--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/instance.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/instance.rs@@ -270,14 +270,25 @@         // We are currently taking the filtering and blending together,         // but we may reconsider this in the future if there are formats         // in the wild for which these two capabilities do not match.-        let filterable = caps.contains(Tfc::SAMPLED_LINEAR)-            && (!caps.contains(Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT)-                || caps.contains(Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT_BLEND));+        flags.set(+            wgt::TextureFormatFeatureFlags::FILTERABLE,+            caps.contains(Tfc::SAMPLED_LINEAR)+                && (!caps.contains(Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT)+                    || caps.contains(Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT_BLEND)),+        );++        flags.set(+            wgt::TextureFormatFeatureFlags::MULTISAMPLE,+            caps.contains(Tfc::MULTISAMPLE),+        );+        flags.set(+            wgt::TextureFormatFeatureFlags::MULTISAMPLE_RESOLVE,+            caps.contains(Tfc::MULTISAMPLE_RESOLVE),+        );         wgt::TextureFormatFeatures {             allowed_usages,             flags,-            filterable,         }     }@@ -535,7 +546,7 @@             None => return,         };-        profiling::scope!("enumerating", format!("{:?}", A::VARIANT));+        profiling::scope!("enumerating", &*format!("{:?}", A::VARIANT));         let hub = HalApi::hub(self);         let mut token = Token::root();

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Information Leak] [third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/instance.rs] [Lines 535]
   [Old Code]
   profiling::scope!("enumerating", format!("{:?}", A::VARIANT));
   [Fixed Code]
   profiling::scope!("enumerating", &*format!("{:?}", A::VARIANT));
   Additional Details: The change involves how a debug string is passed to the profiling scope. While not clearly a security vulnerability, it could potentially relate to information exposure if the debug output contains sensitive data. The change makes the string handling more efficient by avoiding an extra allocation.

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   [Texture Format Feature Handling] [third_party/rust/wgpu-core/src/instance.rs] [Lines 270-283]
   [Old Code]
   let filterable = caps.contains(Tfc::SAMPLED_LINEAR)
       && (!caps.contains(Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT)
           || caps.contains(Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT_BLEND));
   [Fixed Code]
   flags.set(
       wgt::TextureFormatFeatureFlags::FILTERABLE,
       caps.contains(Tfc::SAMPLED_LINEAR)
           && (!caps.contains(Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT)
               || caps.contains(Tfc::COLOR_ATTACHMENT_BLEND)),
   );
   Additional Details: This appears to be a refactoring of texture format feature handling rather than a security fix. The functionality remains the same but is now implemented using flag setting operations.

Note: The diff shows changes in texture format feature handling and profiling scope usage, but neither appears to be clearly addressing a known security vulnerability. The first change might have some security implications related to string handling, but it's not definitive.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/unicode-normalization/src/lib.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/unicode-normalization/src/lib.rs@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ //! //! ```toml //! [dependencies]-//! unicode-normalization = "0.1.3"+//! unicode-normalization = "0.1.7" //! ``` #![deny(missing_docs, unsafe_code)]@@ -43,28 +43,42 @@ pub use tables::UNICODE_VERSION; pub use decompose::Decompositions;+pub use quick_check::{+    IsNormalized,+    is_nfc,+    is_nfc_quick,+    is_nfc_stream_safe,+    is_nfc_stream_safe_quick,+    is_nfd,+    is_nfd_quick,+    is_nfd_stream_safe,+    is_nfd_stream_safe_quick,+}; pub use recompose::Recompositions;+pub use stream_safe::StreamSafe; use std::str::Chars; mod decompose; mod normalize; mod recompose;+mod quick_check;+mod stream_safe; mod tables; #[cfg(test)] mod test; #[cfg(test)]-mod testdata;+mod normalization_tests; /// Methods for composing and decomposing characters. pub mod char {     pub use normalize::{decompose_canonical, decompose_compatible, compose};     /// Look up the canonical combining class of a character.-    pub use tables::normalization::canonical_combining_class;+    pub use tables::canonical_combining_class;     /// Return whether the given character is a combining mark (`General_Category=Mark`)-    pub use tables::normalization::is_combining_mark;+    pub use tables::is_combining_mark; }@@ -91,6 +105,11 @@     /// (compatibility decomposition followed by canonical composition).     #[inline]     fn nfkc(self) -> Recompositions<I>;++    /// An Iterator over the string with Conjoining Grapheme Joiner characters+    /// inserted according to the Stream-Safe Text Process (UAX15-D4)+    #[inline]+    fn stream_safe(self) -> StreamSafe<I>; } impl<'a> UnicodeNormalization<Chars<'a>> for &'a str {@@ -112,6 +131,11 @@     #[inline]     fn nfkc(self) -> Recompositions<Chars<'a>> {         recompose::new_compatible(self.chars())+    }++    #[inline]+    fn stream_safe(self) -> StreamSafe<Chars<'a>> {+        StreamSafe::new(self.chars())     } }@@ -135,4 +159,9 @@     fn nfkc(self) -> Recompositions<I> {         recompose::new_compatible(self)     }++    #[inline]+    fn stream_safe(self) -> StreamSafe<I> {+        StreamSafe::new(self)+    } }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Dependency Version Update [File] [Lines 34-36]  
   [Old Code]  
   `unicode-normalization = "0.1.3"`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `unicode-normalization = "0.1.7"`  

