--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/extras/codec_psd.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/extras/codec_psd.h@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ #include <stddef.h> #include <stdint.h>-#include "lib/extras/color_hints.h"+#include "lib/extras/dec/color_hints.h" #include "lib/jxl/base/padded_bytes.h" #include "lib/jxl/base/span.h" #include "lib/jxl/base/status.h"@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ // Decodes `bytes` into `io`. Status DecodeImagePSD(const Span<const uint8_t> bytes,-                      const ColorHints& color_hints, ThreadPool* pool,+                      const extras::ColorHints& color_hints, ThreadPool* pool,                       CodecInOut* io); // Not implemented yet

Let me analyze the code diff for potential security vulnerabilities:

1. First change (header include):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Header Path Fix [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/extras/codec_psd.h] [Lines 11]
    Old Code: #include "lib/extras/color_hints.h"
    Fixed Code: #include "lib/extras/dec/color_hints.h"
    Additional Details: This appears to be a simple path correction for better code organization, not a security fix.

2. Second change (namespace qualification):
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    Namespace Qualification Fix [third_party/jpeg-xl/lib/extras/codec_psd.h] [Lines 23-25]
    Old Code: const ColorHints& color_hints
    Fixed Code: const extras::ColorHints& color_hints
    Additional Details: This change adds proper namespace qualification but doesn't appear to address any security vulnerability.

No security vulnerabilities were identified in this diff. Both changes appear to be code organization/quality improvements rather than security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/typenum/src/uint.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/typenum/src/uint.rs@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ /// The terminating type for `UInt`; it always comes after the most significant /// bit. `UTerm` by itself represents zero, which is aliased to `U0`. #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd, Clone, Copy, Hash, Debug, Default)]+#[cfg_attr(feature = "scale_info", derive(scale_info::TypeInfo))] pub struct UTerm; impl UTerm {@@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ /// type U6 = UInt<UInt<UInt<UTerm, B1>, B1>, B0>; /// ``` #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd, Clone, Copy, Hash, Debug, Default)]+#[cfg_attr(feature = "scale_info", derive(scale_info::TypeInfo))] pub struct UInt<U, B> {     /// The more significant bits of `Self`.     pub(crate) msb: U,

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be adding a derive macro for `scale_info::TypeInfo` when the "scale_info" feature is enabled, which is more of a feature addition than a security fix.

Analysis for each change:

1. First change:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found [File] third_party/rust/typenum/src/uint.rs [Lines] ~46
    [Old Code]
    #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd, Clone, Copy, Hash, Debug, Default)]
    [Fixed Code]
    #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd, Clone, Copy, Hash, Debug, Default)]
    #[cfg_attr(feature = "scale_info", derive(scale_info::TypeInfo))]

2. Second change:
    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No vulnerability found [File] third_party/rust/typenum/src/uint.rs [Lines] ~143
    [Old Code]
    #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd, Clone, Copy, Hash, Debug, Default)]
    [Fixed Code]
    #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Ord, PartialOrd, Clone, Copy, Hash, Debug, Default)]
    #[cfg_attr(feature = "scale_info", derive(scale_info::TypeInfo))]

These changes are simply adding optional trait derivation for TypeInfo from the scale_info crate when the corresponding feature is enabled. There's no indication of any security vulnerability being addressed in these modifications.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/gfx/layers/ipc/CanvasChild.h+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/gfx/layers/ipc/CanvasChild.h@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@   uint32_t mLastWriteLockCheckpoint = 0;   uint32_t mTransactionsSinceGetDataSurface = kCacheDataSurfaceThreshold;   TimeStamp mLastNonEmptyTransaction = TimeStamp::NowLoRes();+  std::vector<RefPtr<gfx::SourceSurface>> mLastTransactionExternalSurfaces;   bool mIsInTransaction = false;   bool mHasOutstandingWriteLock = false; };

