,255,0,255, "55,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    ```
    Fixed Code:
    ```javascript
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    // ...
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 45,25, 0,255,0,255, "45,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 55,25, 0,255,0,255, "55,25", "0,255,0,255", 2);
    ```

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't appear to address any security issues. The functionality remains identical, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.radius.intersecting.1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.roundrect.radius.intersecting.1.html@@ -17,23 +17,23 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50); ctx.roundRect(0, 0, 100, 50, [40, 40, 40, 40]); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fill();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 2,25, 0,255,0,255, "2,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 97,25, 0,255,0,255, "97,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,48, 255,0,0,255, "98,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 2,25, 0,255,0,255, "2,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,1, 0,255,0,255, "50,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,48, 0,255,0,255, "50,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 97,25, 0,255,0,255, "97,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 255,0,0,255, "1,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,1, 255,0,0,255, "98,1", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 255,0,0,255, "1,48", "255,0,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,48, 255,0,0,255, "98,48", "255,0,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` and updating all references to it. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-40]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, ...);

[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, ...);

This is simply a variable name change with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name. There are no security-related changes in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-15.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-15.xml@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Daniel Glazman" href="http://glazman.org/"/>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <ul>

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-15.xml] [Lines 10]
[Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />]
[Fixed Code: (line removed)]

Additional details:
1. The change simply removes an empty meta tag with name="flags" which doesn't appear to be security-related
2. This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
3. No known vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, etc.) are present in this change
4. The removed tag wasn't serving any apparent security purpose

The modification seems to be part of routine maintenance rather than addressing a security issue.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.negative.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.negative.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_dom("INDEX_SIZE_ERR", function() { ctx.arc(0, 0, -1, 0, 0, true); }); t.done();

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.arc.negative.html [Lines] 17-18
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') with no security implications. The test continues to check for proper error handling when calling arc() with negative radius values, which is a functional test rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/layout/generic/nsImageMap.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/layout/generic/nsImageMap.cpp@@ -737,10 +737,10 @@   mAreas.AppendElement(std::move(area)); }-HTMLAreaElement* nsImageMap::GetArea(nscoord aX, nscoord aY) const {+HTMLAreaElement* nsImageMap::GetArea(const CSSIntPoint& aPt) const {   NS_ASSERTION(mMap, "Not initialized");   for (const auto& area : mAreas) {-    if (area->IsInside(aX, aY)) {+    if (area->IsInside(aPt.x, aPt.y)) {       return area->mArea;     }   }

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Potential Type Confusion Vulnerability [File] layout/generic/nsImageMap.cpp [Lines] 737-743  
   [Old Code]  
   ```cpp
   HTMLAreaElement* nsImageMap::GetArea(nscoord aX, nscoord aY) const {
     NS_ASSERTION(mMap, "Not initialized");
     for (const auto& area : mAreas) {
       if (area->IsInside(aX, aY)) {
         return area->mArea;
       }
     }
   ```

   [Fixed Code]  
   ```cpp
   HTMLAreaElement* nsImageMap::GetArea(const CSSIntPoint& aPt) const {
     NS_ASSERTION(mMap, "Not initialized");
     for (const auto& area : mAreas) {
       if (area->IsInside(aPt.x, aPt.y)) {
         return area->mArea;
       }
     }
   ```

   Additional Details: The change involves modifying the parameter type from separate coordinates to a CSSIntPoint structure. While this could potentially prevent type confusion or coordinate handling issues, there's no clear evidence this was fixing a known vulnerability. The change appears more like an API improvement than a security fix.

Note: The analysis shows no definitive security vulnerability being fixed, but the change could potentially prevent certain types of issues related to coordinate handling. Without more context about the threat model or previous vulnerabilities, this remains uncertain.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.valid.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.valid.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.miterLimit = 1.5; _assertSame(ctx.miterLimit, 1.5, "ctx.miterLimit", "1.5");

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The change appears to be purely a variable name refactoring from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'. This modification doesn't address any security vulnerability but rather improves code readability or consistency. There are no security implications in this change as it doesn't affect the functionality or introduce/remove any security-related features.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-color/t424-hsl-values-b-13.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-color/t424-hsl-values-b-13.html@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ <link rel="author" title="Intel" href="http://www.intel.com"> <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-color/#hsl-color" /> <link rel="match" href="t424-hsl-values-b-13-ref.html" />-<meta name="flags" content="" /> <meta name="assert" content="Implementation of algorithm for converting hsl() colors to rgb() colors." /> <style>   table { border-spacing: 0; padding: 0; border: none; }

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The modification appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag for flags, which doesn't relate to any security vulnerability.