   Additional Details: The version update might include security fixes, but without the changelog, we can't be certain what vulnerabilities were addressed.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   Module Restructuring [File] [Multiple lines]  
   [Old Code]  
   Various functions imported from `tables::normalization::`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Functions imported directly from `tables::`  

   Additional Details: The restructuring of module imports might be related to security improvements, but there's no clear vulnerability indication.

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   New Stream-Safe Implementation [File] [Multiple lines]  
   [Old Code]  
   No stream-safe functionality  
   [Fixed Code]  
   Added `stream_safe` module and implementation  

   Additional Details: The addition of stream-safe text processing (UAX15-D4) could be related to security improvements in Unicode handling, but no specific vulnerability is mentioned.

Note: While there are several changes in the diff, none clearly indicate specific security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily feature additions and code reorganization. The version bump suggests potential security fixes in the dependency, but without access to the changelog for unicode-normalization 0.1.7, we can't confirm specific vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/array.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/array.rs@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ //! Tests for the array channel flavor.++#![cfg(not(miri))] // TODO: many assertions failed due to Miri is slow use std::any::Any; use std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize;@@ -43,38 +45,38 @@     let (s, r) = bounded(2);     assert_eq!(s.len(), 0);-    assert_eq!(s.is_empty(), true);-    assert_eq!(s.is_full(), false);+    assert!(s.is_empty());+    assert!(!s.is_full());     assert_eq!(r.len(), 0);-    assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), true);-    assert_eq!(r.is_full(), false);+    assert!(r.is_empty());+    assert!(!r.is_full());     s.send(()).unwrap();     assert_eq!(s.len(), 1);-    assert_eq!(s.is_empty(), false);-    assert_eq!(s.is_full(), false);+    assert!(!s.is_empty());+    assert!(!s.is_full());     assert_eq!(r.len(), 1);-    assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), false);-    assert_eq!(r.is_full(), false);+    assert!(!r.is_empty());+    assert!(!r.is_full());     s.send(()).unwrap();     assert_eq!(s.len(), 2);-    assert_eq!(s.is_empty(), false);-    assert_eq!(s.is_full(), true);+    assert!(!s.is_empty());+    assert!(s.is_full());     assert_eq!(r.len(), 2);-    assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), false);-    assert_eq!(r.is_full(), true);+    assert!(!r.is_empty());+    assert!(r.is_full());     r.recv().unwrap();     assert_eq!(s.len(), 1);-    assert_eq!(s.is_empty(), false);-    assert_eq!(s.is_full(), false);+    assert!(!s.is_empty());+    assert!(!s.is_full());     assert_eq!(r.len(), 1);-    assert_eq!(r.is_empty(), false);-    assert_eq!(r.is_full(), false);+    assert!(!r.is_empty());+    assert!(!r.is_full()); } #[test]

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be test code improvements and stylistic changes. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Test Code Style Improvements [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/array.rs] [Lines 43-74]
   Old Code: Various `assert_eq!(x, true/false)` statements
   Fixed Code: Changed to more idiomatic `assert!(x)` or `assert!(!x)`

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   Miri Compatibility Note [third_party/rust/crossbeam-channel/tests/array.rs] [Lines 1-2]
   Old Code: No Miri configuration
   Fixed Code: Added `#![cfg(not(miri))]` with TODO comment about Miri being slow

The changes are primarily:
1. Converting assert_eq with boolean comparisons to more direct assert/assert!(!) statements
2. Adding a configuration note about Miri (Rust's experimental interpreter)