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Resource Management Issue] [gfx/layers/ipc/CanvasChild.h] [Lines 141]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```  
   uint32_t mLastWriteLockCheckpoint = 0;  
   uint32_t mTransactionsSinceGetDataSurface = kCacheDataSurfaceThreshold;  
   TimeStamp mLastNonEmptyTransaction = TimeStamp::NowLoRes();  
   bool mIsInTransaction = false;  
   bool mHasOutstandingWriteLock = false;  
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```  
   uint32_t mLastWriteLockCheckpoint = 0;  
   uint32_t mTransactionsSinceGetDataSurface = kCacheDataSurfaceThreshold;  
   TimeStamp mLastNonEmptyTransaction = TimeStamp::NowLoRes();  
   std::vector<RefPtr<gfx::SourceSurface>> mLastTransactionExternalSurfaces;  
   bool mIsInTransaction = false;  
   bool mHasOutstandingWriteLock = false;  
   ```  
   Additional Details: The addition of `mLastTransactionExternalSurfaces` vector suggests potential fixes for resource management issues, possibly related to surface handling or memory management. However, without more context, we can't be certain if this was fixing a specific vulnerability.

Note: The diff shows an addition of a new member variable but doesn't show any security fixes explicitly. The change could be related to performance improvements, feature additions, or defensive programming rather than a direct security fix. More context would be needed to determine if this was addressing a specific vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.obtuse.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.obtuse.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ ctx.lineTo(800, 300); ctx.lineTo(10000, -8900); ctx.stroke();-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,1, 0,255,0,255, "48,1", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 48,48, 0,255,0,255, "48,48", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 1,48, 0,255,0,255, "1,48", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) and corresponding updates to the variable name in the assertions. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No security vulnerability found
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/line-styles/2d.line.miter.obtuse.worker.js
   Lines: 13-14, 34-37
   Old Code: 
   ```
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   [...]
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   [...]
   ```
   Fixed Code:
   ```
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   [...]
   _assertPixel(canvas, 1,1, 0,255,0,255, "1,1", "0,255,0,255");
   [...]
   ```

The changes are purely cosmetic/refactoring in nature and don't address any security issues. The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/server/actors/targets/webextension.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/server/actors/targets/webextension.js@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ const {   webExtensionTargetSpec, } = require("devtools/shared/specs/targets/webextension");-const DevToolsUtils = require("devtools/shared/DevToolsUtils"); const Targets = require("devtools/server/actors/targets/index"); const TargetActorMixin = require("devtools/server/actors/targets/target-actor-mixin");@@ -135,9 +134,6 @@     },   });-  // Bind the _allowSource helper to this, it is used in the-  // WindowGlobalTargetActor to lazily create the SourcesManager instance.-  this._allowSource = this._allowSource.bind(this);   this._onParentExit = this._onParentExit.bind(this);   this._chromeGlobal.addMessageListener(@@ -301,58 +297,6 @@ }; /**- * Return true if the given source is associated with this addon and should be- * added to the visible sources (retrieved and used by the webbrowser actor module).- */-webExtensionTargetPrototype._allowSource = function(source) {-  // Use the source.element to detect the allowed source, if any.-  if (source.element) {-    try {-      const domEl = unwrapDebuggerObjectGlobal(source.element);-      return this.isExtensionWindowDescendent(domEl.ownerGlobal);-    } catch (e) {-      // If the source's window is dead then the above will throw.-      DevToolsUtils.reportException("WebExtensionTarget.allowSource", e);-      return false;-    }-  }--  // Fallback to check the uri if there is no source.element associated to the source.--  // Retrieve the first component of source.url in the form "url1 -> url2 -> ...".-  const url = source.url.split(" -> ").pop();--  // Filter out the code introduced by evaluating code in the webconsole.-  if (url === "debugger eval code" || url === "debugger eager eval code") {-    return false;-  }--  let uri;--  // Try to decode the url.-  try {-    uri = Services.io.newURI(url);-  } catch (err) {-    Cu.reportError(`Unexpected invalid url: ${url}`);-    return false;-  }--  // Filter out resource and chrome sources (which are related to the loaded internals).-  if (["resource", "chrome", "file"].includes(uri.scheme)) {-    return false;-  }--  try {-    const addonID = this.aps.extensionURIToAddonId(uri);--    return addonID == this.addonId;-  } catch (err) {-    // extensionURIToAddonId raises an exception on non-extension URLs.-    return false;-  }-};--/**  * Return true if the given global is associated with this addon and should be  * added as a debuggee, false otherwise.  */

I'll analyze the code diff and provide the security assessment following the required format.

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Information Leak [devtools/server/actors/targets/webextension.js] [Lines 24,135,301-357]
[Old Code]
const DevToolsUtils = require("devtools/shared/DevToolsUtils");
...
this._allowSource = this._allowSource.bind(this);
...
webExtensionTargetPrototype._allowSource = function(source) {
  // (entire function implementation)
}

[Fixed Code]
(All above code removed)

Additional Details:
1. The diff shows removal of the `_allowSource` function and its related bindings/imports
2. The function appears to handle source filtering for web extensions
3. While not clearly a security vulnerability, removing source filtering could potentially lead to information disclosure if not properly handled elsewhere
4. The removal of error reporting (DevToolsUtils.reportException) might affect security visibility

Vulnerability Existed: no
Code Cleanup [devtools/server/actors/targets/webextension.js] [Lines 24,135]
[Old Code]
const DevToolsUtils = require("devtools/shared/DevToolsUtils");
...
this._allowSource = this._allowSource.bind(this);

[Fixed Code]
(Removed lines)

Additional Details:
1. This appears to be simple code cleanup rather than a security fix
2. The removed code was related to functionality that was completely removed
3. No direct security implications from these specific removals

Note: Without more context about why the `_allowSource` function was removed and what replaced its functionality, it's difficult to definitively assess if this introduced or fixed any security issues. The removal could be part of a larger architectural change that moved this functionality elsewhere.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/widget/android/WebExecutorSupport.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/widget/android/WebExecutorSupport.cpp@@ -350,9 +350,10 @@   rv = internalChannel->SetFetchCacheMode(cacheMode);   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);-  // TODO: Bug 1750231 - make this configurable-  rv = internalChannel->SetBeConservative(true);-  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);+  if (req->BeConservative()) {+    rv = internalChannel->SetBeConservative(true);+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);+  }   // We don't have any UI   rv = internalChannel->SetBlockAuthPrompt(true);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Security Misconfiguration [File] [Lines 350-353]  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
// TODO: Bug 1750231 - make this configurable
rv = internalChannel->SetBeConservative(true);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
if (req->BeConservative()) {
  rv = internalChannel->SetBeConservative(true);
  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
```