Here's the structured response:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-color/t424-hsl-values-b-13.html] [Lines 6]
    [Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />]
    [Fixed Code: (removed)]

Additional notes:
1. The change is purely cosmetic/structural, removing an unused meta tag
2. No actual security implications were found in this diff
3. The modification doesn't affect any security-related functionality
4. This appears to be part of test cleanup rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/ttwf-transform-skewx-001.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/ttwf-transform-skewx-001.html@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@     <link rel="author" title="Mihai Corlan" href="mailto:[email protected]">     <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-1/#transform-property">     <link rel="match" href="reference/ttwf-reftest-transform-skewx-001.html">-    <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=63-64;totalPixels=200-200">+    <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=63-64;totalPixels=100-200">     <meta name="assert" content="Test that the green shape is skew on X axis by 45 degrees">     <style type="text/css">         .greenSquare {

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related changes. The modification appears to be adjusting test parameters for visual comparison rather than fixing security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/ttwf-transform-skewx-001.html [Lines 5]
[Old Code] <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=63-64;totalPixels=200-200">
[Fixed Code] <meta name="fuzzy" content="maxDifference=63-64;totalPixels=100-200">

The change simply modifies the acceptable pixel difference range for a visual test comparison, reducing the lower bound of acceptable different pixels from 200 to 100. This is a test configuration adjustment rather than a security fix.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ #include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h" #include "NSSErrorsService.h"-#include "PSMIPCCommon.h" #include "PSMRunnable.h" #include "SSLServerCertVerification.h" #include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"@@ -2236,11 +2235,30 @@ } mozilla::pkix::Result ClientAuthCertNonverifyingTrustDomain::IsChainValid(-    const DERArray& certChain, Time, const CertPolicyId&) {-  if (ConstructCERTCertListFromReversedDERArray(certChain, mBuiltChain) !=-      SECSuccess) {+    const DERArray& certArray, Time, const CertPolicyId&) {+  mBuiltChain = UniqueCERTCertList(CERT_NewCertList());+  if (!mBuiltChain) {     return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());   }++  CERTCertDBHandle* certDB(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB());  // non-owning++  size_t numCerts = certArray.GetLength();+  for (size_t i = 0; i < numCerts; ++i) {+    SECItem certDER(UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(*certArray.GetDER(i)));+    UniqueCERTCertificate cert(+        CERT_NewTempCertificate(certDB, &certDER, nullptr, false, true));+    if (!cert) {+      return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());+    }+    // certArray is ordered with the root first, but we want the resulting+    // certList to have the root last.+    if (CERT_AddCertToListHead(mBuiltChain.get(), cert.get()) != SECSuccess) {+      return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());+    }+    Unused << cert.release();  // cert is now owned by mBuiltChain.+  }+   return Success; }@@ -2394,7 +2412,7 @@   if (cars) {     nsCString rememberedDBKey;     bool found;-    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert(nsNSSCertificate::Create(mServerCert));+    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert(new nsNSSCertificate(mServerCert));     nsresult rv = cars->HasRememberedDecision(         hostname, mInfo.OriginAttributesRef(), cert, rememberedDBKey, &found);     if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {@@ -2446,10 +2464,7 @@   for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);        !CERT_LIST_END(node, certList); node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {-    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> tempCert = nsNSSCertificate::Create(node->cert);-    if (NS_WARN_IF(!tempCert)) {-      return;-    }+    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> tempCert = new nsNSSCertificate(node->cert);     nsresult rv = certArray->AppendElement(tempCert);     if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {       return;@@ -2490,10 +2505,10 @@   }   if (cars && wantRemember) {-    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> serverCert(nsNSSCertificate::Create(mServerCert));+    nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> serverCert(new nsNSSCertificate(mServerCert));     nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> clientCert;     if (certChosen) {-      clientCert = nsNSSCertificate::Create(mSelectedCertificate.get());+      clientCert = new nsNSSCertificate(mSelectedCertificate.get());     }     rv = cars->RememberDecision(hostname, mInfo.OriginAttributesRef(),                                 serverCert, clientCert);

I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security fixes following the specified format.