No security vulnerabilities appear to have been addressed in this diff. The changes are test-related improvements and stylistic enhancements.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/downloads/test/browser/browser_pdfjs_preview.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/downloads/test/browser/browser_pdfjs_preview.js@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@   {     name: "about:downloads, default click behavior",     whichUI: "aboutDownloads",-    itemSelector: "#downloadsRichListBox richlistitem .downloadContainer",+    itemSelector: "#downloadsListBox richlistitem .downloadContainer",     async userEvents(itemSelector, win) {       let browser = win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser;       is(browser.currentURI.spec, "about:downloads");@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@   {     name: "about:downloads, system viewer menu items prefd off",     whichUI: "aboutDownloads",-    itemSelector: "#downloadsRichListBox richlistitem .downloadContainer",+    itemSelector: "#downloadsListBox richlistitem .downloadContainer",     async userEvents(itemSelector, win) {       let browser = win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser;       is(browser.currentURI.spec, "about:downloads");@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@   {     name: "about:downloads, open in new window",     whichUI: "aboutDownloads",-    itemSelector: "#downloadsRichListBox richlistitem .downloadContainer",+    itemSelector: "#downloadsListBox richlistitem .downloadContainer",     async userEvents(itemSelector, win) {       let browser = win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser;       is(browser.currentURI.spec, "about:downloads");@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@   {     name: "about:downloads, open in foreground tab",     whichUI: "aboutDownloads",-    itemSelector: "#downloadsRichListBox richlistitem .downloadContainer",+    itemSelector: "#downloadsListBox richlistitem .downloadContainer",     async userEvents(itemSelector, win) {       let browser = win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser;       is(browser.currentURI.spec, "about:downloads");@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@   {     name: "about:downloads, open in background tab",     whichUI: "aboutDownloads",-    itemSelector: "#downloadsRichListBox richlistitem .downloadContainer",+    itemSelector: "#downloadsListBox richlistitem .downloadContainer",     async userEvents(itemSelector, win) {       let browser = win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser;       is(browser.currentURI.spec, "about:downloads");@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@     name: "Private download in about:downloads, opens in new private window",     skip: true, // Bug 1641770     whichUI: "aboutDownloads",-    itemSelector: "#downloadsRichListBox richlistitem .downloadContainer",+    itemSelector: "#downloadsListBox richlistitem .downloadContainer",     async userEvents(itemSelector, win) {       let browser = win.gBrowser.selectedBrowser;       is(browser.currentURI.spec, "about:downloads");@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@         // we'll be interacting with the library dialog         uiWindow = await openLibrary("Downloads");-        let listbox = uiWindow.document.getElementById("downloadsRichListBox");+        let listbox = uiWindow.document.getElementById("downloadsListBox");         ok(listbox, "download list box present");         // wait for the expected number of items in the view,         // and for the first item to be visible && clickable@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@           async function awaitListItems(expectedCount) {             await ContentTaskUtils.waitForCondition(               () =>-                content.document.getElementById("downloadsRichListBox")+                content.document.getElementById("downloadsListBox")                   .childElementCount == expectedCount,               `Await ${expectedCount} download list items`             );

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely related to UI element identifiers being updated from "downloadsRichListBox" to "downloadsListBox". This seems to be a refactoring or UI update rather than a security fix.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No security vulnerability found [browser_pdfjs_preview.js] [Multiple lines]
[Old code using "#downloadsRichListBox" selector]
[New code using "#downloadsListBox" selector]

The changes are consistent throughout the file and only involve updating the selector for the downloads list box. There are no changes to security-related functionality, no input validation modifications, and no changes to how potentially dangerous operations are handled.

The diff shows a systematic replacement of one DOM element ID with another across multiple test cases, suggesting this was a coordinated UI change rather than a security fix. The test functionality remains the same, just pointing to different element identifiers.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/xre/glxtest.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/xre/glxtest.cpp@@ -541,7 +541,8 @@       EGL_TRUE) {     const char* deviceExtensions =         eglQueryDeviceStringEXT(device, EGL_EXTENSIONS);-    if (strstr(deviceExtensions, "EGL_MESA_device_software")) {+    if (deviceExtensions &&+        strstr(deviceExtensions, "EGL_MESA_device_software")) {       record_value("MESA_ACCELERATED\nFALSE\n");     } else { #ifdef MOZ_WAYLAND

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Null Pointer Dereference [toolkit/xre/glxtest.cpp] [Lines 541-543]
Old Code:
    if (strstr(deviceExtensions, "EGL_MESA_device_software")) {
Fixed Code:
    if (deviceExtensions &&
        strstr(deviceExtensions, "EGL_MESA_device_software")) {

