Shared security patch analysis results
AI Used: claude_cli haiku--- cache/cp-image-store_1.1.9/cp-image-store.php 2026-01-13 11:24:43.604637213 +0000+++ cache/cp-image-store_1.2.0/cp-image-store.php 2026-01-13 11:24:47.008847423 +0000@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Plugin Name: CP Image Store with Slideshow Plugin URI: http://wordpress.dwbooster.com/content-tools/image-store#download Description: Image Store is an online store for the sale of image files: images, predefined pictures, clipart, drawings, vector images. For payment processing, Image Store uses PayPal, which is the most widely used payment gateway, safe and easy to use.-Version: 1.1.9+Version: 1.2.0 Author: CodePeople Author URI: http://wordpress.dwbooster.com/content-tools/image-store Text Domain: cp-image-store@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ $cpis_layout = array(); // CONST-define( 'CPIS_VERSION', '1.1.9' );+define( 'CPIS_VERSION', '1.2.0' ); define( 'CPIS_PLUGIN_DIR', dirname( __FILE__ ) ); define( 'CPIS_PLUGIN_URL', plugins_url( '', __FILE__ ) ); define( 'CPIS_ADMIN_URL', rtrim( admin_url( get_current_blog_id() ), '/' ) . '/' );@@ -823,7 +823,11 @@ add_filter( 'upload_dir', 'cpis_upload_dir' ); try {- if ( empty( $_POST['cpis_import'] ) || ! ( wp_verify_nonce( sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['cpis_import'] ) ), 'session_id_' . session_id() ) || ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) ) {+ if (+ empty( $_POST['cpis_import'] ) ||+ ! wp_verify_nonce( sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['cpis_import'] ) ), 'session_id_' . session_id() ) ||+ ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' )+ ) { throw new Exception( __( 'You have not sufficient privileges to import images', 'cp-image-store' ) ); } require_once __DIR__ . '/includes/import.php';
I'll analyze the provided code diff for security vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability Existed: no
No Security Vulnerabilities Found - Code Formatting Refactor
Old Code:
```php
if ( empty( $_POST['cpis_import'] ) || ! ( wp_verify_nonce( sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['cpis_import'] ) ), 'session_id_' . session_id() ) || ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) ) {
```
Fixed Code:
```php
if (
empty( $_POST['cpis_import'] ) ||
! wp_verify_nonce( sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_POST['cpis_import'] ) ), 'session_id_' . session_id() ) ||
! current_user_can( 'manage_options' )
) {
```
Explanation:
The diff shows only formatting and version number changes. The main code change reformats a conditional statement for better readability by breaking it into multiple lines. The security logic remains identical:
1. **Nonce verification** - `wp_verify_nonce()` properly validates the CSRF token
2. **Input sanitization** - `sanitize_text_field()` and `wp_unslash()` properly handle the POST parameter
3. **Capability check** - `current_user_can( 'manage_options' )` ensures only administrators can perform the action
4. **Empty check** - Verifies the nonce parameter exists
The refactoring maintains the same security controls without introducing or fixing any vulnerabilities. The logical operators remain unchanged, and the order of checks (nonce verification before capability check) is preserved. This is purely a code style improvement for readability.
The CP Image Store with Slideshow plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.9 due to a logic error in the 'cpis_admin_init' function's permission check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to import arbitrary products via XML, if the XML file has already been uploaded to the server.