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Leak Vulnerability [security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp] [Lines 2236-2256]
[Old Code]
```
mozilla::pkix::Result ClientAuthCertNonverifyingTrustDomain::IsChainValid(
    const DERArray& certChain, Time, const CertPolicyId&) {
  if (ConstructCERTCertListFromReversedDERArray(certChain, mBuiltChain) !=
      SECSuccess) {
    return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
  }
```
[Fixed Code]
```
mozilla::pkix::Result ClientAuthCertNonverifyingTrustDomain::IsChainValid(
    const DERArray& certArray, Time, const CertPolicyId&) {
  mBuiltChain = UniqueCERTCertList(CERT_NewCertList());
  if (!mBuiltChain) {
    return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
  }

  CERTCertDBHandle* certDB(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB());  // non-owning

  size_t numCerts = certArray.GetLength();
  for (size_t i = 0; i < numCerts; ++i) {
    SECItem certDER(UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(*certArray.GetDER(i)));
    UniqueCERTCertificate cert(
        CERT_NewTempCertificate(certDB, &certDER, nullptr, false, true));
    if (!cert) {
      return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
    }
    // certArray is ordered with the root first, but we want the resulting
    // certList to have the root last.
    if (CERT_AddCertToListHead(mBuiltChain.get(), cert.get()) != SECSuccess) {
      return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
    }
    Unused << cert.release();  // cert is now owned by mBuiltChain.
  }
```

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Memory Management Vulnerability [security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp] [Multiple locations]
[Old Code]
```
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert(nsNSSCertificate::Create(mServerCert));
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> tempCert = nsNSSCertificate::Create(node->cert);
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> serverCert(nsNSSCertificate::Create(mServerCert));
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> clientCert = nsNSSCertificate::Create(mSelectedCertificate.get());
```
[Fixed Code]
```
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert(new nsNSSCertificate(mServerCert));
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> tempCert = new nsNSSCertificate(node->cert);
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> serverCert(new nsNSSCertificate(mServerCert));
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> clientCert = new nsNSSCertificate(mSelectedCertificate.get());
```

The changes address two main security issues:
1. The first fix replaces a potentially unsafe certificate chain construction method with a more secure implementation that properly manages memory using smart pointers (UniqueCERTCertList) and explicitly handles certificate ownership transfer.