Additional Details:
The fix adds a null check for deviceExtensions before using it in strstr(). Without this check, if eglQueryDeviceStringEXT() returned null, the code would dereference a null pointer, potentially causing a crash. This is a defensive programming improvement that prevents a potential null pointer dereference vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/translate.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/translate.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Ebay Inc." href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-transforms-1/#funcdef-transform-translate"/>   <link rel="match" href="translate-ref.html"/>-  <meta name="flags" content="" />   <meta name="assert" content="translate x, y "/>   <style type="text/css">       .container {

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    Meta Tag Removal [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-transforms/translate.html [Lines 5]
    [Old Code]
    <meta name="flags" content="" />
    [Fixed Code]
    (removed)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any apparent purpose
- There's no indication this was related to any security vulnerability
- The removal appears to be a cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerability patterns match this change

No security vulnerabilities were found in this diff. The change appears to be a benign cleanup of unused metadata.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/string/nsTSubstring.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/string/nsTSubstring.h@@ -992,6 +992,10 @@                   aSpan.Length(), aFallible);   }+  void Insert(mozilla::Span<const char_type> aSpan, index_type aPos) {+    Insert(aSpan.Elements(), aPos, aSpan.Length());+  }+   /**    * string data is never null, but can be marked void.  if true, the    * string will be truncated.  @see nsTSubstring::IsVoid

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Buffer Overflow/Input Validation] [xpcom/string/nsTSubstring.h] [Lines 992-996]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No previous implementation of Insert with mozilla::Span parameter)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```  
   void Insert(mozilla::Span<const char_type> aSpan, index_type aPos) {  
     Insert(aSpan.Elements(), aPos, aSpan.Length());  
   }  
   ```  
   Additional Details: The addition of this method could be a security fix to properly handle span-based inserts with bounds checking, but without seeing the context of how it's used or the previous vulnerability, we can't be certain. The change ensures proper length handling when inserting spans.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Integer Overflow] [xpcom/string/nsTSubstring.h] [Lines 992-996]  
   [Old Code]  
   (No previous implementation)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```  
   void Insert(mozilla::Span<const char_type> aSpan, index_type aPos) {  
     Insert(aSpan.Elements(), aPos, aSpan.Length());  
   }  
   ```  
   Additional Details: The new method delegates length handling to another Insert method. If this was added to prevent potential integer overflows when calculating buffer sizes, it would be a security fix, but we can't confirm without more context.

Note: The diff shows an addition rather than a modification, making it harder to determine if this was fixing an existing vulnerability or adding new functionality. The changes appear to improve safety when handling spans, but we can't definitively say they fix specific known vulnerabilities without more context.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@     { CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305, { 32, 32, CKF_EN_DE }, PR_TRUE },     { CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_CTR, { 32, 32, CKF_EN_DE }, PR_TRUE },     { CKM_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN, { 32, 32, CKF_GENERATE }, PR_TRUE },+    { CKM_CHACHA20, { 32, 32, CKF_EN_DE }, PR_TRUE },     { CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305, { 32, 32, CKF_EN_DE_MSG }, PR_TRUE }, #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_CHACHAPOLY */     /* ------------------------- Hashing Operations ----------------------- */

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: no  
[Added CHACHA20 Support] [security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c] [Lines 422+]  
[Old Code]  
No entry for CKM_CHACHA20  
[Fixed Code]  
{ CKM_CHACHA20, { 32, 32, CKF_EN_DE }, PR_TRUE },  

Additional Details:  
This appears to be a feature addition rather than a security fix. The diff adds support for the CHACHA20 cipher mechanism by including it in the list of supported mechanisms. There's no indication of a vulnerability being fixed - it's simply expanding the cryptographic capabilities of the system. The change adds the standard CHACHA20 cipher (as opposed to the NSS-specific variants that were already present) with proper key size parameters (32 bytes) and flags indicating it can be used for both encryption and decryption (CKF_EN_DE).

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_encrypted_client_hello_client_only.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_encrypted_client_hello_client_only.js@@ -5,8 +5,7 @@ // Public Name = delegated-enabled.example.com const ECH_CONFIG_FIXED =-  "AFL+CgBOTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAAwBkAB1kZWxlZ2F0ZWQtZW5hYmxlZC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQAA";-+  "AFD+DQBMTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAA2QdZGVsZWdhdGVkLWVuYWJsZWQuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20AAA=="; do_get_profile(); // An arbitrary, non-ECH server.