Additional Details:
1. The change makes the "BeConservative" setting conditional based on the request's requirements rather than always enforcing it
2. While this could potentially affect security behavior, there's not enough context to determine if this was fixing an actual vulnerability or just improving configuration flexibility
3. The original TODO comment suggests this was planned work rather than a direct security fix
4. Without knowing what "BeConservative" actually controls, we can't definitively say if this was a security fix or not

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/toolkit/content/editMenuOverlay.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/toolkit/content/editMenuOverlay.js@@ -40,9 +40,6 @@ window.addEventListener(   "DOMContentLoaded",   () => {-    // Bug 371900: Remove useless oncommand attribute once bug 371900 is fixed-    // If you remove/update the oncommand attribute for any of the cmd_*, please-    // also remove/update the sha512 hash in the CSP within about:downloads     let container =       document.querySelector("commandset") || document.documentElement;     let fragment = MozXULElement.parseXULToFragment(`@@ -50,14 +47,14 @@         <commandset id="editMenuCommandSetAll" commandupdater="true" events="focus,select" />         <commandset id="editMenuCommandSetUndo" commandupdater="true" events="undo" />         <commandset id="editMenuCommandSetPaste" commandupdater="true" events="clipboard" />-        <command id="cmd_undo" oncommand=";" />-        <command id="cmd_redo" oncommand=";" />-        <command id="cmd_cut" oncommand=";" />-        <command id="cmd_copy" oncommand=";" />-        <command id="cmd_paste" oncommand=";" />-        <command id="cmd_delete" oncommand=";" />-        <command id="cmd_selectAll" oncommand=";" />-        <command id="cmd_switchTextDirection" oncommand=";" />+        <command id="cmd_undo" internal="true"/>+        <command id="cmd_redo" internal="true" />+        <command id="cmd_cut" internal="true" />+        <command id="cmd_copy" internal="true" />+        <command id="cmd_paste" internal="true" />+        <command id="cmd_delete" />+        <command id="cmd_selectAll" internal="true" />+        <command id="cmd_switchTextDirection" />       </commandset>     `);

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential XSS/Command Injection] [toolkit/content/editMenuOverlay.js] [Lines 50-57]  
   [Old Code]  
   `<command id="cmd_undo" oncommand=";" />`  
   [Fixed Code]  
   `<command id="cmd_undo" internal="true"/>`  

   Additional Details: The change removes empty `oncommand` attributes and replaces them with `internal="true"` attributes. While empty `oncommand` attributes might not be directly exploitable, they could potentially be modified to execute malicious code if an attacker could manipulate the DOM. The `internal="true"` attribute might provide additional security by marking these commands as internal-only.

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential DOM Clobbering] [toolkit/content/editMenuOverlay.js] [Lines 40-42]  
   [Old Code]  
   (Removed comment about CSP hash updates)  
   [Fixed Code]  
   (Comment removed)  

   Additional Details: The removed comment referenced CSP hashes in about:downloads, suggesting there might have been a connection between these commands and CSP. The removal might indicate these commands no longer affect CSP, potentially closing some attack vector related to DOM clobbering or CSP bypass.

Note: Without more context about how these commands are used in the application, it's difficult to determine if these were actual security vulnerabilities or just code cleanup. The changes appear to be hardening measures that could prevent potential security issues.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/framework/components/ToolboxController.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/framework/components/ToolboxController.js@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@       canCloseToolbox: true,       isSplitConsoleActive: false,       disableAutohide: undefined,+      pseudoLocale: undefined,       canRender: false,       buttonIds: [],       checkedButtonsUpdated: () => {@@ -159,8 +160,18 @@     this.setState({ isSplitConsoleActive });   }+  /**+   * @param {bool | undefined} disableAutohide+   */   setDisableAutohide(disableAutohide) {     this.setState({ disableAutohide });+  }++  /**+   * @param {"bidi" | "accented" | "none" | undefined} pseudoLocale+   */+  setPseudoLocale(pseudoLocale) {+    this.setState({ pseudoLocale });   }   setPanelDefinitions(panelDefinitions) {

Based on the provided code diff, I don't see any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be feature additions rather than security patches. Here's my analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found [File] devtools/client/framework/components/ToolboxController.js [Lines] 37-160
    [Old Code]
    No pseudoLocale state variable or setPseudoLocale method
    [Fixed Code]
    Added pseudoLocale state variable and setPseudoLocale method

The changes involve:
1. Adding a new state variable `pseudoLocale` to track localization settings
2. Adding a new method `setPseudoLocale` to update this state
3. Adding JSDoc comments for type safety

These appear to be feature enhancements rather than security fixes. The changes improve type safety through JSDoc annotations and add support for pseudo-localization features, but don't address any apparent security vulnerabilities.

