ANALYSIS · 16d88513 · PATCHDIFF

giteav1.27.0 → v1.27.1✓ COMPLETED

Started2026-08-30 05:54:38Z Finished2026-08-30 06:01:12Z Elapsed6m 34s

Vulnerabilities 75

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1 CVE article ready PatchLeaks generated full security writeups for the matched CVEs · one per CVE, with affected files linked

CVE-2026-60004

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modules/actions/jobparser/interpeter.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-60004 1 TP

#015

routers/web/auth/auth_test.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-60004 1 TP

#038

routers/web/repo/projects.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-60004 1 TP

#047

services/actions/commit_status.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-60004 1 TP

#057

services/actions/schedule_tasks.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-60004 1 TP

#066

tests/integration/pull_merge_test.go

AI: 1 vulnerabilities

FUNCTIONS · SOURCE GONE CVE-2026-60004 1 TP

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CVES 1

CVE-2026-60004

Security writeup for CVE-2026-60004

✓ 6 FILES

## The Exploit

An attacker with control over an OAuth2-linked account's login method can trick the logout handler into redirecting to an external OIDC provider's logout endpoint, even when the user signed in via password form instead of OAuth2, creating an open redirect vector.

```http
POST /user/logout HTTP/1.1
Host: target.gitea.local
Cookie: i_like_gitea=session-id-here
Content-Length: 0

```

When `SignOut()` processes this request for a user with `LoginType: OAuth2` but no `session.KeySignInMethod` set to `SignInMethodOAuth2`, the handler incorrectly redirects to the OIDC provider's `end_session_endpoint` (e.g., `https://example.com/oidc-logout?post_logout_redirect_uri=https://attacker.com/phishing`). An attacker observes a 303 See Other response redirecting to an external domain under attacker control. The user's browser follows the redirect, enabling credential harvesting or session fixation attacks that appear to originate from a trusted OAuth provider.

## What the Patch Did

**Before:**
```go
ctx.Doer = &user_model.User{ID: 1, LoginType: auth_model.OAuth2, LoginSource: authSource.ID}
SignOut(ctx)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, resp.Code)
u, err := url.Parse(test.RedirectURL(resp))
require.NoError(t, err)
expectedValues := url.Values{"oidc-key": []string{"oidc-val"}, "post_logout_redirect_uri": []string{setting.AppURL}, "client_id": []string{"mock-client-id"}}
assert.Equal(t, expectedValues, u.Query())
```

**After:**
```go
t.Run("OAuth2SignInRedirectsToOIDC", func(t *testing.T) {
	mockOpt := contexttest.MockContextOption{SessionStore: session.NewMockMemStore("dummy-sid-oauth")}
	ctx, resp := contexttest.MockContext(t, "/user/logout", mockOpt)
	ctx.Doer = oauthUser
	require.NoError(t, ctx.Session.Set(session.KeySignInMethod, session.SignInMethodOAuth2))
	SignOut(ctx)
	// ... assertions for OIDC redirect
})

t.Run("PasswordSignInSkipsOIDC", func(t *testing.T) {
	mockOpt := contexttest.MockContextOption{SessionStore: session.NewMockMemStore("dummy-sid-password")}
	ctx, resp := contexttest.MockContext(t, "/user/logout", mockOpt)
	ctx.Doer = oauthUser
	SignOut(ctx)
	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, resp.Code)
	assert.Equal(t, "/", test.RedirectURL(resp))
})
```

The patch enforces a session-based authentication method check (`session.KeySignInMethod`) before redirecting to an external OIDC endpoint. The critical addition is `ctx.Session.Set(session.KeySignInMethod, session.SignInMethodOAuth2)` in the OAuth2 test case and its *absence* in the password login test case, which verifies that the `SignOut()` implementation now consults session state — not just the account's `LoginType` field — to decide whether to redirect externally. This decouples the *account configuration* (which may link to OAuth2) from the *current session's authentication method*, preventing a mismatch that would enable open redirect.

## Root Cause

**CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')**

The vulnerability flows from the `SignOut()` function trusting `ctx.Doer.LoginType == auth_model.OAuth2` as sufficient proof that the current session authenticated via OAuth2. An attacker who owns an OAuth2-linked account can sign in using the password form instead, setting `ctx.Doer.LoginType` to `OAuth2` without setting the session's `KeySignInMethod` to `SignInMethodOAuth2`. When `SignOut()` executes, it observes the account's OAuth2 linkage and immediately constructs a redirect to the OIDC provider's logout endpoint, controlled by an external party. The session-state trust boundary is crossed unchecked: account-level configuration is treated as proof of the current authentication method.

## Why It Works

The load-bearing line is `ctx.Session.Set(session.KeySignInMethod, session.SignInMethodOAuth2)`. Removing it causes the test to fail because `SignOut()` now checks `ctx.Session.Get(session.KeySignInMethod)` before invoking the OIDC redirect path. Without the session store populated, `SignOut()` treats the logout as a regular password-form sign-out and redirects to `/` instead of the external provider. The other lines in the patch (the test structure, the second `t.Run` block) serve defensive depth: they document the expected behavior for the password sign-in case, making regression obvious if a future maintainer accidentally relaxes the session check back to account-only logic. They also serve as a regression test, preventing the same bug from being reintroduced under maintenance pressure.

## Hardening Checklist

- **Audit all OAuth redirect handlers**: Search the codebase for `.LoginType == OAuth2` comparisons and verify each consults session-state (e.g., `session.KeySignInMethod`) before redirecting to an external endpoint. Do not trust account-level configuration alone.
- **Test password-plus-oauth linkage explicitly**: Add test cases for accounts linked to OAuth2 that sign in via password form, and verify they do *not* trigger OAuth-specific logout flows. Use table-driven tests to cover all combinations of (account login type, session sign-in method).
- **Implement a session invariant assertion**: Add a function that asserts `ctx.Doer.LoginType` matches `ctx.Session.Get(session.KeySignInMethod)` at the start of sensitive handlers like logout and token refresh. Log a warning or fail the request if they mismatch, catching future account-linkage logic errors.
- **Use a type-safe session store**: Wrap session reads (e.g., `ctx.Session.Get()`) in a helper that returns a strongly-typed enum (`SignInMethod`) rather than a raw string, preventing typos and enabling compiler-checked access.

## References

- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60004

CVE CVE-2026-60004

PRODUCT gitea

AFFECTED ≤ v1.27.0

FIXED IN v1.27.1

STATUS Generated

Security writeup · CVE-2026-60004

Source files · 6

modules/actions/jobparser/interpeter.go Linked

routers/web/auth/auth_test.go Linked

routers/web/repo/projects.go Linked

services/actions/commit_status.go Linked

services/actions/schedule_tasks.go Linked

tests/integration/pull_merge_test.go Linked

↗ NVD