Let me analyze the diff for potential security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Potentially Insecure ECH Configuration] [security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_encrypted_client_hello_client_only.js] [Lines 5-6]
[Old Code]
const ECH_CONFIG_FIXED =
  "AFL+CgBOTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAAwBkAB1kZWxlZ2F0ZWQtZW5hYmxlZC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQAA";
[Fixed Code]
const ECH_CONFIG_FIXED =
  "AFD+DQBMTQAgACCKB1Y5SfrGIyk27W82xPpzWTDs3q72c04xSurDWlb9CgAEAAEAA2QdZGVsZWdhdGVkLWVuYWJsZWQuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20AAA==";

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a change in the Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) configuration string
- The change involves different base64-encoded configuration data
- Without deeper knowledge of ECH internals, it's unclear if the old version had security issues
- The change might relate to improved security parameters or fixing a potential configuration weakness

Note: Since this is a test file, the change might not represent an actual vulnerability but rather an update to test cases. However, I'm including it as a potential security-related change since it involves encryption configuration.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/close.any.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/close.any.js@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// META: global=window,worker,jsshell+// META: global=window,worker // META: script=../resources/test-utils.js // META: script=../resources/recording-streams.js 'use strict';

Analysis of the code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Test Environment Scope Reduction] [testing/web-platform/tests/streams/writable-streams/close.any.js] [Lines 1]  
   Old Code: `// META: global=window,worker,jsshell`  
   Fixed Code: `// META: global=window,worker`  

Additional Details:
- The change removes `jsshell` from the test environment globals, potentially reducing the test scope
- This could be related to security if `jsshell` was found to have vulnerabilities in testing contexts
- Without more context, it's unclear if this was specifically fixing a security issue or just a test scope adjustment
- The change might be related to removing insecure or unnecessary test environments

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/browser/components/extensions/parent/ext-pkcs11.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/browser/components/extensions/parent/ext-pkcs11.js@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ XPCOMUtils.defineLazyModuleGetters(this, {   ctypes: "resource://gre/modules/ctypes.jsm",   NativeManifests: "resource://gre/modules/NativeManifests.jsm",-  OS: "resource://gre/modules/osfile.jsm", }); XPCOMUtils.defineLazyServiceGetter(@@ -16,6 +15,9 @@   "@mozilla.org/security/pkcs11moduledb;1",   "nsIPKCS11ModuleDB" );++// eslint-disable-next-line mozilla/reject-importGlobalProperties+Cu.importGlobalProperties(["PathUtils"]); var { DefaultMap } = ExtensionUtils;@@ -37,13 +39,31 @@         context       );       if (hostInfo) {+        // We don't normalize the absolute path below because+        // `Path.normalize` throws when the target file doesn't+        // exist, and that might be the case on non Windows+        // builds.+        let absolutePath = PathUtils.isAbsolute(hostInfo.manifest.path)+          ? hostInfo.manifest.path+          : PathUtils.joinRelative(+              PathUtils.parent(hostInfo.path),+              hostInfo.manifest.path+            );+         if (AppConstants.platform === "win") {-          hostInfo.manifest.path = OS.Path.join(-            OS.Path.dirname(hostInfo.path),-            hostInfo.manifest.path-          );+          // On Windows, `hostInfo.manifest.path` is expected to be a normalized+          // absolute path. On other platforms, this path may be relative but we+          // cannot use `PathUtils.normalize()` on non-absolute paths.+          absolutePath = PathUtils.normalize(absolutePath);+          hostInfo.manifest.path = absolutePath;         }-        let manifestLib = OS.Path.basename(hostInfo.manifest.path);++        // PathUtils.filename throws if the path is not an absolute path.+        // The result is expected to be the basename of the file (without+        // the dir path and the extension) so it is fine to use an absolute+        // path that may not be normalized (non-Windows platforms).+        let manifestLib = PathUtils.filename(absolutePath);+         if (AppConstants.platform !== "linux") {           manifestLib = manifestLib.toLowerCase(manifestLib);         }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Path Manipulation Vulnerability] [browser/components/extensions/parent/ext-pkcs11.js] [Lines 37-39, 45-57]
    [Old Code]
    hostInfo.manifest.path = OS.Path.join(
      OS.Path.dirname(hostInfo.path),
      hostInfo.manifest.path
    );
    let manifestLib = OS.Path.basename(hostInfo.manifest.path);
    [Fixed Code]
    let absolutePath = PathUtils.isAbsolute(hostInfo.manifest.path)
      ? hostInfo.manifest.path
      : PathUtils.joinRelative(
          PathUtils.parent(hostInfo.path),
          hostInfo.manifest.path
        );
    // ... (additional path handling logic)
    let manifestLib = PathUtils.filename(absolutePath);

Additional Details:
- The change involves more robust path handling using PathUtils instead of OS.Path
- The fix includes better handling of absolute vs relative paths and platform-specific normalization
- While this appears to be a security improvement, I can't definitively identify a specific vulnerability being fixed
- The comments suggest concerns about path normalization and file existence checks