2. The second fix changes how certificate objects are created, replacing the static Create method with direct instantiation. This appears to be part of a larger refactoring to improve memory management and ownership semantics, though the exact vulnerability being fixed isn't specified in the CVE database. The change likely addresses potential memory management issues or reference counting problems that could occur with the old Create method.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/dav1d/src/lib.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/dav1d/src/lib.c@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@     s->operating_point = 0;     s->all_layers = 1; // just until the tests are adjusted     s->frame_size_limit = 0;+    s->strict_std_compliance = 0;+    s->output_invisible_frames = 0; } static void close_internal(Dav1dContext **const c_out, int flush);@@ -127,6 +129,8 @@     c->operating_point = s->operating_point;     c->all_layers = s->all_layers;     c->frame_size_limit = s->frame_size_limit;+    c->strict_std_compliance = s->strict_std_compliance;+    c->output_invisible_frames = s->output_invisible_frames;     if (dav1d_mem_pool_init(&c->seq_hdr_pool) ||         dav1d_mem_pool_init(&c->frame_hdr_pool) ||@@ -165,8 +169,18 @@     c->n_tc = s->n_threads ? s->n_threads :         iclip(dav1d_num_logical_processors(c), 1, DAV1D_MAX_THREADS);+    /* ceil(sqrt(n)) */+    static const uint8_t fc_lut[49] = {+        1,                                     /*     1 */+        2, 2, 2,                               /*  2- 4 */+        3, 3, 3, 3, 3,                         /*  5- 9 */+        4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4,                   /* 10-16 */+        5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5,             /* 17-25 */+        6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6,       /* 26-36 */+        7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, /* 37-49 */+    };     c->n_fc = s->max_frame_delay ? umin(s->max_frame_delay, c->n_tc) :-        umin(c->n_tc, 8);+              c->n_tc < 50 ? fc_lut[c->n_tc - 1] : 8; // min(8, ceil(sqrt(n)))     c->fc = dav1d_alloc_aligned(sizeof(*c->fc) * c->n_fc, 32);     if (!c->fc) goto error;@@ -290,45 +304,24 @@     return res; }+static int has_grain(const Dav1dPicture *const pic)+{+    const Dav1dFilmGrainData *fgdata = &pic->frame_hdr->film_grain.data;+    return fgdata->num_y_points || fgdata->num_uv_points[0] ||+           fgdata->num_uv_points[1];+}+ static int output_image(Dav1dContext *const c, Dav1dPicture *const out,                         Dav1dPicture *const in) {-    const Dav1dFilmGrainData *fgdata = &in->frame_hdr->film_grain.data;-    int has_grain = fgdata->num_y_points || fgdata->num_uv_points[0] ||-                    fgdata->num_uv_points[1];--    // If there is nothing to be done, skip the allocation/copy-    if (!c->apply_grain || !has_grain) {+    if (!c->apply_grain || !has_grain(in)) {         dav1d_picture_move_ref(out, in);         return 0;     }-    // Apply film grain to a new copy of the image to avoid corrupting refs-    int res = dav1d_picture_alloc_copy(c, out, in->p.w, in);-    if (res < 0) {-        dav1d_picture_unref_internal(in);-        dav1d_picture_unref_internal(out);-        return res;-    }--    switch (out->p.bpc) {-#if CONFIG_8BPC-    case 8:-        dav1d_apply_grain_8bpc(&c->dsp[0].fg, out, in);-        break;-#endif-#if CONFIG_16BPC-    case 10:-    case 12:-        dav1d_apply_grain_16bpc(&c->dsp[(out->p.bpc >> 1) - 4].fg, out, in);-        break;-#endif-    default:-        assert(0);-    }-+    int res = dav1d_apply_grain(c, out, in);     dav1d_picture_unref_internal(in);-    return 0;+    return res; } static int output_picture_ready(Dav1dContext *const c) {@@ -373,7 +366,9 @@             const unsigned progress =                 atomic_load_explicit(&out_delayed->progress[1],                                      memory_order_relaxed);-            if (out_delayed->visible && progress != FRAME_ERROR) {+            if ((out_delayed->visible || c->output_invisible_frames) &&+                progress != FRAME_ERROR)+            {                 dav1d_picture_ref(&c->out, &out_delayed->p);                 c->event_flags |= dav1d_picture_get_event_flags(out_delayed);             }@@ -451,6 +446,43 @@         return drain_picture(c, out);     return DAV1D_ERR(EAGAIN);+}++int dav1d_apply_grain(Dav1dContext *const c, Dav1dPicture *const out,+                      const Dav1dPicture *const in)+{+    validate_input_or_ret(c != NULL, DAV1D_ERR(EINVAL));+    validate_input_or_ret(out != NULL, DAV1D_ERR(EINVAL));+    validate_input_or_ret(in != NULL, DAV1D_ERR(EINVAL));++    if (!has_grain(in)) {+        dav1d_picture_ref(out, in);+        return 0;+    }++    int res = dav1d_picture_alloc_copy(c, out, in->p.w, in);+    if (res < 0) {+        dav1d_picture_unref_internal(out);+        return res;+    }++    switch (out->p.bpc) {+#if CONFIG_8BPC+    case 8:+        dav1d_apply_grain_8bpc(&c->dsp[0].fg, out, in);+        break;+#endif+#if CONFIG_16BPC+    case 10:+    case 12:+        dav1d_apply_grain_16bpc(&c->dsp[(out->p.bpc >> 1) - 4].fg, out, in);+        break;+#endif+    default:+        assert(0);+    }++    return 0; } void dav1d_flush(Dav1dContext *const c) {

I'll analyze the provided code diff for security fixes following the specified format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Integer Overflow] [third_party/dav1d/src/lib.c] [Lines 169-180]
[Old Code]
    c->n_fc = s->max_frame_delay ? umin(s->max_frame_delay, c->n_tc) :
        umin(c->n_tc, 8);
[Fixed Code]
    c->n_fc = s->max_frame_delay ? umin(s->max_frame_delay, c->n_tc) :
              c->n_tc < 50 ? fc_lut[c->n_tc - 1] : 8; // min(8, ceil(sqrt(n)))

Additional Details:
The change introduces a lookup table for calculating frame delay count, potentially preventing integer overflow issues by limiting the input range (c->n_tc < 50). However, without more context about the possible values of c->n_tc, it's unclear if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just improving the calculation method.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potential Information Leak] [third_party/dav1d/src/lib.c] [Lines 366-369]
[Old Code]
            if (out_delayed->visible && progress != FRAME_ERROR) {
[Fixed Code]
            if ((out_delayed->visible || c->output_invisible_frames) &&
                progress != FRAME_ERROR)
            {

Additional Details:
The change adds a condition to output invisible frames when explicitly requested. While not clearly a security fix, it could be related to preventing information leaks by controlling when invisible frames are output. The security implications would depend on how this feature is used.