If there were any security implications to these changes, they would likely be related to input validation, but since the method just passes through the value to React's state management, there's no obvious vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.source-in.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.source-in.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0';@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ ctx.clip(); ctx.fillStyle = '#f00'; ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 50, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

After analyzing the provided code diff, here's the security assessment:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found in the diff. The changes appear to be variable renaming only.
   File: testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/compositing/2d.composite.clip.source-in.html
   Lines: 17-18, 28-29
   Old Code: 
   ```var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');```
   ```_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");```
   Fixed Code:
   ```var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');```
   ```_assertPixel(canvas, 25,25, 0,255,0,255, "25,25", "0,255,0,255");
   _assertPixel(canvas, 75,25, 0,255,0,255, "75,25", "0,255,0,255");```

The changes in the diff are purely cosmetic, renaming the variable `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas` for consistency or readability. There are no security-related changes or vulnerability fixes in this diff. The functionality remains exactly the same, only the variable name has been changed.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp@@ -3738,8 +3738,8 @@ } mozilla::ipc::IPCResult ContentParent::RecvInitBackground(-    Endpoint<PBackgroundParent>&& aEndpoint) {-  if (!BackgroundParent::Alloc(this, std::move(aEndpoint))) {+    Endpoint<PBackgroundStarterParent>&& aEndpoint) {+  if (!BackgroundParent::AllocStarter(this, std::move(aEndpoint))) {     NS_WARNING("BackgroundParent::Alloc failed");   }@@ -4070,8 +4070,7 @@     return;   }-  if (!KillProcess(otherProcessHandle, base::PROCESS_END_KILLED_BY_USER,-                   false)) {+  if (!KillProcess(otherProcessHandle, base::PROCESS_END_KILLED_BY_USER)) {     NS_WARNING("failed to kill subprocess!");   }@@ -4207,11 +4206,9 @@   return true; }-PNeckoParent* ContentParent::AllocPNeckoParent() { return new NeckoParent(); }--bool ContentParent::DeallocPNeckoParent(PNeckoParent* necko) {-  delete necko;-  return true;+already_AddRefed<PNeckoParent> ContentParent::AllocPNeckoParent() {+  RefPtr<NeckoParent> actor = new NeckoParent();+  return actor.forget(); } PPrintingParent* ContentParent::AllocPPrintingParent() {@@ -5927,7 +5924,9 @@   }   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;-  rv = ssm->GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(principal));+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> partitionedPrincipal;+  rv = ssm->GetChannelResultPrincipals(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(principal),+                                       getter_AddRefs(partitionedPrincipal));   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);   // Let the caller know we're going to send main thread IPC for updating@@ -5938,7 +5937,13 @@   TransmitBlobURLsForPrincipal(principal);+  // Tranmit permissions for both regular and partitioned principal so that the+  // content process can get permissions for the partitioned principal. For+  // example, the desk-notification permission for a partitioned service worker.   rv = TransmitPermissionsForPrincipal(principal);+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);++  rv = TransmitPermissionsForPrincipal(partitionedPrincipal);   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);   nsLoadFlags newLoadFlags;@@ -7221,11 +7226,12 @@ mozilla::ipc::IPCResult ContentParent::RecvHistoryCommit(     const MaybeDiscarded<BrowsingContext>& aContext, const uint64_t& aLoadID,     const nsID& aChangeID, const uint32_t& aLoadType, const bool& aPersist,-    const bool& aCloneEntryChildren, const bool& aChannelExpired) {+    const bool& aCloneEntryChildren, const bool& aChannelExpired,+    const uint32_t& aCacheKey) {   if (!aContext.IsDiscarded()) {     aContext.get_canonical()->SessionHistoryCommit(         aLoadID, aChangeID, aLoadType, aPersist, aCloneEntryChildren,-        aChannelExpired);+        aChannelExpired, aCacheKey);   }   return IPC_OK();@@ -7336,6 +7342,21 @@       aContext.get_canonical()->GetActiveSessionHistoryEntry();   if (entry) {     entry->SetCacheKey(aCacheKey);+  }+  return IPC_OK();+}++mozilla::ipc::IPCResult ContentParent::RecvSessionHistoryEntryWireframe(+    const MaybeDiscarded<BrowsingContext>& aContext,+    const Wireframe& aWireframe) {+  if (aContext.IsNullOrDiscarded()) {+    return IPC_OK();+  }++  SessionHistoryEntry* entry =+      aContext.get_canonical()->GetActiveSessionHistoryEntry();+  if (entry) {+    entry->SetWireframe(Some(aWireframe));   }   return IPC_OK(); }

Here's the security analysis following your requested format:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes
Insecure Principal Handling [dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp] [Lines 5927-5945]
[Old Code]
  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
  rv = ssm->GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(principal));
  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
  TransmitBlobURLsForPrincipal(principal);
  rv = TransmitPermissionsForPrincipal(principal);
[Fixed Code]
  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> partitionedPrincipal;
  rv = ssm->GetChannelResultPrincipals(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(principal),
                                       getter_AddRefs(partitionedPrincipal));
  TransmitBlobURLsForPrincipal(principal);
  rv = TransmitPermissionsForPrincipal(principal);
  rv = TransmitPermissionsForPrincipal(partitionedPrincipal);

2. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Potential Memory Management Issue [dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp] [Lines 4207-4212]
[Old Code]
PNeckoParent* ContentParent::AllocPNeckoParent() { return new NeckoParent(); }
bool ContentParent::DeallocPNeckoParent(PNeckoParent* necko) {
  delete necko;
  return true;
}
[Fixed Code]
already_AddRefed<PNeckoParent> ContentParent::AllocPNeckoParent() {
  RefPtr<NeckoParent> actor = new NeckoParent();
  return actor.forget();
}

3. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Process Termination Issue [dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp] [Lines 4070-4073]
[Old Code]
  if (!KillProcess(otherProcessHandle, base::PROCESS_END_KILLED_BY_USER,
                   false)) {
[Fixed Code]
  if (!KillProcess(otherProcessHandle, base::PROCESS_END_KILLED_BY_USER)) {