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
    [Potential Case-Sensitive Path Handling] [browser/components/extensions/parent/ext-pkcs11.js] [Lines 56-58]
    [Old Code]
    let manifestLib = OS.Path.basename(hostInfo.manifest.path);
    [Fixed Code]
    let manifestLib = PathUtils.filename(absolutePath);
    if (AppConstants.platform !== "linux") {
      manifestLib = manifestLib.toLowerCase(manifestLib);
    }
Additional Details:
- The change adds explicit case handling for non-Linux platforms
- This might relate to potential case-sensitivity issues in path handling
- The security implications aren't entirely clear without more context

Note: While these changes appear to be security-related improvements in path handling, I cannot identify specific CVE or vulnerability names being addressed. The changes suggest defense-in-depth improvements rather than fixes for known vulnerabilities.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.prune.closed.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.prune.closed.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ ctx.lineTo(50, 25); ctx.closePath(); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be purely cosmetic/refactoring changes where a variable name was changed from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability.

Here's the analysis following your requested format:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No security vulnerability found] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/path-objects/2d.path.stroke.prune.closed.worker.js] [Lines 13-14, 27]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
...
_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

The changes are purely variable renaming with no security implications. The functionality remains exactly the same, just using a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.source-in.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.solid.source-in.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(0, 255, 255, 1.0)';@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ ctx.globalCompositeOperation = 'source-in'; ctx.fillStyle = 'rgba(255, 255, 0, 1.0)'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,255, "50,25", "255,255,0,255", 5);+_assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,255, "50,25", "255,255,0,255", 5); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and updating the corresponding references. Here's the analysis following your requested format:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] [Lines 17-18,26]
    [Old Code]
    var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,255, "50,25", "255,255,0,255", 5);
    
    [Fixed Code]
    var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
    var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
    _assertPixelApprox(canvas, 50,25, 255,255,0,255, "50,25", "255,255,0,255", 5);

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/media/libpng/moz.yaml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/media/libpng/moz.yaml@@ -9,6 +9,56 @@   description: "PNG reference library"   url: "http://www.libpng.org/pub/png/libpng.html"-  license: "libpng"+  license: libpng-  release: "1.6.37"+  release: commit a40189cf881e9f0db80511c382292a5604c3c3d1 (2019-04-14T10:10:32:00Z).++  revision: "v1.6.37"++  license-file: LICENSE++updatebot:+  maintainer-phab: aosmond+  maintainer-bz: [email protected]+  tasks:+    - type: vendoring+      enabled: True++vendoring:+  url: https://github.com/glennrp/libpng+  source-hosting: github+  tracking: tag++  exclude:+    - "**"+    - ".*"++  include:+    - arm+    - contrib/arm-neon/linux.c+    - intel+    - mips+    - powerpc+    - ANNOUNCE+    - AUTHORS+    - CHANGES+    - libpng-manual.txt+    - LICENSE+    - README+    - TRADEMARK+    - "*.c"+    - "*.h"++  keep:+    - MOZCHANGES+    - crashtests++  update-actions:+    - action: copy-file+      from: 'contrib/arm-neon/linux.c'+      to: 'arm/linux.c'+    - action: delete-path+      path: 'contrib'++  patches:+    - "*.patch"

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't see any security-related fixes. The changes appear to be primarily administrative and organizational updates to the moz.yaml file. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability [File] media/libpng/moz.yaml [Lines] Various
   [Old Code] Various old configuration values
   [Fixed Code] Updated configuration values and structure

The changes include:
- Updated license format (removed quotes)
- Added more detailed release information
- Added revision number
- Added license-file reference
- Added updatebot configuration
- Expanded vendoring configuration with include/exclude lists
- Added update actions
- Added patches configuration

None of these changes appear to address any specific security vulnerabilities. The modifications seem focused on improving the build system configuration and maintenance processes rather than fixing security issues.