Vulnerability Existed: yes
[Code Refactoring for Security] [third_party/dav1d/src/lib.c] [Lines 304-328]
[Old Code]
    // Apply film grain to a new copy of the image to avoid corrupting refs
    int res = dav1d_picture_alloc_copy(c, out, in->p.w, in);
    if (res < 0) {
        dav1d_picture_unref_internal(in);
        dav1d_picture_unref_internal(out);
        return res;
    }

    switch (out->p.bpc) {
#if CONFIG_8BPC
    case 8:
        dav1d_apply_grain_8bpc(&c->dsp[0].fg, out, in);
        break;
#endif
#if CONFIG_16BPC
    case 10:
    case 12:
        dav1d_apply_grain_16bpc(&c->dsp[(out->p.bpc >> 1) - 4].fg, out, in);
        break;
#endif
    default:
        assert(0);
    }
[Fixed Code]
    int res = dav1d_apply_grain(c, out, in);

Additional Details:
The change extracts the grain application logic into a separate function (dav1d_apply_grain) with input validation. This appears to be a security hardening measure by:
1. Centralizing the grain application logic
2. Adding explicit input validation
3. Potentially making the code more maintainable and less prone to errors
While not fixing a specific named vulnerability, this is a security improvement through better code organization and validation.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.zero.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.create1.zero.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.createImageData(null); }); t.done();

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The change appears to be purely a variable name change from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related functionality was modified
- The test's purpose (testing TypeError for createImageData with null) remains unchanged
- This seems to be a code style/consistency change rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.stroke.cap.2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/shadows/2d.shadow.stroke.cap.2.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ ctx.moveTo(25, -25); ctx.lineTo(75, -25); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 98,25, 0,255,0,255, "98,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-31]
   [Old Code] var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [Fixed Code] var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50); var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 31-34]
   [Old Code] _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");
   [Fixed Code] _assertPixel(canvas, 1,25, 0,255,0,255, "1,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely variable name refactoring (renaming 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas') with no security implications. The functionality remains identical, just using a different variable name. There are no apparent security vulnerabilities being fixed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.lineedge.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.lineedge.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ ctx.miterLimit = 1.414; ctx.beginPath(); ctx.strokeRect(100, 25, 200, 0);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to function calls using this variable. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found
File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.lineedge.html
Lines: Changed lines 17-18 and 28-31
Old Code: Used variable name 'offscreenCanvas' and called _assertPixel with this variable
Fixed Code: Uses variable name 'canvas' and calls _assertPixel with this variable

This appears to be a code style/readability change rather than a security fix. The functionality remains identical, only the variable name has been changed for consistency or clarity.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-solid-2.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-solid-2.html@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(  0  ,  255  ,  0  ,  1.0  )'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.rgba-solid-2.html [Lines 17-25]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring, renaming a variable from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. There are no security-related changes in this diff, no changes to the actual functionality or security-sensitive operations. The test continues to perform the same canvas operations and assertions.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.get.solid.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.get.solid.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#fa0'; _assertSame(ctx.fillStyle, '#ffaa00', "ctx.fillStyle", "'#ffaa00'");

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18]
   Old Code:
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');

   Fixed Code:
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Notes:
- The change appears to be a simple variable renaming from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`
- No security-related changes or vulnerabilities are apparent in this diff
- This seems to be a code style/readability improvement rather than a security fix
- The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name changed

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/indexedDB/IndexedDatabase.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/indexedDB/IndexedDatabase.cpp@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/FileBlobImpl.h" #include "mozilla/dom/StructuredCloneTags.h"-#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerScope.h" #include "MainThreadUtils.h" #include "jsapi.h"

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [No specific vulnerability name identified] [dom/indexedDB/IndexedDatabase.cpp] [Lines 12]
    Old Code: #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
    Fixed Code: [Removed line]

Additional Details:
- The diff shows only the removal of an include statement for WorkerPrivate.h
- Without more context about why this was removed or what functionality changed, it's impossible to determine if this was a security fix
- The removal could be related to code cleanup, refactoring, or dependency management rather than a security fix
- No direct security vulnerability is evident from this change alone

Note: This appears to be a minor maintenance change rather than a clear security fix. More context would be needed to determine if there was any security implication to this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.