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure
Background Process Initialization [dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp] [Lines 3738-3743]
[Old Code]
mozilla::ipc::IPCResult ContentParent::RecvInitBackground(
    Endpoint<PBackgroundParent>&& aEndpoint) {
  if (!BackgroundParent::Alloc(this, std::move(aEndpoint))) {
[Fixed Code]
mozilla::ipc::IPCResult ContentParent::RecvInitBackground(
    Endpoint<PBackgroundStarterParent>&& aEndpoint) {
  if (!BackgroundParent::AllocStarter(this, std::move(aEndpoint))) {

The most clear security fix is the first one, which addresses potential security issues with partitioned principals and permission handling. The other changes might be security-related but their exact impact is less clear without more context.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/get_physical_device_properties2.rs+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/rust/ash/src/extensions/khr/get_physical_device_properties2.rs@@ -1,30 +1,21 @@ use crate::prelude::*; use crate::vk;-use crate::{EntryCustom, Instance};+use crate::{Entry, Instance}; use std::ffi::CStr; use std::mem; use std::ptr; #[derive(Clone)] pub struct GetPhysicalDeviceProperties2 {-    handle: vk::Instance,-    get_physical_device_properties2_fn: vk::KhrGetPhysicalDeviceProperties2Fn,+    fp: vk::KhrGetPhysicalDeviceProperties2Fn, } impl GetPhysicalDeviceProperties2 {-    pub fn new<L>(entry: &EntryCustom<L>, instance: &Instance) -> Self {-        let get_physical_device_properties2_fn =-            vk::KhrGetPhysicalDeviceProperties2Fn::load(|name| unsafe {-                mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(instance.handle(), name.as_ptr()))-            });-        Self {-            handle: instance.handle(),-            get_physical_device_properties2_fn,-        }-    }--    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {-        vk::KhrGetPhysicalDeviceProperties2Fn::name()+    pub fn new(entry: &Entry, instance: &Instance) -> Self {+        let fp = vk::KhrGetPhysicalDeviceProperties2Fn::load(|name| unsafe {+            mem::transmute(entry.get_instance_proc_addr(instance.handle(), name.as_ptr()))+        });+        Self { fp }     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetPhysicalDeviceFeatures2KHR.html>"]@@ -33,7 +24,7 @@         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,         features: &mut vk::PhysicalDeviceFeatures2KHR,     ) {-        self.get_physical_device_properties2_fn+        self.fp             .get_physical_device_features2_khr(physical_device, features);     }@@ -44,8 +35,11 @@         format: vk::Format,         format_properties: &mut vk::FormatProperties2KHR,     ) {-        self.get_physical_device_properties2_fn-            .get_physical_device_format_properties2_khr(physical_device, format, format_properties);+        self.fp.get_physical_device_format_properties2_khr(+            physical_device,+            format,+            format_properties,+        );     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetPhysicalDeviceImageFormatProperties2KHR.html>"]@@ -55,7 +49,7 @@         image_format_info: &vk::PhysicalDeviceImageFormatInfo2KHR,         image_format_properties: &mut vk::ImageFormatProperties2KHR,     ) -> VkResult<()> {-        self.get_physical_device_properties2_fn+        self.fp             .get_physical_device_image_format_properties2_khr(                 physical_device,                 image_format_info,@@ -70,7 +64,7 @@         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,         memory_properties: &mut vk::PhysicalDeviceMemoryProperties2KHR,     ) {-        self.get_physical_device_properties2_fn+        self.fp             .get_physical_device_memory_properties2_khr(physical_device, memory_properties);     }@@ -80,46 +74,49 @@         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,         properties: &mut vk::PhysicalDeviceProperties2KHR,     ) {-        self.get_physical_device_properties2_fn+        self.fp             .get_physical_device_properties2_khr(physical_device, properties);     }+    /// Retrieve the number of elements to pass to [`Self::get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2()`]     pub unsafe fn get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2_len(         &self,         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,     ) -> usize {         let mut count = 0;-        self.get_physical_device_properties2_fn-            .get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2_khr(-                physical_device,-                &mut count,-                ptr::null_mut(),-            );+        self.fp.get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2_khr(+            physical_device,+            &mut count,+            ptr::null_mut(),+        );         count as usize     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetPhysicalDeviceQueueFamilyProperties2KHR.html>"]+    ///+    /// Call [`Self::get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2_len()`] to query the number of elements to pass to `out`.+    /// Be sure to [`Default::default()`]-initialize these elements and optionally set their `p_next` pointer.     pub unsafe fn get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2(         &self,         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,-        queue_family_properties: &mut [vk::QueueFamilyProperties2KHR],+        out: &mut [vk::QueueFamilyProperties2KHR],     ) {-        let mut count = queue_family_properties.len() as u32;-        self.get_physical_device_properties2_fn-            .get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2_khr(-                physical_device,-                &mut count,-                queue_family_properties.as_mut_ptr(),-            );+        let mut count = out.len() as u32;+        self.fp.get_physical_device_queue_family_properties2_khr(+            physical_device,+            &mut count,+            out.as_mut_ptr(),+        );     }+    /// Retrieve the number of elements to pass to [`Self::get_physical_device_sparse_image_format_properties2()`]     pub unsafe fn get_physical_device_sparse_image_format_properties2_len(         &self,         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,         format_info: &vk::PhysicalDeviceSparseImageFormatInfo2KHR,     ) -> usize {         let mut count = 0;-        self.get_physical_device_properties2_fn+        self.fp             .get_physical_device_sparse_image_format_properties2_khr(                 physical_device,                 format_info,@@ -130,27 +127,30 @@     }     #[doc = "<https://www.khronos.org/registry/vulkan/specs/1.2-extensions/man/html/vkGetPhysicalDeviceSparseImageFormatProperties2KHR.html>"]+    ///+    /// Call [`Self::get_physical_device_sparse_image_format_properties2_len()`] to query the number of elements to pass to `out`.+    /// Be sure to [`Default::default()`]-initialize these elements and optionally set their `p_next` pointer.     pub unsafe fn get_physical_device_sparse_image_format_properties2(         &self,         physical_device: vk::PhysicalDevice,         format_info: &vk::PhysicalDeviceSparseImageFormatInfo2KHR,-        properties: &mut [vk::SparseImageFormatProperties2KHR],+        out: &mut [vk::SparseImageFormatProperties2KHR],     ) {-        let mut count = properties.len() as u32;-        self.get_physical_device_properties2_fn+        let mut count = out.len() as u32;+        self.fp             .get_physical_device_sparse_image_format_properties2_khr(                 physical_device,                 format_info,                 &mut count,-                properties.as_mut_ptr(),+                out.as_mut_ptr(),             );     }-    pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::KhrGetPhysicalDeviceProperties2Fn {-        &self.get_physical_device_properties2_fn+    pub fn name() -> &'static CStr {+        vk::KhrGetPhysicalDeviceProperties2Fn::name()     }-    pub fn instance(&self) -> vk::Instance {-        self.handle+    pub fn fp(&self) -> &vk::KhrGetPhysicalDeviceProperties2Fn {+        &self.fp     } }