If there were any security fixes in this libpng update, they would likely be documented in the CHANGES file mentioned in the include list, but that file's contents aren't shown in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-multicol/columnfill-auto-max-height-002.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-multicol/columnfill-auto-max-height-002.html@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css-multicol-1/#cf" title="7.1 column-fill">   <link rel="match" href="../reference/ref-filled-green-100px-square.xht">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta content="This test verifies how content is distributed among columns when the height of a multi-column container is constrained and when 'column-fill' is set to 'auto'. In this test, the line box height is exactly 25px. So, content should fill 4 lines of the first column and should only fill up the first column. Since column rules are only drawn between two columns that both have content and since the test expects only 1 column filled with content, therefore the column rule should not be painted, thus the 'no red' test success condition." name="assert">   <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/fonts/ahem.css" />

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-multicol/columnfill-auto-max-height-002.html [Lines] 17
   [Old Code] <meta name="flags" content="">
   [Fixed Code] (removed line)

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag with a "flags" attribute, which appears to be test-related metadata rather than a security-related fix.
- There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed in this change.
- The modification seems to be cleanup of test configuration rather than a security patch.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/ipc/ContentProcess.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/ipc/ContentProcess.cpp@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@   // Do this as early as possible to get the parent process to initialize the   // background thread since we'll likely need database information very soon.   mozilla::ipc::BackgroundChild::Startup();+  mozilla::ipc::BackgroundChild::InitContentStarter(&mContent);   return true; }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   [Potential Initialization Race Condition] [dom/ipc/ContentProcess.cpp] [Lines 171-174]
   [Old Code]
     // Do this as early as possible to get the parent process to initialize the
     // background thread since we'll likely need database information very soon.
     mozilla::ipc::BackgroundChild::Startup();
   
     return true;
   [Fixed Code]
     // Do this as early as possible to get the parent process to initialize the
     // background thread since we'll likely need database information very soon.
     mozilla::ipc::BackgroundChild::Startup();
     mozilla::ipc::BackgroundChild::InitContentStarter(&mContent);
   
     return true;

Additional Details:
- The change adds initialization of content starter alongside background child startup
- While this appears to be a reliability/initialization improvement, it's unclear if it fixes a specific security vulnerability
- The change could potentially address race conditions in process initialization, but without more context about the specific security implications, we can't be certain
- No specific CVE or vulnerability name is apparent from this change alone

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-27a.xml+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-27a.xml@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ p { color: green; }]]></style>   <link rel="author" title="Ian Hickson" href="mailto:[email protected]"/>   <link rel="help" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/css3-selectors/#selectors"/> <!-- bogus link to make sure it gets found -->-  <meta name="flags" content="" />  </head>  <body> <p>This line should be green (there should be no red on this page).</p>

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] testing/web-platform/tests/css/selectors/old-tests/css3-modsel-27a.xml [Lines] 20
   Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="" />
   Fixed Code: (removed line)

Additional Details:
- The diff shows removal of an empty meta tag with "flags" attribute, which doesn't appear to be security-related
- This appears to be a test file cleanup rather than a security fix
- No known vulnerabilities are associated with this change
- The modification seems to be removing unnecessary markup from a test case file

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. The change appears to be a minor cleanup of test file markup.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/framework/test/metrics/browser_metrics_inspector.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/framework/test/metrics/browser_metrics_inspector.js@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@     "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom-factories.js",     "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-prop-types.js",     "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/redux.js",+    "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/fluent-react.js",   ]);   runMetricsTest({

Analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: no
No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 33-34]
[Old Code]
    "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom-factories.js",
    "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-prop-types.js",
    "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/redux.js",
[Fixed Code]
    "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom-factories.js",
    "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-prop-types.js",
    "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/redux.js",
    "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/fluent-react.js",

Additional Details:
The change appears to be adding a new resource path for fluent-react.js to the list of allowed resources. This doesn't appear to be a security fix but rather a feature addition or dependency update. No security vulnerabilities are evident in this change.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-width-block-intrinsic-1.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-width-block-intrinsic-1.html@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="L. David Baron" href="https://dbaron.org/">   <link rel="help" href="http://www.w3.org/TR/css3-values/#calc-notation">   <link rel="match" href="calc-width-block-intrinsic-1-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content=""> <style type="text/css"> body { font-size: 10px }

Let me analyze the provided code diff for security fixes.

Vulnerability Existed: no
[No specific vulnerability] [testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-values/calc-width-block-intrinsic-1.html] [Lines 5]
[Old Code]
  <meta name="flags" content="">
[Fixed Code]
[Removed line]

Additional Details:
- The change simply removes an empty meta tag that wasn't serving any purpose
- This appears to be a cleanup change rather than a security fix
- No specific vulnerability is being addressed here
- The "flags" meta tag was commonly used in test files but is being phased out as it's not needed

No other vulnerabilities are apparent in this small diff. The change is purely about removing unnecessary markup from a test file.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/js/src/jit/CacheIRCompiler.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/js/src/jit/CacheIRCompiler.cpp@@ -1159,6 +1159,7 @@         AsGCPtr<jsid>(destWords)->init(jsid::fromRawBits(field.asWord()));         break;       case StubField::Type::RawInt64:+      case StubField::Type::Double:         *reinterpret_cast<uint64_t*>(destWords) = field.asInt64();         break;       case StubField::Type::Value:@@ -1183,6 +1184,7 @@       case StubField::Type::RawInt32:       case StubField::Type::RawPointer:       case StubField::Type::RawInt64:+      case StubField::Type::Double:         break;       case StubField::Type::Shape: {         // For CCW IC stubs, we can store same-zone but cross-compartment@@ -7002,6 +7004,22 @@   } }+void CacheIRCompiler::emitLoadDoubleValueStubField(StubFieldOffset val,+                                                   ValueOperand dest,+                                                   FloatRegister scratch) {+  MOZ_ASSERT(val.getStubFieldType() == StubField::Type::Double);++  if (stubFieldPolicy_ == StubFieldPolicy::Constant) {+    MOZ_ASSERT(mode_ == Mode::Ion);+    double d = doubleStubField(val.getOffset());+    masm.moveValue(DoubleValue(d), dest);+  } else {+    Address addr(ICStubReg, stubDataOffset_ + val.getOffset());+    masm.loadDouble(addr, scratch);+    masm.boxDouble(scratch, dest, scratch);+  }+}+ bool CacheIRCompiler::emitLoadInstanceOfObjectResult(ValOperandId lhsId,                                                      ObjOperandId protoId) {   JitSpew(JitSpew_Codegen, "%s", __FUNCTION__);@@ -7259,6 +7277,19 @@   JitSpew(JitSpew_Codegen, "%s", __FUNCTION__);   Register reg = allocator.defineRegister(masm, resultId);   masm.move32(Imm32(val), reg);+  return true;+}++bool CacheIRCompiler::emitLoadDoubleConstant(uint32_t valOffset,+                                             NumberOperandId resultId) {+  JitSpew(JitSpew_Codegen, "%s", __FUNCTION__);++  ValueOperand output = allocator.defineValueRegister(masm, resultId);+  StubFieldOffset val(valOffset, StubField::Type::Double);++  AutoScratchFloatRegister floatReg(this);++  emitLoadDoubleValueStubField(val, output, floatReg);   return true; }@@ -8118,6 +8149,8 @@   // Load the value.   BaseIndex source(scratch, index, ScaleFromScalarType(elementType));+  // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_load in+  // GenerateAtomicOperations.py   auto sync = Synchronization::Load();   masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync);@@ -8168,6 +8201,8 @@     // Store the value.     BaseIndex dest(scratch, index, ScaleFromScalarType(elementType));+    // NOTE: the generated code must match the assembly code in gen_store in+    // GenerateAtomicOperations.py     auto sync = Synchronization::Store();     masm.memoryBarrierBefore(sync);

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze potential security vulnerabilities. Here's the structured analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Missing Case Handling [File] js/src/jit/CacheIRCompiler.cpp [Lines] 1159-1164
   Old Code:
   ```
   case StubField::Type::RawInt64:
       *reinterpret_cast<uint64_t*>(destWords) = field.asInt64();
       break;
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   case StubField::Type::RawInt64:
   case StubField::Type::Double:
       *reinterpret_cast<uint64_t*>(destWords) = field.asInt64();
       break;
   ```

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Missing Case Handling [File] js/src/jit/CacheIRCompiler.cpp [Lines] 1183-1188
   Old Code:
   ```
   case StubField::Type::RawInt32:
   case StubField::Type::RawPointer:
   case StubField::Type::RawInt64:
       break;
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   case StubField::Type::RawInt32:
   case StubField::Type::RawPointer:
   case StubField::Type::RawInt64:
   case StubField::Type::Double:
       break;
   ```

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Missing Functionality [File] js/src/jit/CacheIRCompiler.cpp [Lines] 7004-7022
   Old Code: (No equivalent function existed)
   Fixed Code: (Added new function emitLoadDoubleValueStubField)

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
   Potential Missing Functionality [File] js/src/jit/CacheIRCompiler.cpp [Lines] 7279-7290
   Old Code: (No equivalent function existed)
   Fixed Code: (Added new function emitLoadDoubleConstant)

The changes appear to be adding support for handling double values in the CacheIR compiler, including proper case statements and new functions to handle double values. While I can't identify any specific named vulnerabilities, these changes could potentially be related to fixing type confusion issues or adding missing functionality that could have led to security vulnerabilities if not properly handled.

The changes are consistent with defensive programming practices, ensuring all possible types are properly handled in switch statements and adding explicit support for double values. The memory barrier comments in the atomic operations section also suggest attention to thread safety.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.