After analyzing the provided code diff, I don't find any clear security vulnerabilities being fixed. The changes appear to be primarily structural/refactoring changes rather than security fixes. Here's the analysis:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The changes mainly involve:
   - Renaming `EntryCustom` to `Entry`
   - Simplifying the struct by removing the `handle` field and renaming `get_physical_device_properties2_fn` to `fp`
   - Reorganizing method implementations
   - Adding documentation comments
   - Renaming some parameters (`properties` to `out`, `queue_family_properties` to `out`)

2. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The changes in parameter names and structure don't indicate any security fixes, but rather improved code organization and documentation. The unsafe operations remain the same but are now better documented.

3. Vulnerability Existed: no
   The Vulkan API function calls and their usage patterns remain fundamentally the same, just with different variable names and slightly different organization.

The diff shows code quality improvements and better documentation rather than security fixes. The unsafe blocks remain necessary for FFI with Vulkan but are properly contained and documented.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/third_party/python/taskcluster_taskgraph/taskgraph/transforms/task.py+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/third_party/python/taskcluster_taskgraph/taskgraph/transforms/task.py@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ @transforms.add def check_task_identifiers(config, tasks):     """Ensures that all tasks have well defined identifiers:-    ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,38}$+    ``^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,38}$``     """     e = re.compile("^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,38}$")     for task in tasks:

Analyzing the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
   [Potential Regex Injection] [third_party/python/taskcluster_taskgraph/taskgraph/transforms/task.py] [Lines 1132-1135]  
   [Old Code]  
   ```python
   """Ensures that all tasks have well defined identifiers:
   ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,38}$
   """
   e = re.compile("^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,38}$")
   ```  
   [Fixed Code]  
   ```python
   """Ensures that all tasks have well defined identifiers:
   ``^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,38}$``
   """
   e = re.compile("^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,38}$")
   ```  
   Additional Details: The change appears to be documentation-only (changing the format of the regex pattern in the docstring from unquoted to backtick-quoted). The actual regex compilation remains unchanged. While this doesn't fix any direct vulnerability, proper documentation of regex patterns can help prevent regex injection vulnerabilities by making the expected format clearer to developers.  

Note: No clear security vulnerability was fixed in this diff. The change is primarily documentation formatting. The regex pattern itself appears to be properly escaped and safe.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.name-3.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/fill-and-stroke-styles/2d.fillStyle.parse.invalid.name-3.worker.js@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); ctx.fillStyle = '#0f0'; try { ctx.fillStyle = 'red blue'; } catch (e) { } // this shouldn't throw, but it shouldn't matter here if it does ctx.fillRect(0, 0, 100, 50);-_assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");+_assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255"); t.done(); });

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for security vulnerabilities:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability [File] [Lines 13-14, 20]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(offscreenCanvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
   _assertPixel(canvas, 50,25, 0,255,0,255, "50,25", "0,255,0,255");

Additional Details:
- The changes appear to be purely variable renaming (from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas')
- No security-related changes were made
- The functionality remains identical
- This is likely a code style/consistency improvement rather than a security fix

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/devtools/client/fronts/webconsole.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/devtools/client/fronts/webconsole.js@@ -292,23 +292,6 @@   }   /**-   * Start the given Web Console listeners.-   * TODO: remove once the front is retrieved via getFront, and we use form()-   *-   * @see this.LISTENERS-   * @param array listeners-   *        Array of listeners you want to start. See this.LISTENERS for-   *        known listeners.-   * @return request-   *         Request object that implements both Promise and EventEmitter interfaces-   */-  async startListeners(listeners) {-    const response = await super.startListeners(listeners);-    this.hasNativeConsoleAPI = response.nativeConsoleAPI;-    return response;-  }--  /**    * Close the WebConsoleFront.    *    */

Based on the provided code diff, here's the analysis:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure
[Removed potentially unsafe listener initialization] [devtools/client/fronts/webconsole.js] [Lines 292-306]
[Old Code]
  async startListeners(listeners) {
    const response = await super.startListeners(listeners);
    this.hasNativeConsoleAPI = response.nativeConsoleAPI;
    return response;
  }
[Fixed Code]
[Entire method removed]

Notes:
1. The diff shows removal of the `startListeners` method which was marked with a TODO comment suggesting it should be removed when the front is retrieved via getFront.
2. While this could potentially relate to security (as listener initialization can sometimes be a security surface), there's no clear evidence of a specific vulnerability being fixed.
3. The removal might be part of architectural changes rather than a direct security fix.
4. Without more context about the superclass's `startListeners` implementation or the security implications of the nativeConsoleAPI property, we can't definitively identify a vulnerability.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.nonfinite.worker.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.get.nonfinite.worker.js@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.getImageData(Infinity, 10, 10, 10); }); assert_throws_js(TypeError, function() { ctx.getImageData(-Infinity, 10, 10, 10); });

Analysis of the provided code diff:

1. Vulnerability Existed: no
   No specific vulnerability found [File] [Lines 13-14]
   [Old Code]
   var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
   
   [Fixed Code]
   var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
   var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

The changes appear to be purely variable naming changes (from `offscreenCanvas` to `canvas`) with no security implications. The rest of the test cases remain unchanged, continuing to test for proper handling of non-finite values in the `getImageData` method. No security vulnerabilities are addressed in this diff.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/modules/libjar/nsJARURI.cpp@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@     return NS_OK;   }-  *o_Equals = PL_strcasecmp("jar", i_Scheme) ? false : true;+  *o_Equals = nsCRT::strcasecmp("jar", i_Scheme) == 0;   return NS_OK; }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
[Potential String Comparison Vulnerability] [modules/libjar/nsJARURI.cpp] [Lines 434]  
[Old Code]  
`*o_Equals = PL_strcasecmp("jar", i_Scheme) ? false : true;`  
[Fixed Code]  
`*o_Equals = nsCRT::strcasecmp("jar", i_Scheme) == 0;`  

Additional Details:  
1. The change replaces `PL_strcasecmp` with `nsCRT::strcasecmp` for case-insensitive string comparison.  
2. While this doesn't appear to fix a specific known vulnerability, it could potentially address:  
   - Portability issues (different implementations of case comparison)  
   - Possible null pointer dereference if `i_Scheme` is null (though not clear from context)  
3. The logic is simplified from a ternary operation to a direct equality comparison.  

Note: Without more context about the surrounding code and the purpose of this comparison, it's difficult to determine if this was fixing an actual security vulnerability or just improving code quality/consistency.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/talos/talos/talos-powers/content/TalosPowersContent.js+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/talos/talos/talos-powers/content/TalosPowersContent.js@@ -96,10 +96,10 @@       document.dispatchEvent(event);     },-    goQuitApplication(waitForSafeBrowsing) {+    goQuitApplication(waitForStartupFinished) {       var event = new CustomEvent("TalosPowersGoQuitApplication", {         bubbles: true,-        detail: waitForSafeBrowsing,+        detail: { waitForStartupFinished },       });       document.dispatchEvent(event);     },

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff following the specified format:

Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Parameter Injection Vulnerability [File] [Lines 96-100]  
[Old Code]  
```javascript
goQuitApplication(waitForSafeBrowsing) {
  var event = new CustomEvent("TalosPowersGoQuitApplication", {
    bubbles: true,
    detail: waitForSafeBrowsing,
  });
```  
[Fixed Code]  
```javascript
goQuitApplication(waitForStartupFinished) {
  var event = new CustomEvent("TalosPowersGoQuitApplication", {
    bubbles: true,
    detail: { waitForStartupFinished },
  });
```

Additional Details:
1. The change involves modifying how the parameter is passed in a custom event. The old version directly passed the parameter value as the event detail, while the new version wraps it in an object.
2. This could potentially address a security concern where direct parameter passing might allow injection of malicious values, but without more context about how this event is handled, we can't be certain.
3. The parameter name also changed from `waitForSafeBrowsing` to `waitForStartupFinished`, suggesting a functional change in addition to the structural modification.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-040.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-040.html@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@   <link rel="author" title="Mozilla" href="http://www.mozilla.org/">   <link rel="help" href="https://drafts.csswg.org/css-shapes-1/#supported-basic-shapes">   <link rel="match" href="reference/shape-outside-ellipse-040-ref.html">-  <meta name="flags" content="">   <meta name="assert" content="Test the left float shape defines an empty float area by the basic shape ellipse(0% 0%) value.">   <style>   .container {

Based on the provided diff, I don't see any security vulnerabilities being fixed. The change appears to be a simple removal of an empty meta tag flag. Here's the analysis:

    Vulnerability Existed: no
    No security vulnerability found
    File: testing/web-platform/tests/css/css-shapes/shape-outside/supported-shapes/ellipse/shape-outside-ellipse-040.html
    Old Code: <meta name="flags" content="">
    Fixed Code: (removed line)

This change is purely cosmetic/cleanup rather than a security fix. The empty meta tag was removed but it wasn't posing any security risk.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/xpcom/threads/TimerThread.cpp+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/xpcom/threads/TimerThread.cpp@@ -680,8 +680,10 @@ } // This function must be called from within a lock+// Also: we hold the mutex for the nsTimerImpl. bool TimerThread::AddTimerInternal(nsTimerImpl* aTimer) {   mMonitor.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();+  aTimer->mMutex.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();   if (mShutdown) {     return false;   }@@ -701,8 +703,11 @@   return true; }+// This function must be called from within a lock+// Also: we hold the mutex for the nsTimerImpl. bool TimerThread::RemoveTimerInternal(nsTimerImpl* aTimer) {   mMonitor.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();+  aTimer->mMutex.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();   if (!aTimer || !aTimer->mHolder) {     return false;   }@@ -772,11 +777,16 @@     // with the timer API we'll deadlock.     MonitorAutoUnlock unlock(mMonitor);     rv = target->Dispatch(event, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);-  }--  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {-    timer = event->ForgetTimer();-    RemoveTimerInternal(timer);+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {+      timer = event->ForgetTimer();+      // We do this to avoid possible deadlock by taking the two locks in a+      // different order than is used in RemoveTimer().  RemoveTimer() has+      // aTimer->mMutex first.   We use timer.get() to keep static analysis+      // happy+      MutexAutoLock lock1(timer.get()->mMutex);+      MonitorAutoLock lock2(mMonitor);+      RemoveTimerInternal(timer.get());+    }   } }@@ -818,6 +828,7 @@   return NS_OK; }-uint32_t TimerThread::AllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds() const {+uint32_t TimerThread::AllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds() {+  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);   return mAllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds; }

Here's the analysis of the provided code diff for security fixes:

1. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Race Condition Vulnerability [xpcom/threads/TimerThread.cpp] [Lines 680-703, 772-787]  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
bool TimerThread::AddTimerInternal(nsTimerImpl* aTimer) {
  mMonitor.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();
  if (mShutdown) {
    return false;
  }
```
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
bool TimerThread::AddTimerInternal(nsTimerImpl* aTimer) {
  mMonitor.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();
  aTimer->mMutex.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();
  if (mShutdown) {
    return false;
  }
```

2. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Race Condition Vulnerability [xpcom/threads/TimerThread.cpp] [Lines 701-711]  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
bool TimerThread::RemoveTimerInternal(nsTimerImpl* aTimer) {
  mMonitor.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();
  if (!aTimer || !aTimer->mHolder) {
    return false;
  }
```
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
bool TimerThread::RemoveTimerInternal(nsTimerImpl* aTimer) {
  mMonitor.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();
  aTimer->mMutex.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();
  if (!aTimer || !aTimer->mHolder) {
    return false;
  }
```

3. Vulnerability Existed: yes  
Potential Deadlock Vulnerability [xpcom/threads/TimerThread.cpp] [Lines 772-787]  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
    timer = event->ForgetTimer();
    RemoveTimerInternal(timer);
  }
```
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
      timer = event->ForgetTimer();
      MutexAutoLock lock1(timer.get()->mMutex);
      MonitorAutoLock lock2(mMonitor);
      RemoveTimerInternal(timer.get());
    }
```

4. Vulnerability Existed: not sure  
Potential Race Condition [xpcom/threads/TimerThread.cpp] [Lines 818-830]  
[Old Code]  
```cpp
uint32_t TimerThread::AllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds() const {
  return mAllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds;
}
```
[Fixed Code]  
```cpp
uint32_t TimerThread::AllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds() {
  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
  return mAllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds;
}
```

The main fixes address race conditions and potential deadlocks by:
1. Adding mutex assertions for thread safety in AddTimerInternal and RemoveTimerInternal
2. Fixing lock acquisition order in the failure case of timer dispatch
3. Adding monitor locking for thread-safe access to mAllowedEarlyFiringMicroseconds

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.

--- /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_97_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.object.round.html+++ /root/PatchLeaks-main/products/firefox_downloads/FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/firefox-FIREFOX_RELEASE_98_END/testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.object.round.html@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ }); t.step(function() {-var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);-var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');+var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);+var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d'); var imgdata = ctx.getImageData(0, 0, 10, 10); imgdata.data[0] = 0.499;

Based on the provided diff, I'll analyze it for potential security vulnerabilities:

Vulnerability Existed: no
[Variable Renaming] [testing/web-platform/tests/html/canvas/offscreen/pixel-manipulation/2d.imageData.object.round.html] [Lines 17-18]
[Old Code]
var offscreenCanvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = offscreenCanvas.getContext('2d');
[Fixed Code]
var canvas = new OffscreenCanvas(100, 50);
var ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');

Additional Details:
- This appears to be a simple variable name change from 'offscreenCanvas' to 'canvas'
- No security-related changes are evident in this diff
- The modification seems to be purely for code style/consistency purposes
- The functionality remains exactly the same, just with a different variable name
- No actual security vulnerability is being addressed here

Note: The rest of the file content (including the pixel manipulation part) remains unchanged in this diff, so there's nothing else to analyze regarding security fixes.

If an attacker could control the contents of an iframe sandboxed with <code>allow-popups</code> but not <code>allow-scripts</code>, they were able to craft a link that, when clicked, would lead to JavaScript execution in violation of the sandbox. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 98, Firefox ESR < 91.7, and Thunderbird < 91.7.